# UCLA HISTORICAL JOURNAL

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# *Call for papers:*

# *Special Issue: women and gender*

***The UCLA Historical Journal*** is seeking articles and book reviews for a special issue on women and gender to be published in the fall of 1994. The *Journal* is dedicated to publishing quality work by graduate students in history and welcomes interdisciplinary approaches to historical studies.

Please submit manuscripts in triplicate accompanied by a self-addressed, stamped envelope **no later than March 1, 1994,** to Editor-in-chief, *UCLA Historical Journal*, Dept. of History, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA 90024. All submitted work should be double-spaced, including footnotes. For questions of style, consult the University of Chicago *Manual of Style* or Kate Turabian *A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses and Dissertations.* Manuscripts, including footnotes, should be no more than 40 pages in length. Because submissions are evaluated anonymously, the author's name should appear only on the title page.

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## Acknowledgments

It is with great pleasure that I present the thirteenth volume of the *UCLA Historical Journal.*

The articles in this issue of the *Journal* represent some of the most exciting work being done by history graduate students in the United States. Norbert Scholz's article on Arab nationalism provides fascinating insight into the contemporary political situation in the Middle East by examining the historical construction of a specifically Arab cultural identity. Through the use of oral history and alumni records, David Diepenbrock reconstructs life at Oberlin College for its first African-American women graduates during the painful period of Jim Crow. John Van Sant's linguistic analysis of Japan's post-World War II Constitution sheds new light on the relationship between Japan and the United States. Mary Thurlkill demonstrates how two biographers of an Irish saint changed the narrative of the saint's life over time in order to serve as a commentary on contemporary Irish political and religious debates.

The "Notes and Documents" section provides a forum for publishing articles by *Journal* members (who are ineligible for article publication). My article on the exhibition of native peoples utilizes Michel Foucault's concept of the prison system as a metaphor for understanding the ways in which native peoples were represented in the United States at the turn of the century.

I would like to thank the other members of the editorial board, Lisa Sousa and Damon Woods, for their tireless efforts on behalf of the *Journal* this year. In addition, I would like to thank Holly Brewer, Robinson Herrera, Kevin McBride-Luman, Marian McBride-Luman, Brian O'Neil, Becky Mead and Carolyn Eichner.

Finally, on behalf of the *Journal* I would like to express our sincere appreciation to Professor Ron Mellor, Chair of the UCLA History Department, and Kevin Terraciano, director of UCLA Graduate Student Publications. Professor Mellor has provided invaluable support and assistance to the *Journal* during the past year. Prior to his appointment as director of Graduate Student Publications, Kevin was a devoted staff member of the *Journal* and served in many editorial board positions including editor-in-chief. Although his appointment as director prevents him from belonging

to the *Journal* in a formal capacity, Kevin has continued to give indispensable advice and guidance .

A special word of thanks to Sonja Jekich for her energy, inspiration and intense commitment to bettering the *Journal*.

We are looking forward to our next volume of the *Journal* which will be a special issue devoted to historical studies on women and gender.

Jo Ann Woodsum

# Toward a New Understanding of Arab Nationalism: Ethnic Survival in Non-Ethnic States

Norbert J. Scholz*

## Introduction

Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Western scholars have discredited the study of Arab nationalism. In his essay on "The End of Pan-Arabism",[1] Fouad Ajami officially proclaimed the death of this seemingly outdated paradigm. During the era of the Cold War, Western observers of the Middle East emphasized the secular aspects of Arab nationalism and its susceptibility to Communism. After the rise of an Islamic government in Iran, however, they shifted their attention to the study of the "Islamic dimensions" of Arab societies.[2] The events following Khomeini's seizure of power in Iran seemed to justify this trend. The assassination of Anwar al-Sadat by Islamic fundamentalists in 1981, the outbreak of civil wars in Lebanon and Sudan along confessional lines, the unprecedented electoral success of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria (1992), the increasing assertiveness of fundamentalists in Egypt, and the rise of the populist Hamas as a challenge to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in the Occupied Territories, all demonstrate that a revitalized (or rather repoliticized) Islam poses a severe threat to the stability of the Middle Eastern social and political order.

Initially the United States only feared for the security of its oil supply and the well-being of its historic ally, Israel. At the same time, Western European states envisaged the invasion of fundamentalist hordes aimed at Europe's "soft underbelly" in Italy and Spain.[3] However, the evaporation of the Cold War also globalized the Western perception of a growing Islamic threat. In Western Europe, notably in France and Germany, a surge of xenophobia has been directed primarily against the Muslim

population of these countries. In the United States the perception of a global Islamic conspiracy has replaced the former perceived communist threat. The 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City reinforced this perception. The influential Samuel Huntington has even conjured up nineteenth century notions of the clash of civilizations, Islam and the West (once again!) fighting a battle of life and death.[4]

The rhetoric of the Arab-Israeli conflict also mirrors these changes. No longer can Israel derive its *raison d'etre* from being the staunchest ally of the United States against Communist expansionism in the Middle East. In order to remain indispensable to the United States, and thus not to interrupt the multi-billion dollar cash-flow from the time of the Cold War, the Jewish state now prefers to present itself as a bastion of liberalism and moderation "against murderous Islamic terror [which is] meant to awaken the world which is lying in slumber."[5] Like the West, Israel has created for itself a new enemy. The "Islamic terrorists" of Hamas has surreptitiously replaced the former "terrorist organization" of the PLO as the country's chief foe. The Israeli Labor party's willingness to strike a deal with the PLO is directly related to the party's attacks on the fundamentalists.

Still, in the Middle East the debate on the viability of Arab nationalism carries on. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991, numerous Middle Eastern leaders called for an "Arab Solution" to the crisis.[6] Whereas Western scholars continue to re-bury Arab nationalism,[7] many Arab scholars continue to point out that behind the facade of fragmentation, "the Arab nation remains true to itself - loyal to its past achievements, conscious of its present needs, and [...] on the brink of a new surge forward".[8] The Arab world, they argue, remains united by virtue of its common language, religion, history, and ancestry.[9] If the Arab world remains fragmented in spite of these ties, in the opinion of such scholars, it is the result of the malicious plotting of foreign interests to maintain the division of the Arabs in order to avoid having to confront one powerful, unified Arab nation. This theory, however, does not explain why so far all attempts at establishing even minimal unity among the Arab states either ended in failure (like the United Arab Republic) or proved to be highly inefficient (the Arab League).

The conceptual confusion that obfuscates the discussion of Arab unity and disunity stems from the fact that there never has

been a coherent theory of Arab nationalism. Scholars either emphasize a number of the above mentioned elements of Arab nationalism without showing their interrelation, or they simply blur the difference between Arab nationalism as an historical movement, and Arab nationalism as a political ideology. An early bibliography on the topic elucidates this lack of conceptual elaboration when it associates Arab nationalism concurrently with Arab Unity, Islam, Communism, separatism, party movements, and Nasserism.[10] In the meantime, scholarship on Arab nationalism has contributed relatively little to solve these shortcomings.

The study of Arab nationalism has been characterized by its compartmentalization along linguistic and national lines.[11] While there have been numerous case studies on the emergence of Arab nationalism as an historical movement,[12] scholars have spent little effort understanding the ideological and cultural aspects of the phenomenon.[13] One of the more fruitful attempts so far to theoretically come to terms with Arab nationalism as a political ideology has been Bassam Tibi's application of the concept of acculturation.[14] In order to fully understand the phenomenon it is necessary to go beyond confined regional studies, and leave behind ahistorical sociological explanations. Instead of elaborating solely on the internal aspects of the ideology of Arab nationalism, its specific conjunctural conditions as a historical process must be examined.[15]

Unfortunately the vast majority of scholars on Arab nationalism narrow-mindedly only deal with what has been published in the field of Middle Eastern studies and obsequiously build on and reshuffle elements that once percolated from now obsolete scientific paradigms. Not infrequently it takes scholars of the Middle East decades to adopt and synthesize research done outside their regional field of specialization.[16] On the other hand, innovative studies on nationalism deal with the Middle East only in the most superficial manner.[17]

What is needed is a redefinition of Arab nationalism that is broad enough to encompass all the different approaches which explains Arab nationalism in terms of language, religion, and ancestry. Moreover, it has to show how these elements were transported through space and time. Finally it should explain why—in spite of the de facto annihilation of the Arab Nation by European colonial-

ism—the idea of being a member of the Arab Nation still occupies an important place in the minds of a large number of Arabs.

I will argue that the paradigm shift from Arab nationalism to the study of Islamic fundamentalism conjures up a false dichotomy between Islamic loyalties on the one hand and Arab affiliations on the other. These approaches did not "function as mutually antagonistic, distinct political paradigms."[18] Both were and are the political expressions of the desire to maintain the integrity of the Arab *ethnie*, the imagined community of those who by virtue of their language, history, religion, and interests claim to share certain values and beliefs.

This imagined community has its roots in the days of the early Islamic empires. In spite of internal and external threats, the Arab ethnie managed to maintain its identity until the emergence of imperialism in the region. When the members of the Arab ethnie saw that outside forces (the Young Turks and the Europeans) tried to eliminate the identity of this community by attacking their values and beliefs, they developed a strategy of ethnic survival. By systematically emphasizing and politicizing their difference as opposed to other ethnies, they resorted to *ethnonationalism*.[19] Although a modern state system, imposed by the colonial powers, fragmented the territorial affiliations of the members of the Arab ethnie, their pre-national ethnic loyalty lives on. This is why Arab nationalism as the politicized expression of ethnic affiliation remains an important factor in present day politics. By emphasizing the attitudinal aspects of Arab nationalism rather than its institutional structures, I will try to understand Arab nationalists in their own terms. The point of my argument is not that there is an essential difference between Eastern and Western conceptions of nationhood. The decisive factor is the sense of ethnic cohesion which, as the recent developments in the former Yugoslavia have blatantly shown, is as much a European as it is a Middle Eastern phenomenon. In the Middle East, Arab-Islamic fundamentalism *and* Arab nationalism are two different manifestations of the desire to ensure ethnic survival.

## Ethnonationalism

An ethnie does not exist in and of itself but is defined in relation to other ethnies with different beliefs and value systems. As a named human population with shared ancestry myths, history and culture, an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity,[20] it requires both the development of a certain nostalgia after the sedentarization of the population, as well as an organized religion to survive. The trauma of the transition from nomadism to sedentarization entails a yearning and glorification of the "lost past", which in turn gives rise to the development of shared customs and habits. The institutionalization of religious practices facilitates the diffusion and universalization of these shared values.

The ethnie is the connecting link between the collective cultural units of former times and modern nations. Centered on the quartet of myths, memories, values, and symbols, it provides form and identity to a certain number of people. As media of communication, these myths, memories, values, and symbols give cohesion to an ethnie, bridging contradictory group and class interests. Over time, different myths amalgamate into a *mythomoteur*, the constitutive myth of an ethnie.[21] In modern nations as in classical ethnies "myths mingle factual observations and generalizations with dramatic narrative, and [...] relate past events to present and/or future purposes."[22]

Ethnies are in continuous competition with exogenous forces, at times amalgamating, at times surrendering certain elements of identity. On the basis of the principle of uniqueness and exclusion, ethnicism becomes an autonomous "collective movement, whose activities and efforts are aimed at resisting perceived threats from outside and corrosion within, at renewing a community's forms and traditions, and at reintegrating a community's members and strata which have become dangerously divided by conflicting pressures."[23]

Apart from geo-political and demographic factors, religion becomes the pivotal force of ensuring ethnic survival. When religion embraces both ethnic forms and traditions as well as ethnic contents and traits, a modification of the latter may be rationalized with the necessity of maintaining the former in order not to endanger ethnic identity. Hence the threat of secularization appears to be tantamount to an attack on ethnic identity.

When does an ethnie become a nation? The nation is the last step in a process in which certain shared beliefs of a group of people are transformed into a national sentiment. Once they become institutionalized by political movements into nationalist ideologies, these sentiments contribute to the creation of a national myth, which is essential for the viability of any nation.[24] In the West the transformation from ethnie to nation was relatively successful, establishing new foci of loyalty, and a "civil religion" based on economy, law, and education. In the non-Western world the colonial experience resulted in a different development. Here, in reaction to colonialism, ethnic features became politicized; the "civil religion" of the Western territorial nation has its parallel in "a kind of missionary nativism, a belief in the redemptive quality and unique inwardness of the ethnic nation."[25] It is at the interstices of ethnie and nation where nationalism becomes a politically powerful force.

It has become obvious that nation-building requires the adaptation of ethnic myths to new realities. The politicization of an ethnie in its step toward nationhood involves the triple movement "from isolation to activism, from quietism to mobilization, and from culture to politics."[26] Contact with the national myths of already existing nations transforms ethnic sentiment into nationalist sentiment among intellectual strata. In their attempt to transform the ethnic myth into a nationalist myth, they become the "new priesthood of the nation."[27] The principle of inclusion requires a reformulation of ethnicity. In order to emphasize and disperse the ethnic-national sentiment, myths of origin and descent have to be activated. If they do not exist, they have to be invented. In the hands of these intellectuals, "'history' becomes the focal point of nationalism and nation-formation. The 'rediscovery' or 'invention' of history is no longer a scholarly pastime; it is a matter of national honour and collective endeavor."[28]

It does not matter whether history and mythologies of nationalist intellectuals are fabrications or based on real events. All they do is to draw on and reshuffle "traditional, perhaps unanalysed, motifs and myths taken from epics, chronicles, documents of the period, and material artifacts."[29] Moreover, in their attempt to refurbish and romanticize the ethnie's past, they spare no effort to utilize the latest discoveries in all fields of science.

Once activated, ethnic-national myths can create their own reality. On the one hand, they contribute to the infusion of meaning

into an otherwise anarchic environment. The ethnie-nation-to-be develops a special identity on the base of pre-existing but modified myth-symbol complexes. On the other, "ethnic nationalisms generate their own ritual and sacred practices, their feasts and celebrations, monuments and memorials, parades and pilgrimages, which commemorate and extol critical moments and exemplary persons in the life-story of the nation."[30]

The above analysis makes it clear that nationalism is more than an institutionalized political ideology. It is rooted in a particular cultural tradition that builds on the mythology and symbolism of the respective ethnie. By projecting them into the political arena, nationalism universalizes ethnic sentiments. This universalism, in turn, accounts for the possibility of fusing them with newfangled political ideologies, among them the European conception of the territorial state. In that sense, ethnonationalism is neither completely modern nor entirely traditional, but can assume the form of a political ideology in the process of nation-building.

To a large extent, the inability to perceive the historical continuity between nation and ethnie, as well as the close link between nationalism and ethnicism accounts for the undeveloped state of studies in nationalism. Of course it is necessary that one conceptualize the coexistence of these elements in concrete case studies. To acknowledge the significance of ethnicity for nationalist movements, however, seems to be a useful tool for better understanding of the way nationalism has an impact on the action of the individuals concerned.[31]

## The Mythomoteurs of the Arab Ethnie

The idea of an Arab ethnie long precedes the post-Word War I liberation struggle of the territorial states in the Middle East. European colonialists were well aware that they were dealing with a community that had, over several centuries, developed a strong sense of identity. Whereas in sub-Saharan Africa colonialists used sheer violence to subdue what they considered racially inferior people, in the Middle East they resorted to different strategies. Their knowledge of the "Golden Age of Islam", their close ties with the Oriental Christians, and the military prowess of the Ottoman Empire made them challenge the Middle East on

cultural, political, and economic grounds.[32] They hoped to gain control of the area not so much by direct military occupation but by promoting their Christian allies, by softening the Arab-Islamic resistance to the West through missionaries as well as economic and political advisors to local rulers, and by encouraging the spread of secessionist ideas based on the principle of the territorial nation state.[33]

What was it that gave this sense of cohesion to the Arabs? Like any ethnie, their identity rested on a set of constitutive myths, which became politicized when they were challenged from outside the community. For generations, Orientalist scholars who wrote on Arab nationalism have dwelt on the significance of Islam for national independence. Islam unlike Christianity, they argue, is both a religious and a social ideology. Therefore Arab nationalists by definition have to deal with Islam. As a result they tend to label Arab nationalists either as secular or as religious.[34] This dichotomy, however, is misleading since it cannot explain why many nationalists oscillated between local nationalism, Pan-Ottomanism, and Pan-Islamism. Nor does it present any convincing solution for why Muslim and Christian nationalists were interested in working toward the same goal, the establishment of an Arab nation. Pragmatism and opportunism alone are insufficient motives.[35]

We can avoid these shortcomings by acknowledging that Islam is only one of the mythomoteurs that are essential for the identity of the Arab ethnie. Western scholars tend to overlook that there is another myth-symbol complex on which Arab identity rests. This second mythomoteur is *`Urubah* (Arabism), "the essence of the person who is an Arab."[36] Both Islam and `Urubah are necessary to ensure the survival of the Arab ethnie. Although political conditions at times make it necessary to emphasize one over the other, the abandoning of either one over a long period of time will lead to its members' alienation and the final dissolution of the Arab ethnie. Secularization, therefore, inevitably leads to *ethnocide*.

Even though they are not the same, there is a close interrelationship between these two mythomoteurs. Both have as their foundation the language, literature, fairs, and spiritual activities of the peoples who were affected by the Islamic conquests.[37] In

addition, both serve as powerful legitimizing myths in the political discourse of Arab-Islamic rulers.

There are, however, significant differences. `Urubah existed before the rise of Islam. One school of Arabist theory maintains that since time immemorial there had existed an "Arab stream of being" on the Arabian Peninsula. Unexplainable and unalterable, this "Arab stream of being" has its own logic, its own 'mind'.[38] `Urubah is its soul, its 'pneuma'. It is the reflection of divinity on earth. It percolated into the consciousness of the inhabitants of the area, and enabled them to formulate their identity when it became institutionalized in the religions of Judaism and Christianity.

> `Urubah reflects all the values present in the consciousness of the living, but equally in that of all past generations of humans who participated to any degree in the Arab stream of being. `Urubah is as much the spirit of Imru'ul Qays and Samaw'al, of Moses, Abraham and Jesus, of Cerinthus, Marcion and Justin Martyr, of Hunayn ibn Ishaq and Yahya ibn `Adiyy, as it is that of Malik Shafi'i and Abu Hanifah.[39]

Only when Jews and Christians could no longer fulfill the expectations divinity had set in them did Islam become the main medium for `Urubah.

Unlike `Urubah Islam had a start in history. Islam provided `Urubah with the means to spread to new territories. It provided `Urubah with a body of customs and rituals, with a language and with a script. With the rise of an Islamic Empire, Islam and `Urubah entered a symbiosis without ever becoming one and the same. Frequently, Islamization and Arabization did not coincide. Members of different ethnies who did not want to abandon their ethnic identity became Islamized (Persians, Turks), whereas members of the Arab ethnie adhered to their former beliefs (Jews, Christians). Even though the Arabs became part of larger multiethnic Islamic empires, they were able to maintain their identity as an ethnie, because Islam to a large extent utilizes the same myths and symbols which constitute the Arab ethnie. After the rise of Islam the Arabic language became associated with the transmission of God's word in the *qur'an*; the previous religions of

the Arab ethnie, Judaism and Christianity, were reinterpreted as leading toward the emergence of Islam; history was reinterpreted as *jahiliyyah* (the "age of ignorance") and post-jahiliyyah; and descendence of the Prophet Muhammad became more important than descendence from Qahtan or `Adnan.[40]

## Ethnic Survival in Non-Ethnic States

The history of the Arab ethnie is one of constant alienation. Before Islam its ethnic consciousness had been weak. Without a unifying political framework it consisted of congeries of tribes and merchant towns on the Arabian peninsula. The sedentarization of Arab tribes in Petra, Palmyra and Kinda, as well as the monotheism of the Ghassanids and the Lakhmids had already foreshadowed the possibility of ethnic unification when Muhammad developed the institutional framework for an Arab state. When he proclaimed the establishment of the *'ummah*, the Muslim community, with the qur'an and the *sunnah* as its constitution, the stage was set for territorial expansion.

After the Shi`i opposition had been largely confined to the neighboring Persian ethnie, the `Umayads (661-750) embarked on the Arabization of the conquered territories. It was inconceivable to be Muslim without being an Arab, and the only way of becoming Muslim was by association with an Arab tribe, thereby obtaining the status of *mawali*.[41] Authority positions were in Arab hands but territorial expansion increasingly integrated different ethnies into the empire. However, when mawali could no longer be successfully Arabized, they slowly penetrated into positions of political and economic power. What had started out as an ethnic Arab empire collapsed under the burden of ethnic inclusion and gave way to the non-ethnic Islamic empire of the `Abbasids. About fifty years after the Arab ethnie was unified it ran the risk of losing its identity in a multi-ethnic religious state. This did not happen because the Umayyad state was based on the double mythomoteur of `Urubah and Islam.

The revolt against the Umayyads had ethnic origins: the disadvantaged mawali in the agricultural regions in the periphery of the empire and the cosmopolitan class of merchants, writers and *`ulama'* battled the unproductive Arab warrior class of the Umayyad rulers. The revolt originated in the Shi`i dominated

territories of the Persian ethnie, and soon gained the support of the non-Arab element under Umayyad rule. When the Abbasid dynasty assumed power in 750, they replaced the tribal structure of the Umayyad empire with the cosmopolitan principles based on Islamic universalism. For a short time the former tensions between Arabs and mawali disappeared. Non-Arabs participated in exercising political power, and the principle of building the army on tribal foundations was abandoned.

From the ninth to the eleventh centuries the Persian influence became stronger. During this time the class of state secretaries (*kuttab*) expanded and became the foundation of the administration. They began emphasizing their ethnic Persian heritage, translating Persian literature into Arabic thereby belittling the historical continuity of the Arab ethnie. The Arab-Persian controversy also was reflected in the struggle for succession to Caliph. In 811 Ma'mun, governor of the Persian provinces, deposed Amin from the Caliphate with the help of his Shi`i supporters. He designated the Shi`i Ali al-Radi as his successor, but as soon as he felt that his power was secure he reverted to his ethnic origin. Ali al-Radi was assassinated and the Caliphate once more was in Arab hands.

In the Persian provinces the Persian ethnie soon asserted its independence. In 945 the Persian Buwayhids, the successor dynasty of the Persian Tahirids, and later the Safavids and the Samanids, invaded Baghdad and took the Caliph hostage. Ethnicity also served to express social discontent. The Persian Ali Ibn Muhammad was responsible for inciting the social revolts of the Zanj, Black slaves in the salt swamps of Basrah, between 869-883. After their conquest of Egypt (969) the Shi`i Fatimid dynasty remained a potential danger for the Arab ethnie.

The cohesion of the Arab ethnie came under attack from another side. The second Caliph, al-Mansur (754-775) had recruited Turkish (Mamluk) soldiers. Only when al-Mu`tasim (833-842) recruited them *en masse* in order to curb the growing Persian influence did they assert their ethnic independence. Early in the eleventh century the Mamluk Alptigin founded the Ghaznavid dynasty on the Persian provinces. At the same time the Seljuq Turks, nomads of the Kirgisian steppe, conquered Baghdad (1055), and occupied Fatimid Egypt and Syria.

During this time the Arab ethnie was condemned to cultural and political insignificance. Since the Mongol period (1258-1517) in the East, and the Mamluk reign in Egypt and Syria (1250-1517) Shi`i and Sunni Islam were the only legitimizing ideologies that kept the multi-ethnic empire together. This pattern did not change after the Ottomans conquered Istanbul (1453) and put an end to Mamluk rule in Syria and Egypt (1516-17). They simply replaced the Seljuq and Mamluk ruling elites with members of their own ethnie, replenished their military elite from the conquered peoples of the Balkans, and diffused any tendency toward ethnic self-assertion by the institution of the *millet* system based on religious affiliation. "Assuming the cosmopolitanism and the ethnic indifference of the `Abbasids, the Ottomans found an a-national empire *par excellence*, where Islamic laws and courts have universal authority and where, no matter of their ethnic affiliations, the peoples are equally linked to the sultan by the bond of Islam, communicating in the same essentially religious solidarity."[42]

Unlike the previous Islamic empires, the Ottomans were not able to suppress the ethnic identity of the Arabs much longer. This was the result of three forces. In part it was due to the fact that they replaced Arabic with Turkish as the official language of the empire. For the Arab ethnie this was another attack on its identity. In part it reflected the distribution of power. After the pinnacle of Ottoman power under Süleyman I (1520-66), the Turkish elite lost its leading position to their military elite, the Janissary *aghas*. Finally, the Empire began to feel the military power of Europe. The process, which had been underway since the Empire had granted the Europeans political and economic privileges in the Capitulations, was accentuated by a series of defeats after the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699). The Ottoman Empire came under the crossfire of European differences. Under Selim III (1789-1807) the Empire opened itself to Europe. The reforms in the wake of the *khatt-i sherif* of Gülkhane (1839) and the *khatt-i hümayun* (1856) prepared the path for imperialist European countries to gain complete control over the Empire. When after World War I the imperialist countries of Europe no longer needed the integrity of the Ottoman Empire as a buffer against one another, they divided it along territorial lines. Neither Islamic nor ethnic affiliations were

preserved in the territorial states that gained independence after World War II.

What did this process mean for the Arab ethnie? Whereas Arab identity (although alienated) had been preserved under the `Abbasid and Ottoman Caliphate by virtue of its mythomoteur Islam, European imperialism resulted in a double alienation: Ottoman Europeanization attempts were an immediate threat to Islam. In 1850 the Ottomans adapted French law for their Commercial Code as they did for the 1858 Penal Code. In the field of education the Imperial Rescript of 1846 suggested the parallel establishment of a modern educational system alongside the traditional Islamic schools. The government rather than the Islamic clergy would from now on supervise education.

In the provinces imperialism asserted itself more forcefully in its attempt to challenge the Arab ethnie. Here the Europeans did not confront the relatively strong centralized forces of the Empire directly. In their struggle for greater autonomy from the Ottomans, local potentates had already carved out their own pockets of autonomy, facilitating European economic and military intervention. On the one hand, Western capital flowed into the peripheral areas of the empire, leading (amongst other things) to the state bankruptcy of Egypt (1875) and its effective occupation and colonialization by Britain (1882). On the other hand, the European powers intervened against the centrifugal tendencies in the province in favor of the Ottoman central state (in order to prevent their respective competitors from gaining the upper hand).

Whereas the French exercised direct imperial control of most of the North African territories, in the East great power competition resulted in cultural penetration. European influence became most acute in the region of Greater Syria. In Lebanon European merchants helped to create a new middle class from among the Christian notables by favoring them over their Muslim counterparts. At the same time when the French military occupied Algeria (1830), American, British and French missionaries were becoming active among the Syrian-Lebanese Christians, breaking up the century-old peaceful cohabitation of different religious communities by redefining ethnic identity in terms of religion. Perhaps the most blatant attack on the Arab ethnie was the European interventions in Lebanon. After the bloody revolts between Christians and Druzes during the 1840s and 1850s, the European powers agreed with the

Ottomans on military intervention in favor of the beleaguered Christians. The outcome of this venture, the *Règlement Organique* of 1864, assigned a fixed number of Christians, Muslims, and Druzes to the administration of the province.

More important than the fact that these arrangements were imposed on the Ottoman Empire is that they divided Arab territory along confessional lines. Christians and Muslims were granted equal representation regardless of ethnic affiliation. By this measure the European powers hoped to perpetuate the Ottoman administrative principle of millets which for centuries had kept the various minorities in check. They overlooked the fact that they did not possess the Islamic legitimacy of the Ottomans rulers. Taken together with secular Westernization, confessionalism implemented by non-Muslims now assumed a new meaning for the Arabs. It constituted an immediate threat on the second mythomoteur of the Arab ethnie.

In order to escape ethnocide, the Arabs revitalized their other mythomoteur, `Urubah. In Egypt where Muhammad Ali's modernization had made the most progress, al-Barudi (d. 1904), Shawqi (d. 1932), al-Tahtawi (d. 1873), `Ali Mubarak (d. 1893), and Muhammad `Abduh (d. 1905) tried to rejuvenate the Arabic language. Butrus al-Bustani (d. 1883), Ahmad Faris al-Shidyaq (d. 1887), Husayn al-Marsafi (d. 1890) and others appealed to the noble past of the Arabs, which, as soon as it was purged of all obsolete elements would once again enable them to rise to their previous grandeur. In Syria a number of cultural societies were founded. The Society of Refinement (*Jam`iyah al-tadhib*, founded 1845-6), the Oriental Society (*al-Jam`iyyah al-sharqiyyah*, f. 1850), the Syrian Society (*al-Jam`iyyah al-suriyyah*, 1847-52), and the Literary Authority (*al-`Umdah al-adabiyya*), to mention but a few, promoted literary revival and the development of strong ties to the Arab nation.

In the peripheral regions of the Empire, the notion that Islam had been corrupted under Ottoman rule emerged. The Wahhabi movement in the Arabian Peninsula and the Sanusiyyah in North Africa demanded the return to a pure Islam (Salafiyyah). The Ottoman Sultan `Abdülhamid recognized the rising assertiveness of the Arab ethnie and tried to counteract possible unrest by emphasizing the significance of Islam. Not only did the Sultan emphasize the importance of the Ottoman caliphate, he

also made it clear that the territorial integrity of the Empire was the precondition for the preservation of this element of Arab identity.

It is therefore not surprising that many Islamic reformists at that time advocated the rejuvenation of Islam *and* Arabic within the institutional framework of the Ottoman Empire. In the opinion of al-Zahrawi, Rafiq al-`Azm, and Shakib Arslan the interests of the Arab ethnie were safer under Ottoman domination than under the rule of the European imperial powers. For them existence in a non-ethnic state was preferable to the double alienation under European control.

Things changed when the Young Turks came to power (1909). Their attempts to Turkify the different ethnies of the Empire was intolerable for the Arabs. Their joint opposition to the Young Turks' attack gave the Arab ethnie a degree of cohesion it had never had before. A number of secret and expatriate societies such as the Society for Arab-Ottoman Brotherhood (*Jam`iyyah al-ikha' al-`arabi al-`uthmani*), the *Qahtaniyyah*, the Young Arab Society (*al-Jam`iyyah al-`arabiyyah al-fatat*), and the Decentralization Party demanded greater freedoms for the Arabs under the umbrella of the Ottoman Empire. And the majority of nationalist thinkers like al-Qasimi (d. 1916), al-`Uraysi (d. 1916), or `Umar Fakhuri (d. 1946) wanted to maintain the integrity of the Empire only if the Arabs were allowed to keep their ethnic identity. Of course there were those who proposed the creation of an independent Arab kingdom. At least for the time being, these voices, which had their chief proponent in the Lebanese Maronite Najib Azuri, were in the minority. As long as the umbrella of the Ottoman Empire was still intact, most supporters of the Arab ethnie believed that they could somehow arrange a compromise.

More and more it became obvious that the unity of the Empire would not last much longer. When Turkey entered the First World War on the side of the axis powers, the Arabs under the leadership of Sharif Husayn revolted (1916). In this context it is relatively unimportant that the Arab Revolt was sponsored by the British, and primarily served British imperial interests in the region. What mattered was that McMahon promised the Arabs their own state, one that would ensure the integrity of their ethnie.

The betrayal of the Arabs in the Sykes-Picot agreement (1916) and the subsequent imposition of the Franco-British mandate system did not eliminate the Arab quest for ethnic survival. It did however redirect the strategies of how survival should be ensured. Each of these strategies emphasized one mythomoteur of the Arab ethnie over the other; each one seemed to approach the problem from a different angle. In the final analysis all of them attempted to escape ethnocide of the Arabs which under European control was much more threatening than ever before.

Under the mandate system three different strategies of ethnic survival emerged. The first school of thought continued where the pre-war pan-Ottomanism had ended. The circle around Hassan al-Banna, Ali `Abd al-Raziq and the Muslim Brethren claimed that for Arabs there was nothing outside Islam. Only a return to the true roots of Islam would enable Arabs to fend off imperialist advances. The second school paid no attention whatsoever to Islam. Antun Sa`adah accepted the territorial division of the Arab world and maintained that it consisted of four different geographic zones, each of which had developed a distinct nationality: Syria, the Arabian Peninsula, the Nile valley, and the Maghrib (North Africa). In his opinion "a nation stems not from a common ethnic origin, but from the unifying process of the social environment."[43] Sa`adah stressed the imaginary character of the Arab nation. For him it was a purely cultural-linguistic concept which in everyday political affairs was of little importance. Instead of concentrating on the unobtainable goal of Arab unity, he suggested that the Arabs should construct their different states as building blocks of Arab civilization.

The third school of thought tried to reintegrate both mythomoteurs. Usually referred to as Arab Nationalists, the most outstanding of these thinkers were Sati` al-Husari, Constantin Zurayq, Sami Shawkat, `Abd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz, `Abd Allah al-Alayli, and Edmond Rabbath. With a few exceptions they agreed on two basic principles. For them Islam was an inseparable element of Arab history. Only by subordinating religion to Arabism was it possible to gain the support of non-Muslim intellectuals. The Lebanese Christian Edmond Rabbath declared that, "Islam is the national religion of the Arabs. There is no Islamic history, only Arab history."[44] This was a systematic attempt to rehabilitate the concept of ethnicity that had been discredited since the fall of the

Umayyad Empire. The second point of agreement was the definition of the elements which constituted the Arab ethnie. First and foremost it was a linguistic and cultural community. It was especially the former adherents of the pan-Ottomanist ideal around Sati` al-Husari and Shakib Arslan who projected their previous identification with the dissolved Empire onto the imagined Arab ethnie. Although they did not condemn regional nationalisms outright, they always considered these affiliations inferior to affiliation with the Arab nation.

It is true that these Arab nationalists have been criticized for their a-humanist vision of the future Arab nation, and for their neglect of democratic values and institutions.[45] However, one has to keep in mind that the task of overcoming the century-old alienation of the Arab ethnie required all the energies of these intellectuals. In their opinion, the modes of political interaction among the Arabs would follow once their ethnic identity had been formalized.

After World War II, the Arab ethnie lost the tenuous territorial basis for unity it had maintained during the Mandate. For some time the Zionist challenge let ethnic self-defense appear a politically viable option. Michel `Aflaq's call for "nationalism, unity, and socialism" in the Arab world, as well as Gamal `Abd al-Nasser's attempt to form the United Arab Republic together with Syria and Yemen (1958) showed that the idea of ethnic unity lived on. When the Arab ethnie, already territorially fragmented, came into the crossfire of the Soviet-American superpower conflict, the new rulers abandoned the Islamic mythomoteur in favor of the ideology of the respective superpower. A number of short-lived unification attempts followed. For example, in 1971 Egypt, Libya and Sudan established the Federation of Arab Republics, Egypt and Libya formed a unified state in 1973, and in 1980 Libya and Syria tried to merge. Since almost all of them appealed to political and economic integration, they were doomed to failure. Without recourse to both of the ethnie's mythomoteurs, unification seems to be impossible.

The anti-imperialist Islamic resurgence in the wake of the Iranian revolution in part tries to redress this shortcoming. Islamic fundamentalism by Arab groups maintains the Ottoman option.[46] If (unrealistic though it might sound) the Arab ethnie were once again integrated within a large non-ethnic Islamic Empire, it

would at least escape the alienation from one of its mythomoteurs. If this empire were further based on ethnic pluralism, the Arabs would be able to restore their ethnic identity.

However, Arab Islamic fundamentalists face one problem. Present-day political fundamentalism started out as the anti-imperial struggle of the Persian ethnie. By embracing the Islamic solution, Arab fundamentalists run the risk of ethnic confrontation. In the short run this danger seems to be negligible in the face of the complete loss of Arab identity. But over time ethnic differences will reemerge. As the Iran-Iraq war demonstrated, the danger of a clash between the two ethnies is more than merely a hypothetical possibility. Iran's sponsorship of fundamentalist factions in various Arab countries should not obscure the fact that for both donor and recipients such support is merely instrumental to short-term political goals. The ultimate motive of Arab Islamic fundamentalists is and remains the preservation of their ethnie. Compared to the impending ethnocide by the West, the collaboration of the Iranian ethnie certainly appears to be the minor evil. Since the secular appeal to `Urubah could not withstand the force of the West, for the time being politicized religion is seen as the panacea for ethnic survival.

## Conclusion

The concept of an Arab ethnie with its mythomoteurs Islam and `Urubah enables us to understand certain features of Arab nationalism that would otherwise appear contradictory. Arab nationalism originated long before the emergence of nation states. I argued that the primary motive of Arabs in history has been ethnic survival. Such survival was ensured so long as at least one of the ethnie's mythomoteurs remained intact. Whereas the Umayyads preserved both Islam and `Urubah, the `Abbasids and Ottomans alienated the Arab ethnie from `Urubah in their universalist, non-ethnic religious empires. The Arab ethnie survived because Islam kept alive a large part of the value system of `Urubah. The fact that Islam served as a unifying ideology between the different ethnies of the empire prevented major confrontations. Only after the Young Turks and imperialism besieged Islam did Arab nationalism arise as a clear-cut political ideology. It was the politicized expression of Arab ethnic self-preservation. Modern

Arab-Islamic fundamentalism serves the same purpose: It postulates the return to a pluralistic religious empire in which the double alienation of the Arab ethnie would be dissolved.

This interpretation does not imply that Arab nationalists or Arab fundamentalists are always aware that they advocate the proliferation of their ethnie. Neither do I disregard fundamentalism's roots in concrete economic grievances. On the contrary, without the exploitation of the Middle Eastern countries by a secularized Western elite, and the subsequent alienation of large strata of society from traditional value systems, these movements would probably not have emerged. Consciously or unconsciously, however, their adherents follow the historical heritage of the Arab ethnie. Under different political conditions they might well become aware that their religious struggle of today in reality serves the preservation of their ethnie, a community which by reference to its mythomoteurs Islam and `Urubah and by its recourse to *turath* (tradition), has over the centuries been imagined and reimagined again and again.

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**Notes:**

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1. Fouad Ajami, "The End of Pan-Arabism," in Tawfic E. Farah, ed., *Pan-Arabism and Arab Nationalism: The Continuing Debate* (Boulder and London: Westview, 1987), 96-114. [Originally published in *Foreign Affairs* v. 57, 2 (Winter 1978/79): 355-73.]

2. Cf. Edmund Burke, III, and Ira M. Lapidus, eds., *Islam, Politics and Social Movements* (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1988).

3. Reinhard Schulze, "Weil sie ganz anders sind: Alte Klischees verstellen uns den Blick auf einen Orient im Aufbruch," in *Die Zeit* 10 (March 8, 1991): 19; or Heinz Halm, "Die Panikmacher: Wie im Westen der Islam zum neuen Feindbild aufgebaut wird," in *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Feuilleton-Beilage 40 (February 16-17, 1991).

4. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, 3 (Summer 1993): 22-49.

5. Israeli Prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, quoted in David Hoffman, "Israel Seeking to Convince U.S. that West is Threatened by Iran," *Washington Post* (March 13, 1993): 14.

6. Anthony Lewis, "It's not Over," *New York Times* (Jan. 11, 1991): sec. A, p. 29; Jonathan C. Randal, "PLO Sees Gulf Peace Crucial to Its Cause," *Washington Post* (Jan. 8, 1991): sec. A, p. 12; Robert V. Keeley, "Handwriting on the Wall," *Washington Post* (Jan. 4, 1991): sec. A, p. 17.

7. Bernard Lewis, "What Saddam Wrought," *Wall Street Journal* (Aug. 2, 1991): sec. A, p. 8; Martin Kramer, "Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity," *Daedalus* 122,3 (Summer 1993): 171-206.

8. Mohammad H. Heikal, "The Future Arab World: An Overview," in Hani A. Faris, ed., *Arab Nationalism and the Future of the Arab World* (Belmont, Mass.: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1987 [AAUG Monograph Series: No. 22]), 6.

9. For an overview of a number of different approaches, cf. Elie Chalala, "Arab Nationalism: A Bibliographic Essay," in Tawfic E. Farah, ed., *Pan-Arabism and Arab Nationalism: The Continuing Debate* (Boulder and London: Westview, 1987), 50-1.

10. Fahim I. Qubain, *Inside the Arab Mind: A Bibliographic Survey of Literature in Arabic on Arab Nationalism and Unity. With an annotated list of English-language books and articles* (Arlington, VA: Middle East Research Associates, 1960).

11. Rashid Khalidi, "Arab Nationalism: Historical Problems in the Literature," *American Historical Review* (Dec. 1991): 1363.

12. E.g. Philip S. Khoury, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: The Politics of Damascus 1860-1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Rashid Khalidi, "Social Factors in the Rise of the Arab Movement in Syria," in Said Amir Arjomand, ed., *From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), 53-70, (and other case studies in the same volume); Rashid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, Muhammad Muslih, and Reeva S. Simon, eds., *The Origins of Arab Nationalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).

13. In this essay, "ideology" does not refer merely to the institutionalization of certain ideas in the form of political programs. Instead it alludes to a complex interaction between ideas and reality both having an impact on one another without the one necessarily being in a causal or linear relationship with the other. For a suggestion for a reformulation of an Arab/Muslim ideology, cf., Bassam Tibi, "Islam and Secularization," *Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie* 66,2 (1980): 206-22. "Culture" is used in the Geertzean sense of constituting a social system.

14. Bassam Tibi, *Vom Gottesreich zum Nationalstaat: Islam und panarabischer Nationalismus* (Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp, 1987 [Originally

published as *Nationalismus in der Dritten Welt am arabischen Beispiel* (Frankfurt/M, 1971) [English translation by Marion and Peter Sluglett, *Arab Nationalism. A Critical Enquiry* (New York and London, 1981).] Cf., however, a critique of the concept of acculturation: C. Ernest Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism* (Urbana/Chicago/London: University of Illinois Press, 1973), 198 *ff*.

15. A useful starting point would be the article by Martin Allor, "Information, Institution, and Ideology: On the Discursive Control of Communications Systems," in Jennifer Daryl Slack and Fred Frjes, eds., *The Ideology of the Information Age* (Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1987), 15-23.

16. An extreme but not unusual case of this delayed reception is Gordon Welty "Progressive Versus Reactive Nationalism: The Case of the Arab Nation," in Hani A. Faris, ed., *Arab Nationalism and the Future of the Arab World* (Belmont, Mass.: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1987), 119-127. Welty uses works of Lewis Henry Morgan (1877), Robert Michels (1915), and Carlton Hayes (1928).

17. Cf. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London/New York: Verso, 1983); John A. Armstrong, *Nations before Nationalism* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982); Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

18. Christine M. Helms, *Arabism and Islam: Stateless Nations and Nationless States* (National Defense University: The Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1990), 5.

19. The term was coined by Waker Conner, "The Politics of Ethnonationalism," *Journal of Educational Affairs* 27,1 (1973).

20. Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Basil Blackwell, 1987), 32.

21. The term was coined by Ramon d'Abadal i de Vinyals, "A Propos du Legs Visigothique en Espagne," *Settimane di Studio del Centro Italiano di Studi sull'Alt. Medioevo* 2 (1958): 541-85. [Cited in Armstrong (n.), 8 *f*.]

22. Anthony Smith, "The myth of the `Modern Nation' and the myths of nationalism," *Ethnic & Racial Studies* 11,1(January 1988): 2.

23. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, 50.

24. Ernst B. Haas, "What is nationalism and why should we study it?" *International Organization* 40,3 (Summer 1986): 726-729.

25. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, 138.

26. Ibid., 154 *ff*.

27. Ibid., 157.

28. Ibid., 148. The following elements can be found in any nationalist mythology:

1) a myth of origins in time; i.e. when the community was `born'; 2) a myth of origins in space; i.e. where the community was `born'; 3) a myth of ancestry; i.e. who bore us, and how we descend from him/her; 4) a myth of migration; i.e. whither we wandered; 5) a myth of liberation; i.e. how we were freed; 6) a myth of the golden age; i.e. how we became great and heroic; 7) a myth of decline; i.e. how we decayed and were conquered/exiled; and 8) a myth of rebirth; i.e. how we shall be restored to our former glory. (Ibid., 192)

29. Ibid., 178.

30. Ibid., 202.

31. No doubt, there are other short-term motives for the study of nationalism. Ernst B. Haas, for example, analyzes nationalism in order "explore its role as a type of "rationalization" which helps or hinders domestic and international harmony." Haas, 708.

32. Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, "Arab Cultural Consolidation: A Response to European Colonialism?" *Islamic Quarterly* 19, 1-2 (1975): 30-41.

33. This does not mean that in the Arab world colonialism did not resort to violence. The French occupation of Algeria and the Italian occupation of Libya are a case in point. In comparison to the colonial domination of Africa, however, violence was relatively restricted.

34. Cf. the various articles in the prolific anthologies of Sylvia G. Haim and Kemal H. Karpat. Sylvia G. Haim, ed., *Arab Nationalism: An Anthology* (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2nd printing 1964); Kemal H. Karpat, ed., *Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East* (New York: Praeger, 1982).

35. Cf. Nikki Keddie's emphasis on Afghani's pragmatism ("Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism," *The Journal of Modern History* 41,1 (March 1969): 17-28.) Note the fact that Shakib Arslan has been classified under Pan-Islamism, Islamic Reformism, and Arab nationalism respectively. William L. Cleveland, *Islam Against the West: Shakib Arslan and the Campaign of Islamic Nationalism* (Austin: University of Texas Press), xiv.

36. Isma`il Ragi A. al-Faruqi, *On Arabism: `Urubah and Religion. A Study of the Fundamental Ideas of Arabism and of Islam as its Highest Moment of Consciousness* (Amsterdam: Djambatan, 1962), IX. An interesting discussion on the relation between Islam and *`Urubah* can be found in Amin Huwaydi et al., *Al-`Urubah wa al-Islam: `Alaqat jadidah* (Beirut: Nadwah nasir al-fikriyyah al-khamisah, 1981).

37. `Abd al-`Aziz Duri, *The Historical Formation of the Arab Nation: A Study in Identity and Consciousness* (London/New York/Sydney: Croom Helm and Centre for Arab Unity Studies, 1987), 119-120.

38. al-Faruqi, 206.

39. Ibid., 208.

40. For the significance of descendence in pre-Islamic times, cf. Duri, 10-12.

41. Charles Rizk, *Entre l'Islam et l'arabisme: Les Arabes jusqu'en 1945* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1983), 44.

42. Rizk, 74 (my translation).

43. Quoted in Rizk, 303 (my translation).

44. Edmond Rabbath, *Unité syrienne et devenir Arabe* (Paris: Rivière, 1937). Quoted in Rizk, 296 (my translation).

45. Rizk, 300-302.

46. Youssef M. Choueiri, *Arab History and the Nation-State: A Study in Modern Arab Historiography, 1820-1980* (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), 197.

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# Black Women and Oberlin College in the Age of Jim Crow

David Diepenbrock*

## Introduction

This essay focuses on the experiences of Black women at Oberlin College from 1882-1934. I examine student attitudes and administrative policies towards Black women, and investigate how Oberlin students and administrators were both influenced by and reacted to the ideology of white supremacy that was so pervasive during that period in U.S. history. My objective is to place Black women at the center of historical analysis, to reveal how they were affected by and responded to the racism they encountered at Oberlin. I demonstrate that Black women have been dynamic actors who supported one another in challenging the Oberlin community to actively support their presence at the College.

I agree with a number of historians who have criticized the concept of a single women's community because it minimizes the importance of race and class in differentiating women's experiences.[1] At Oberlin, individual and institutional racism prevented Black women from establishing a bond of sisterhood based on common experiences of patriarchal oppression with their white sisters. Racism made Black women's experience fundamentally different from their white sisters; indeed, the very racism of some white women at Oberlin, meant that for many decades sisterhood could not exist between Black and white women. Consequently, evidence of an interracial sisterhood only surfaced after white women began challenging the racism which affected all aspects of Black women's lives.

## Founding Oberlin and the Decision to Admit Blacks

Oberlin College, was established in 1833 on an undeveloped site just ten miles south of Lake Erie in Lorain County, Ohio. The school's founder, John Shippard, "Lamenting the degeneracy of the Church and the deplorable condition of our perishing world, and ardently desirous of bringing both under the entire influence of the blessed gospel of peace" sought to establish an institution that

would train ministers who would save from damnation the souls of those living throughout the Mississippi Valley.[2] Shippard sought to establish an educational institution based on the honored Protestant values of frugality, temperance, and physical labor.[3] Students were to "simplify diet and dress" and work four hours per day to defray the costs of their education and to "promote muscular, mental and moral vigor."[4]

These intense religious sentiments which gave birth to Oberlin were a product of the religious revival, now known as the Second Great Awakening, which began in Cane Ridge, Kentucky, in 1801, and spread South and West, then East and North, culminating in New York state in the 1820s. Revivalism was strongly anti-elitist. Its preachers rejected the doctrine of predestination, and stressed free-will. They also rejected excessively intellectual sermonizing, preferring to appeal to the heart by using a highly emotional style of preaching.[5]

Despite the commitment of Oberlin's founders, they experienced serious difficulties in realizing their vision for the school. The school was in a desperate financial situation within a year of its founding, and was unable to even pay the full salaries of its three faculty members.[6] Oberlin survived largely as a result of the recruitment of thirty-nine students from Lane Seminary in Cincinnati who had withdrawn from the school after its administration refused to allow them to discuss the issue of abolishing slavery. Because of their anti-slavery sentiments, they enjoyed the sponsorship of several wealthy New York abolitionists. This sponsorship enabled them to demand that Oberlin make several changes before they would adopt the school as their new home. They demanded that one of their favorite teachers from Lane be placed on the Oberlin faculty and that another be made President of the College; they also wanted Charles Finney, one of the great revivalist preachers of the day, who lived in New York, to be

made Professor of Theology. They demanded complete freedom of speech on all reform issues; and they also demanded that Blacks should be admitted along with whites.[7]

The proposal to admit Blacks to the school created strong opposition among both students and trustees. Many expressed fears that the school would suddenly be flooded with Black students. Several women students from New England declared they would "wade Lake Erie" and leave the school, rather than attend school with Blacks.[8] A poll of student opinion on the issue indicated that the school's white female students strongly opposed the admission of Blacks fifteen to six; the white male students narrowly favored their admission, twenty to seventeen.[9] The Oberlin trustees accepted all of the Lane student's demands, except the one calling for the admission of Blacks, which was tabled. They were reportedly quite fearful of bringing Black men and White women into such close proximity.[10] Nevertheless, after acrimonious debate, the board passed the policy allowing Blacks to attend the school, by a vote of 5-4 in February 1835.[11]

This decision transformed Oberlin. The substantial support that the abolitionists who had backed the Lane rebels now provided to Oberlin put the school on a solid financial foundation. Oberlin also benefited from conservative suppression of anti-slavery activity on campuses throughout the East in 1834-45. Many students from campuses where anti-slavery activity was barred and faculty who had been dismissed for supporting the abolitionist cause traveled to Oberlin where academic freedom was now guaranteed.[12]

The impact of this influx of abolitionists was dramatic. By June 1835 an Oberlin Anti-Slavery Society was established with 230 members.[13] By 1840 Oberlin had become an important stop on the underground railroad; the town helped hundreds of slaves reach freedom each year.[14] In the early 1840s a school was

established to educate the town's growing Black population. Oberlin students taught at the school. In 1858 white and Black Oberlin residents rescued a young Black man from jail who had been seized by slave catchers. After spending nearly three months in jail for violating the Fugitive Slave Law, these Oberlin students received a hero's welcome by the town and College.[15] Just one year later, three Oberlin citizens died as martyrs to the anti-slavery cause after assisting John Brown in his attempt to inspire a slave uprising at Harper's Ferry, Virginia.[16] Anti-slavery sentiments were so strong in Oberlin before the Civil War that few students who entered the College "escaped complete conversion to the cause."[17]

**Oberlin in the Age of Jim Crow and Booker T. Washington**

By 1870, slavery had been abolished and Black men had been granted the right to vote. Most white abolitionists believed their goals had been fully accomplished. Even though southern whites were re-establishing political and economic control over Blacks through violent mob actions and new discriminatory laws, northern determination to impose a new order of racial equality was all but gone by 1872. The severe economic recession of 1873 preoccupied northern whites; few protested the removal of the remaining federal troops from the South in 1877. Additionally, a series of Supreme Court decisions in the 1870s and 1880s limited the ability of the federal government to protect Blacks from discrimination. The Supreme Court's 1896 decision in Plessy v. Ferguson upheld the legality of segregation based on the doctrine of separate-but-equal enabling the White South to formally relegate Blacks to second-class status.[18] This system of legalized segregation, known as Jim Crow, would define the Black experience for several generations.

Oberlin was not immune to these changes. In 1882 a professor protested plans to have a Black and white student live together.

During the 1882-83 school year a series of complaints by white women against eating with Black women compelled the Black women to eat by themselves. This was a significant departure from the past when Blacks and whites ate together. Consequently, when alumni learned of the segregation, they vigorously protested and forced the administration to take steps to reintegrate the dining hall.[19] The College was unable to prevent this problem's reappearance several years later.

In 1904, several New England women refused to eat near three Black women who boarded in their dining hall. They reportedly objected on principle to recognizing Blacks as their equals.[20] However, in contrast to the actions taken by College officials in 1883, the house matron accommodated the New Englanders by arranging things so that they would not have to eat near the Black women. Apparently this was not an uncommon incident because in 1908 the Dean of Women, Florence Fitch, felt compelled to lecture a group of white women about these issues. She told them that they were to treat Blacks as equals, interacting with them in their houses, in lectures, and concerts, as they would with white women. She also expected them to stop their habit of leaving seats vacant next to Black women at social functions.[21]

Between 1904 and 1910, white students consistently barred both Black women and men from the school's literary societies. These societies played a central role in student life at the time. Indeed, Mary Church Terrell, one of Oberlin's most well known Black graduates, stated that without the speaking skills and training in Parliamentary Law she gained from her membership in one of these societies while at Oberlin between 1879 and 1884, her leadership abilities would have been seriously handicapped.[22] (Terrell went on to become the first Black woman to sit on a board of education, and was the first president of the National Association of Negro Women.) When alumni learned of these incidents in the

College's alumni newsletter, they vigorously protested and pressured both College officials and students. As a result, one of the men's societies, Phi Delta, re-admitted a Black man they had refused earlier, and dropped their proposed debate topic: "Resolved that the present system of coeducation of colored people at Oberlin be abolished."[23] However, it does not appear that this pressure benefited Black women. Both Mary Church Terrell and a local paper reported that Black women no longer applied for membership because they preferred to avoid the humiliation of being turned down.[24]

Henry Churchill King, Oberlin's President from 1902 to 1927, attended Oberlin in the 1870s when abolitionist sentiments were still strong on campus. Although King realized that, "the attitude of the students toward the colored question as a whole is merely representative of the attitude of the whole north toward the question" these recent incidents represented such a departure from earlier days, that he felt compelled to make his sentiments officially known to the entire campus.[25] In a series of five speeches made during the winter of 1910-1911, King spoke about race relations in general and incidents of student prejudice in particular. In one of these he stated: "Men must find ways of rising above the natural prejudices of race and of working together with mutual understanding and respect."[26] King noted that the abolition of slavery had not eliminated the country's race problem; rather, the extension of the problem into the North had seriously constrained Black rights and opportunities. He also spoke uncompromisingly against the exclusion of Blacks from literary societies, stating, "I am not willing, that in this town and College that have stood thru history for the rights of man, irrespective of race, that we should reach in this question a merely tolerable situation, rather than one that is distinctly creditable to both races."[27]

King's idea of a situation "distinctly credible to both races"

was quite similar to the one articulated by Booker T. Washington. Both men felt it necessary to accommodate racism since little could be done to oppose it. Booker T. Washington stated in his famous Atlanta Compromise speech that, "In all things purely social we can be as separate as the five fingers, and yet one as the hand in all things essential to mutual progress."[28] Similarly, King told Oberlin's students that whites and Blacks could interact in business and public with mutual respect, courtesy and good will, while "In all personal and social matters let each, if he will, go unto his own company."[29] King added that differences between individuals and races always produce a certain amount of "friction," or "uncongeniality," "sometimes in such marked degree that some kinds of association, at least, are better not attempted."[30] Apparently, President King felt that the association of whites and Blacks in College housing and dining facilities were a source of such friction.

These concerns were at least partly responsible for the College's establishing an informal policy of not placing more than two Black women in any single dorm.[31] This policy, however, created some real difficulties for Black students. Since the College could not accommodate all students, white or Black, on campus, most stayed in private houses or privately operated boarding homes. Locating such lodging was complicated for Blacks because as early as the mid-1880s many white townspeople would not receive Blacks as boarders, and white students would often move out of a house rather than room with a Black student. The College attempted to make the search for housing easier by publishing a list of houses approved by the College for Black students.[32]

While Booker T. Washington's doctrine of accommodating racism may still have been prevalent among whites in 1913, it had become much less highly regarded among Black activists and leaders.[33] Indeed, Mary Church Terrell was outraged by the state of race relations at her *alma mater* when she visited the school in

1913 to enroll her daughter. Not only did she discover that Black women were segregated in certain dormitories, she also learned that they had not joined any of the literary societies for several years because they feared they would not be admitted. Mrs. Terrell felt that Black students, by creating separate societies of their own, were playing into the hands of white racism. She was also shocked by one College official who argued strongly with her that Blacks should not be allowed, "to board in any of the dorms and thus be brought into social contact with white students."[34] The following passages communicated Mrs. Terrell's disappointment with the College:

> If colored students are to be segregated at Oberlin with such a wonderful record as it once made for itself even in the dark days of slavery, it seems to me it would be wiser and kinder to exclude them altogether.[35]

> Although I try to be optimistic in this wicked and cruel country, in which everything is done to crush the life and break the heart of my unfortunate race, nothing has come so near to forcing me to give up hope, and resigning myself to the cruel fate which many people are certain awaits us, then the heart-breaking, back-sliding of Oberlin College.[36]

**Resisting Segregation, Enduring Prejudice**

The deterioration in the quality of life for Blacks at Oberlin continued to mirror the abysmal state of race relations nationally. The millions of Black-Americans who were compelled by crop failures, flood, and economic distress to migrate north, encountered tremendous discrimination and even violent attacks by whites.

Despite the violence and pervasive discrimination they experienced, many Blacks became increasingly militant. Some Black leaders advocated armed resistance to white mob violence, and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) defended in court those who used guns in self-defense. Blacks also attempted to stop lynch mobs by organizing support for the ultimately unsuccessful Dyer anti-lynching bill.[37]

Reflecting the national increase of Black resistance to racism, in 1921 several Black women pressured Oberlin to end segregation in campus housing.[38] Black women firmly refused a proposal by the College's Dean of Women to create a dormitory specifically for them; they firmly rejected any plan that would segregate them.[39] As a result of their pressure, these women were assigned by the College's "lottery" to three separate dorms, conforming to the College's unwritten policy of placing no more than two Black women in any building.

The response to these assignments reveals how inhospitable Oberlin had become for Blacks students. The Dean of Women reported that protests only died down after a "negligible fraction" of the white women in these dorms moved out. Even after the protests had died down, she reported that many white women remained dissatisfied with the new arrangements: "They do not really believe that it is best for either race to live in the same dormitory... they do not want social relations with the Colored race."[40] Records reveal that even the Dean did not believe white and Black women should live together. She was concerned that such arrangements would force personal intimacy between the races beyond their "instinctive limits." The Dean was also concerned that integrated dormitories would lead to miscegenation:

> We ask them (white women) to receive colored women as close associates in their student home, but would swiftly put a stop to the slightest intimacy between white girls and colored men. The white men find the presence of colored girls in a social group to be especially embarrassing. Oberlin has always counted upon the tradition or instinct which keeps the opposite sexes of widely diverse races apart. This is as it should be, but just how far may social relations be wholesome and natural between groups whose intermarriage would be disastrous?[41]

With such sentiments found among administrators, it is not surprising that white students could be strident in their racism. For example, an article in the Oberlin Critic reported that white women often refused to talk to or serve on committees with Black women, and made racist jokes about them.[42] However there were others who worked to improve the climate for Blacks at the school. In 1923, the YWCA formed an inter-racial discussion group to improve race relations on campus and educate the community about Black contributions to society and the barriers constructed by society against Blacks. The YWCA also formed the World Fellowship Committee which decided to investigate the position of Blacks and foreign students on campus.[43]

Even as Oberlin students formed organizations and discussion groups to address campus race-relations in a constructive fashion, elements of the world outside the campus, intruded. A letter appeared in an October 1923 issue of the Oberlin Review, describing the Ku Klux Klan as a peaceful organization, which "stands for welding the different nationalities and religions into one unified whole with a single objective: making America a fit place to bring

up children."[44] Another letter appeared two weeks later in the Oberlin Review, signed by three students who denounced the Klan, and criticized the Oberlin Review for even allowing the organization to use the paper as a forum for its views.[45] A few weeks later, 150 men attended a debate between a student from Oberlin's Graduate School of Theology and three members of the Klan who came from two nearby towns.[46]

These incidents document the renewed Ku Klux Klan movement that emerged in 1915, after several decades of inactivity, aided by the release of the historically inaccurate, idealized portrayal of the Klan in the D.W. Griffith film, Birth of A Nation. Through the 1920s, the revived Klan exploited the insecurities and fears of small-town Protestant America. In addition to Blacks, the Klan now added Catholics, Jews, and foreigners to the list of those who they believed threatened "White America." Before declining into relative dormancy by 1930, the Klan grew to over three million members in 1925.[47] The letter defending the Klan, noted above, was typical of the Klan's attempt to portray itself as a peaceful, fraternal organization committed to defending traditional American values, or as the organization put it, "one hundred percent Americanism." The organization's racism, xenophobia, and vigilantism were denied publicly. Instead, the Klan announced its commitment to helping communities rid themselves of "bootlegging, graft, night clubs, violations of the Sabbath, unfair business dealings," and the like. As the Klansman's letter in the Oberlin Review, stated: "the communities where the Klan is strongest have better law enforcement."[48] Posturing as a solution to the "great menace facing the American people today," the Klan attempted to gain public respectability.[49]

Without further documentation of student attitudes concerning the Klan, it is difficult to gauge the extent to which Oberlin students either supported, or denounced, the Invisible

Empire. The school has had a strong and long-standing commitment to the principal of free speech and debate. Some students may have been curious to hear about the Klan. Others may have hoped to see the Oberlin debater effectively counter the Klan's rhetoric. Regardless of these uncertainties, the mere fact that the debate occurred testifies to the strength the Klan enjoyed throughout the United States at that time.

**The 1930'S: Fighting Discrimination**

Nationally, the 1930s represented a watershed in race relations, after "a clear-cut reversal in the attitudes of white Americans started to become evident."[50] Although in several important aspects the New Deal was detrimental to Blacks as a group, the Roosevelts, Eleanor Roosevelt in particular, demonstrated sincere concern regarding the status of American Blacks.[51] As early as 1934, Eleanor Roosevelt began to show genuine concern about racial matters; she interacted with both Walter White, head of the NAACP, and Mary McLeod Bethune, former president of the National Association of Colored Women and founder of Bethune-Cookman College. Her support of Blacks emboldened liberal cabinet administrators to appoint Blacks to relief agencies, and to work harder to see that Blacks received a more equitable share of relief allocations. Eleanor Roosevelt's public endorsement of the Costigan-Wagner Act, which called for federal intervention in lynching cases where federal authorities refused to act, and her relationships with Black leaders and organizations "gave the civil rights movement a kind of crucial visibility and sanction it had never had before."[52]

A change also occurred in southern white women's attitudes during the 1930s. For the first time they began to understand that the ideology of protecting white women used to justify lynching, also oppressed them. Previously, Black women like Ida B. Wells,

had worked without any support from their white sisters to stop the lynch mob. Now however, when Mary McCleod Bethune publicly called on southern white women to assume responsibility for stopping the rise in racial violence, they responded by forming the Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of Lynching (ASWPL). However, despite the effectiveness of ASWPL in mobilizing support for the anti-lynching cause, its commitment to civil rights for Blacks was limited. ASWPL leaders were primarily interested in promoting racial harmony (not equality) and southern economic advancement. Consequently, when the ASWPL chose not to endorse the Costigan-Wagner Act in 1935 on the grounds that the Act would limit states' rights, and simply push violence underground, Black women once again felt pessimistic about the possibility of meaningful interracial cooperation.[53]

Oberlin's administration showed a similar lack of interest in improving the status of Blacks. President Wilkins, who assumed leadership of the school in 1927, was the first of Oberlin's Presidents who did not have any personal ties to the school's abolitionist past.[54] While Wilkins did not change school policies in relation to Black students, he was certainly less supportive of their presence and less concerned about the discrimination they experienced than his predecessors had been. A memo he sent describing how the College decided the appropriate number of non-whites to enroll is indicative of this:

> There are not quotas established for minority groups; the controlling factor being the number of any one group that can be assimilated in the student body without student consciousness that there exists such a thing as minority groups. If any so-called minority group were to become so large or *so vocal,* as to threaten the Christian character of the

> College or seriously threaten the democratic unity of the student body, this would probably serve as a break on the admissions for that group until such time as a critical balance had been restored.[55]

When it came to outright discrimination the President favored a slow, patient response. He attended a YWCA-YMCA Student-Faculty Conference in Detroit with a number of students in 1931. One of the more memorable aspects of their trip was that the hotel would not provide equal accommodations to Blacks and whites. The Oberlin delegation met to decide whether to stay or to accompany the Black students to another hotel which did not discriminate. The majority voted to stay at the Jim Crow hotel, leaving Blacks, accompanied by a few principled whites, to seek lodging elsewhere.[56] In a discussion held at Oberlin evaluating their experience in Detroit, some students complained that the fervent support for racial equality found at Oberlin during the days of the underground railroad had evaporated. Others suggested that those interested in reviving this spirit of old become involved in the campus YWCA's Interracial Committee which was studying the "racial problem at Oberlin." President Wilkins however, did not feel so strongly. He commented that, "We are at the place where power is generated, not at the place where it is applied. Everything must be done by us slowly, with resolute, relentless, patient intelligence."[57]

Under Wilkins, the College moved from accommodating racial discrimination, to total acquiescence. Mr. Wilkin's patience with racism meant that Black women and men continued to experience raw forms of racism at Oberlin. In the fall of 1931 Marjorie Witt, who had been at Oberlin only two weeks, quickly discovered how vicious some whites could be. One day when Ms. Witt sat down for breakfast, a white woman at the table became physically sick

and before leaving the table viciously shouted, "I can't eat with a nigger."[58] Years later, Marjorie Witt recalled that incidents such as these, combined with the College's policy of only permitting two Black women to live together in any dorm, created such a sense of isolation that Blacks sought out places of refuge from white hostility. Thomas House, a private boarding house for Black women, provided just such a refuge for Marjorie Witt. At Thomas House she was able to experience a sense of community, deal with feelings of isolation, and gather the strength necessary to go out and participate in campus life.[59] Such community support may have enabled her to take a leading role in a number of campus activities. For example, in November 1932 Marjorie Witt led a discussion of "the Negro problem in the United States from a cultural point of view, considering Negro drama, art, and music," at a meeting of the YWCA World Fellowship Committee.[60]

Unlike the tepid support of the College Administration for racial equality, Black and white students organized for racial justice on the Oberlin campus, in the town, and nationally during the 1930s. Black women were among those who challenged the College's discriminatory practices, protesting a local bowling alley which would not admit Blacks, and supporting the "Scottsboro Boys." The "Scottsboro Boys" were a group of nine young Black men who had been arrested for allegedly raping two white women. The case aroused indignation throughout the country and became "synonymous with southern racism repression and injustice."[61]

In the Spring of 1933, a large number of students and town residents formed the Scottsboro Action Committee. The Committee's officers included Reverend Brown of the Mt. Zion Baptist Church, and one of the four Black women in the class of 1934, Nerissa Brokenburr, who was elected Assistant Secretary.[62] At a mass meeting held in 1933, the Committee adopted a resolution condemning the lynchings and mob violence that had recently

occurred in Maryland, Missouri, and California. They sent the resolution demanding immediate action against these crimes to President Roosevelt, two Judges involved in the cases, and the press. A representative of the International Labor Defense committee, the legal arm of the Communist Party providing legal council to the Scottsboro defendants, spoke at the meeting.[63] In early March of 1934, the Oberlin Review published an announcement that the Committee on Negro Student Problems would be holding a meeting to discuss "the problem of racial discrimination in Oberlin and the general subject of race prejudice." The notice stated further that the same subject had been discussed at a meeting of the Radical Club the previous week, and that "many examples of racial discrimination in the town and on campus" were discussed. Students, "colored and white" were urged to attend and take part in the discussion.[64]

These discussions were quickly followed by action. The same month the discussions were held, members of the Radical Club challenged a town bowling alley's racist policies. Marjorie Witt, who had led a discussion of racial discrimination during the fall of 1932, participated in the protest. While a full description of the protest is beyond the scope of this paper, the College Administration's treatment of Ms. Witt is relevant. President Wilkins called Marjorie Witt into his office and told her that because she was a scholarship student, she should not participate in protest activities. The rationale Mr. Wilkins gave Marjorie was essentially that the College did not believe it should meddle in "town affairs", and so its students should not either.[65]

### Challenging College Policies

As we have seen, Black women at Oberlin played important roles in interracial efforts challenging racism at the national and local levels in 1933 and 1934. In these cases they worked with other

students, men and women, white and Black. In the Spring of 1934, several Black women challenged the College Administration on a number of discriminatory policies. One of these women, Florence May, wrote a letter to President Wilkins in May 1934 after learning that student teaching positions in academic subjects were not available for Black women in the town's public schools. The College's policy was that students with a "B" average in their major could be placed as student teachers in town schools. However, Black students, even those with "A" averages, were not placed.[66] Ms. May asked the College to intervene or at least offer a "satisfactory explanation" because lack of student teaching experience "handicaps one in seeking a position after graduation". While she stated tactfully in the opening of her letter that, "It appears that the college itself has no objection to practice teaching on the part of the Negro students," she concludes by stating:

> We are asking that the College do what it can to remedy this situation ... We feel justified in asking this since Oberlin College admits us as students and we would appreciate having all the privileges which are due students, not because we are a minority group, asking for a special favor, but because we are "students."[67]

The Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, C.N. Cole, supplied the president with the information necessary to respond to Miss May's letter. He wrote that there was only a "policy," rather than a "regulation," of discouraging Blacks from applying for the "privilege" of practice teaching because of the "embarrassment" it would cause both the College and student. Cole wrote that a Black woman would be "embarrassed" not only by the "natural difficulty" arising from her first teaching experience but also by the, "strained

attitude that would naturally arise from putting a colored girl in charge of a room in which the pupils were entirely or mainly white."[68] Dean Cole did note that there was a difference between Black Conservatory women doing practice teaching because they usually played the piano, while white women conducted. Dean Cole insisted: "This decidedly lessens the prominence of the colored girl. In the academic work, where the practice teacher is in complete charge of the room, the situation would be immeasurably different."[69] The Dean continued that the College would not attempt to force the School Board to allow a Black woman to teach because the Administration believed the Board would respond by discontinuing the "privilege" of practice teaching for white students as well. The only redress offered by the College to May was support for her application to student teach at Wilberforce, George Washington University, or the University of Pennsylvania. May was also told that although her application to Kent State and Bowling Green would probably be an "embarrassment to them," she might be able to make special arrangements to avoid "embarrassment."[70] It is worth noting that while similar circumstances certainly existed in towns throughout the country, in nearby Cleveland Blacks taught at predominantly white elementary and high schools by 1929.[71] In Oberlin, the School Board did not allow Black women to teach in the schools until 1940, after heavy pressure was applied by the town's Black community.[72]

On May 18th, two days after the letter just discussed, May again challenged the College on issues of racial discrimination by issuing a report co-signed by her Black classmate Narissa Brokenburr, and two white women. In the earliest documentable case of interracial cooperation in the period examined here, the women detailed several cases of discrimination. They reported an incident where two Black women were compelled to break a previous engagement so that they could accompany two Black men

to a social event at a dormitory. After the two Black couples arrived at the party "the white element stayed in one room and the four colored young people were allowed to play bridge in another room. Added to this the curtains were drawn."[73] Yet on another occasion, one house matron would not permit a Black woman to send an invitation to a "prominent colored student." The women's report also described how a house matron and the Dean of the Women's Office reached an "understanding" that Black women would not live at Lord Cottage any longer, because six Black women had lived there in 1932. The students stated that, "the matron seemed to be pleased by the fact that she did not have any more Negro students in her dormitory."[74] The report also stated that the Deans of the College and Conservatory requested that house matrons with Black women in their cottages ask the students to spend the Centennial Commencement week in Thomas House. "This house is a local colored home which the Deans recommend very highly to Negro girls despite its inadequacy." The women reported that the Dean cited parental disapproval as her reason for asking the Black women to move. Apparently she did not want alumni who would be visiting that week to feel any "friction" or "embarrassment" by staying in the same building with Black women. The women concluded their report by stating:

> We believe that the individual's attitudes and actions are largely influenced by the society in which he is placed, and that the attitudes and actions of the Oberlin deans and matrons exert a significant influence upon the individual student. We believe further, as you suggested to us, that race discrimination as such is caused largely by a lack of education or by improper education. Thus we believe that the Oberlin deans and matrons are not

> properly educated to uphold and to practice the ideal of recognizing their fellow man upon his personal worth, regardless of the accident of race ... It is our hope, that the proper use of (these reports) may serve to bring about a change in the attitudes and actions of students, and to bring about less embarrassment and fewer handicaps to those who are discriminated against because of race.[75]

In her report to President Wilkins in the Spring of 1934, the Dean of Women denied each of the charges raised by Florence May, Narissa Brokenburr, and their co-signers.[76] The Dean attempted to bolster her claim that there was "no discrimination against negro girls," by stating that one Black "girl" was unanimously awarded one of the six available scholarships for which ninety-five women had applied. The Dean stated, "To select a colored girl for a substantial gift, while denying eighty-nine white girls, hardly looks like discrimination against the colored people."[77] Despite the Dean's denials six years earlier, her annual report from 1940-41 indicates that some of the points raised by the four women in 1934 were well-founded. In this report the Dean wrote that "a great deal of tact" was necessary when dealing with housing Black women on campus because,

> A dormitory director is certain to object to having more than two colored students at a time because she fears that her house will be considered a dormitory especially for colored students. For the same reason she will also object to having colored students for two or three successive years.[78]

Evidence of further discrimination is shown by the Dean's terse comment that house directors "never want to have colored girls on the work force," and that "a great care has to be taken in regard to the distribution to these students in jobs." The Dean was particularly concerned about the so-called perennial problem of white women who in their "zeal" to uplift Blacks, made "very friendly" relations with Black janitors. The Dean stated: "One of the most difficult duties of a dormitory director and of a dean of women is to persuade a student, of a reforming temper, that relationships of this kind are unwise and serve no useful purpose."[79] Furthermore, interracial rooming arrangements between women were not permitted.[80]

The Dean also wrote that she had "taken pains" to get to know the Black women on campus and discovered they were intelligent, "well adjusted young persons who asked no favors, who had no sense of being discriminated against, and who were not aggressive."[81] She also stated that there had been no "difficulty" with Black women since 1937. Although it is unclear what "difficulty" took place in 1937, records survive of an event involving Florence May that occurred in 1934. The Dean believed that because of Florence's "radical involvements" she was guilty of assisting a fellow student who had broken the College's honor code. In this incident the Dean threatened to prevent Florence from graduating if she could prove Florence's guilt. The Dean, however, could not find any real evidence to support her allegations and so Ms. May graduated on schedule.[82] This story, like Marjorie Witt's, illustrates that Black women who actively challenged racial discrimination at Oberlin, often risked administrative harassment.

## Conclusion

From the 1880s through the first decade of the twentieth century, Black women were socially ostracized and isolated by

whites at Oberlin. White women refused to eat, live, or interact socially with their Black sisters. During this period, Oberlin's alumni and the College's President objected to the exclusion of Blacks from the school's academic and social life. Yet, the school's administrators reflected the opinions of their day, in objecting to forcing personal contact between the races "beyond their instinctive limits." The first steps toward interracial cooperation were taken in the 1920s by the College's YWCA, and flourished during the 1930s as students challenged racism at the national and local levels. However, heightened concern about racial discrimination coexisted with continued racism among students and administrators.

The College's informal policy of limiting the number of Black women who were assigned to any particular College dormitory presented Black women with a real dilemma. They were forced to choose between living in a supportive, all-Black home off campus, or living within a predominantly white dormitory. Either option entailed a degree of social marginalization. For some Blacks choosing Thomas House meant accepting the desires of the Dean of Women, house matrons, and many white women, to exclude them from the College's social life altogether. Other Black women, felt that choosing to live in a predominantly white dormitory meant enduring cultural isolation.

The continuity in sentiments between President Wilkins and the dorm directors is remarkable. As noted above, under President Wilkins, Blacks and other minorities were only welcome at Oberlin as long as they did not disrupt the "Christian character" or "threaten the democratic unity of the student body" by becoming too "vocal" or growing so numerous as to prevent their being assimilated into the student body "without student consciousness that there exists such a thing as minority groups."[83] Similarly, the dorm directors feared that if more than two Black women lived in their houses, the dormitory would be "considered especially for

colored students."[84] Apparently, fears of being inundated by a flood of Blacks, so prevalent in 1835 when the school debated whether to admit Blacks, continued to exist 100 years later. By 1934, however, white women joined Black women in challenging Oberlin to overcome these fears, and its discriminatory policies.

Despite the ongoing presence of racial discrimination at the College, Oberlin's admission policy provided a valuable education to a small, but significant number of Black women during the age of Jim Crow. About 120 Black women graduated from Oberlin between 1870 and 1934, roughly 47 percent of the total number of Blacks who received an Oberlin degree.[85] Many of these women, feeling a deep sense of responsibility to their race because of their relatively privileged status, used that education to go beyond Oberlin and serve their own people and society as a whole.[86]

**Notes:**

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1. Nancy A. Hewitt, "Beyond the Search for Sisterhood: American Women's History in the 1980s", in *Unequal Sisters, A Multicultural Reader in U.S. Women's History*, Ellen Carol DuBois and Vicki L. Ruiz, eds. (New York, NY: Routledge, 1990), pp. 5-7.
2. Robert S. Fletcher, *A History of Oberlin College, From Its Foundation Through the Civil War*, (New York: Arno Press and the New York Times, 1971), pp. 110, 90.
3. Ibid., pp. 42-43.
4. Ibid., p. 90
5. John Mayfield, *The New Nation 1800-1845* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1991), p. 153.
6. Fletcher, *A History of Oberlin College*, pp. 101; 140.
7. Ibid., pp. 168-69

8. Albert McQueen, "Black Students at Oberlin", *Oberlin Alumni Magazine*, (June 1968), p. 18

9. Robert S. Fletcher, *A History of Oberlin College* , p. 171.

10. Ibid., p. 172

11. Ibid., p. 177. After casting the deciding vote to admit Blacks to Oberlin, John Keep, the President of the Board of Trustees, wrote a letter to Charles Finney which reveals a great deal about how the College would conduct itself in relation to Black student enrollment for many years to come. Keep wrote: "The division in the Board is occasioned by the *alleged* impropriety of permitting blacks to be in the same school with the whites. But the prime object of the movement (am I right?) is I suppose to train in a better manner for the ministry, holding yourselves ready to receive applicants irrespective of color - not as you are *reported*, to congregate such a mass of negroes at Oberlin as to darken the whole atmosphere." While the percentage of Blacks often exceeded 5% in the Conservatory, and sometimes reached nearly 20% in the Graduate School of Theology, the number of Blacks in the College was always quite small. Indeed, Blacks did not comprise more than 3-5% of the College's overall student population until 1964. Colored statistics re 1844-1935, Secretary's Office, Box 126, O.C. Archives; also see "Black Students at Oberlin" *Oberlin Alumni Magazine*, (June, 1968), p. 7.

12. Ibid., pp. 184-85

13. Ibid., p. 236

14. *The Crisis*, December, 1934 , p. 360.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Fletcher, *A History of Oberlin College*, p. 249.

18. The standard account on Reconstruction is Eric Foner's *Reconstruction, America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1988).

19. W.E. Bigglestone, "Oberlin College and the Negro Student, 1865-1940", *Journal of Negro History* (July, 1971): 198-201 and Geoffrey Blodgett,

"Spiced Wine: An Oberlin Scandal of 1862", *Oberlin Alumni Magazine* (Feb 1970). These authors document several earlier incidents of racism directed towards Black women. I would like to note that this paper would not have been possible without the pathbreaking research of Mr. Bigglestone.

20. Ibid.

21. Idem, p. 202 citing *Cleveland News*, March 12, 1908; *Oberlin News*, March 17, 1908.

22. Idem, citing, Mary Church Terrell, *A Colored Woman In A White World*, (Washington D.C.: Ramsdell, Inc., 1940), p. 44.

23. Bigglestone,"Oberlin College and the Negro Student", pp. 203-204.

24. Bigglestone, "Oberlin College and the Negro Student", p. 204.

25. Ibid.

26. *Oberlin Review*, November 9, 1910, pp. 7-8.

27. Idem, November 16, 1910, p. 5.

28. W.E.B. DuBois, *Souls of Black Folks*, (New York: Bantam, 1989), p. 31.

29. *Oberlin Review*, 23 November 1910, p. 5.

30. Ibid.

31. Bigglestone, "Oberlin College and the Negro Student", p. 209.

32. Idem, p. 208

33. August Meier and Eliot Rudwick, *From Plantation to Ghetto* 3rd ed. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1976), pp. 223-231.

34. Mary Church Terrell, Letter to H.C. King, 26 January 1914, King Papers, O.C. Archives.

35. Mary Church Terrell, Letter to H.C. King, 24 January 1914, King Papers, O.C. Archives: 1.

36. Mary Church Terrell, Letter to H.C. King, 26 January 1914, King Papers, O.C. Archives: 5.

37. Meier, *From Plantation to Ghetto*, pp. 239-42.

38. Bigglestone, "Oberlin College and the Negro Student", p. 210.

39. Idem: 210-211 quoting Frances J. Hosford Memorandum, 1920,

Bohn Files.

40. Ibid.

41. Bigglestone, "Oberlin College and the Negro Student", pp. 210-211, quoting Frances J. Hosford Memorandum, 1920, Bohn Files.

42. Bigglestone, "Oberlin College and the Negro Student", p. 212, quoting, "Race Prejudice in Oberlin", *The Oberlin Critic*, 25 March 1922, pp. 1,4.

43. Bigglestone, "Oberlin College and the Negro Students", p. 212.

44. *Oberlin Review*, 23 October 1923, p. 2.

45. Idem, November 6, 1923, p. 2. These students respond to several points of misinformation in the pro-Klan letter. They state that the Klan, despite its denials did discriminate against Jews, Negroes, and Catholics. In response to the Klan's claim that it had never violated a "single act" of the Constitution, the students stated, "Any intelligent person will admit that the abridgement of an individual's personal rights by punishing for any act whatsoever without legal trial is a distinct and flagrant violation of the spirit and letter of the Constitution. That is what the Klan has done when it has taken the law into its own hands." The students also note that Klan members were convicted by the courts in both Oklahoma and Georgia, and that "many Klan officials were proven to have been implicated in many lawless outrages."

46. Idem, November 13, 1923.

47. David Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism, The History of the Ku Klux Klan*, (New York: Franklin Watts, 1981). See also Kenneth T. Jackson, *The Ku Klux Klan in the City, 1915-1930* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).

48. *Oberlin Review*, 23 October 1923, p. 2.

49. David Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism, The History of the Ku Klux Klan*.

50. August Meier, *From Plantation to Ghetto*: p. 259.

51. The Agricultural Adjustment Act, whose goal was to raise prices for farm goods by limiting production, allowed southern White landlords to receive federal subsidies for idling land formerly worked by Black and

poor white tenant farmers. This was one factor which compelled thousands of Blacks to migrate north during the 1930s. Paula Giddings, *When and Where I Enter, The Impact of Black Women on Race and Sex in America,* (New York: Bantam Books 1985), p. 218. The Home Owners Loan Corporation consistently designated Black neighborhoods as least desirable, thereby creating the system of redlining. The Federal Housing Association refused to recommend loans to redlined neighborhoods and even urged homeowners to use restrictive racial covenants. Roger Biles, *A New Deal for the American People* (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1991), p. 178.

52. Ibid., p. 219.

53. Giddings, *When and Where I Enter,* pp. 206-209.

54. Bigglestone, "Oberlin College and the Negro Student", p. 215.

55. Vice President, Letter to Mr. Joseph A. Baily (Editor and Publisher NEW VISTAS), August 8, 1945, Wilkins Papers, Negro Files. Emphasis Added.

56. *Oberlin Review,* January 16, 1931.

57. Idem, January 20, 1931.

58. "One of Ten Thousand Strong: The Story of Marjorie Witt Johnson, Oberlin Class of 1935." Unpublished Play by Mitty Jordan, p. 14.

59. Interview with Marjorie Witt Johnson, December 12, 1987. Black women at Oberlin were divided over the issue of Thomas House. As I show below, others felt that living there meant accepting segregation. This split between ardent interracialism and what might be termed cultural nationalism existed among the leaders of national Black organizations. In 1935, W.E.B. DuBois became highly critical of pursuing a policy of integration for its own sake; he left the NAACP that year, and called on Blacks to build up their own institutions. Similar differences of opinion were aired among Black women leaders when Mary McCleod Bethune's sought to withdraw the National Association of Colored Women from the predominantly white National Council of Women in 1935. Giddings, *When and Where I Enter,* pp. 210-215.

60. *Oberlin Review,* 6 December 1932.

61. Dan T. Carter, *Scottsboro, A Tragedy of the American South* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 50, cited in Mark Naison, *Communists in Harlem during the Depression* (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1983), p. 57. The first complaint against the nine defendants, aged 13 to 21, came from several white boys they had thrown off a freight train. Local police invented the rape charge only after discovering that two young white women had been traveling with some of the Black youths. Hysteria followed news of the rape charges, and the National Guard was called to prevent gathered crowds from lynching the youths. Despite weak evidence the nine defendants were tried and sentenced to death within two weeks of the incident.

62. *Oberlin Review*, May 26, 1933.

63. *Oberlin Review*, December 8, 1933. The Communist Party used the Scottsboro Case to attack the NAACP, arguing that Blacks would never achieve equality in a capitalist country. See Mark Naison, *Communists in Harlem* for a full discussion of this.

64. Bigglestone, "Oberlin College and the Negro Student", p. 216 citing *Oberlin Review*, March 2, 1934.

65. Interview with Marjorie Witt Johnson, December 12, 1987.

66. Bigglestone: "Oberlin College and the Negro Student", p. 217.

67. Florence May, Letter to E. H. Wilkins, May 16, 1934, Wilkins Papers, Correspondence, Box 51, Maurer-Mayo.

68. C.N. Cole, Memo to E.H Wilkins June 9, 1934, Wilkins Papers, Correspondence, Box 20. I would like to thank Oberlin Archivist, Roland Bauman for his help in locating these letters and memos.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. Kenneth L. Kusmer, "The Black Urban Experience in American History," in *The State of Afro-American History*, ed. Darlene Clark Hine (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986).

72. Interview with Mrs. Glenn Thomas, December 21, 1987.

73. Margaret Helvinston, Florence May, Mary Gay Blunt, Nerissa Brokenburr, Letter to E. H. Wilkins, May 18, 1934, Wilkins Papers,

Correspondence, Box 65, Racial Discrimination - Ralston, C.

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid.

76. Dean Klingenhagen, Report to E.H. Wilkins, June 1, 1934, Wilkins Papers, Correspondence, Box 65, Racial Discrimination - Ralston, C.

77. Ibid., pp. 2-3.

78. Annual Report of the Dean of Women, 1940-41, Secretary's Office, General Files, Box 25, folder T-Z 1940-41.

79. Ibid.

80. This subject deserves a paper itself. Not until the 1940's were Blacks and whites able to pressure the Administration to allow interracial rooming between women. The files on the Interracial Committee, 1942-57, are in Boxes 3-4 of the Student Senate Files; they are rich with information on the whole struggle. They contain detailed reports of Administrative reactions to Black and white women seeking to room together and detail steps of how the YWCA acted to change the policy.

81. Annual Report of the Dean of Women, 1940-41, Secretary's Office, General Files, Box 25, folder T-Z 1940-41.

82. Phone Interview with Florence May Santiago, December 18, 1987.

83. Vice President, Letter to Mr. Joseph A. Baily (Editor and Publisher NEW VISTAS), August 8, 1945, Wilkins Papers, Negro Files.

84. Annual Report of the Dean of Women, 1940-41, Secretary's Office, General Files, Box 25, folder T-Z 1940-41.

85. The percentage of Blacks women students at Oberlin fluctuated between 1900 and 1935. Black women were 52% of the total between 1900 and 1910, 67% from 1910-20, 61% from 1920-1930, but only 46.6% from 1930-35. Negro Graduates of Oberlin, Bohn Papers, Box 12, Negro and Oberlin College, O.C. Archives. Also see Colored Graduates, Secretary's Office, Box 126, Students-Negro; Colored: Statistics re c. 1844-1935, O.C. Archives. The figures for the total number of Black women who graduated can be better contextualized by noting that there were just 13 Black women bankers, 2 Black women attorneys, and just 333 Black women physicians in 1910. These statistics were taken from *The Black Woman*, edited by La Frances

Rodgers-Rose (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications,1980), p. 23.

86. To my knowledge, a complete investigation into the careers of Black Oberlin graduates in the first three decades of the twentieth century has not been done. The best known graduates of this period are Mary Church Terrell and Anna Julia Cooper. The careers of both women are described at length in Giddings, *When and Where I Enter*. The limited information I do have indicates that Black women who graduated from Oberlin assumed leadership positions within the Black women's movement, and in secondary and post-secondary educational institutions dedicated to the education of Black people.

87. Michon Boston, "The Mission of the Negro Woman", *Oberlin Alumni Magazine*, (Spring 1984), pp. 65-66.

88. Giddings, *When and Where I Enter*, pp. 98; 95-97. Giddings argues that Black women accepted the fundamental premises of the Victorian ethic, even as they opposed its racist and classist implications.

89. Ibid.

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# Democracy and Discontinuity: Japan's Postwar Constitution

John Van Sant*

Having, by virtue of the glories of Our Ancestors, ascended the Throne of a lineal succession unbroken for ages eternal; desiring to promote the welfare of, and to give development to the moral and intellectual faculties of Our beloved subjects, the very same that have been favored with the benevolent care and affectionate vigilance of Our Ancestors . . . , We hereby promulgate . . . a fundamental law of the State, to exhibit the principles, by which we are guided in our conduct, and to point out to what Our descendants and Our subjects and their descendants are forever to conform.

*From the Preamble of the 1889 Meiji Constitution*

°°°

We, the Japanese people, acting through our duly elected representatives in the National Diet, determined that we shall secure for ourselves and our posterity the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations and the blessings of liberty throughout this land, and resolved that never again shall we be visited with the horrors of war through the action of government, do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people and do firmly establish this Constitution.

*From the Preamble of the 1947 Constitution of Japan*

The initial draft of what became the 1947 Constitution of Japan was written in just over one week by a group of Americans working for the Government Section in the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP), General Douglas MacArthur.[1] As in America's own constitution, the postwar Japanese constitution is based on the individual, who has fundamental human rights that the government must respect and protect. The individual, in the collective capacity as "the Japanese people," is also in possession of the nation's sovereignty. Conversely, the previous Meiji Constitution (formally known as the "Constitution of the Empire of Japan") bestowed duties and qualified rights on the individual. Furthermore, the national polity—the *kokutai*—was based on the Emperor, who was empowered as the head of the Empire, "combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty."[2] As with the 1947 Constitution of Japan, the 1889 Meiji Constitution signaled a major step forward in Japan's political development, and it was also influenced by foreign concepts of constitutional law--especially by the German constitutional monarchy. But the similarities end there. Like the Occupation era (1945-1952) as a whole, the postwar Japanese constitution represented far more of a discontinuity than a continuity with pre-World War Two Japan.[3]

In this paper, I will first describe and analyze the process of making the postwar Constitution of Japan. Then I will discuss the major linguistic problems that arose between SCAP officials and Japanese government officials when the two sides revised the initial American draft of the new constitution. As shall be seen, these linguistic problems were not really about language differences: they were about political differences between SCAP officials who drafted a democratic, even radical constitution and Japanese officials who wanted nothing more than a few token changes to the pre-war Meiji Constitution. In the final section, the dual themes of continuity and discontinuity in comparing Japan's postwar constitution to its pre-war constitutional heritage will be discussed.

I

On July 26, 1945, the United States, the Republic of China, and Great Britain issued the *Potsdam Declaration* which stated: "The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. The freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established." Furthermore, Allied occupying forces would be withdrawn from Japan as soon as "a peacefully inclined and responsible government" was established in accordance with "the freely expressed will of the Japanese people." Despite these conditions and many others, the *Potsdam Declaration* also called for the "unconditional surrender" of Japan.[4] This inherent contradiction led to confusion during the Occupation. Whenever SCAP implemented reforms opposed by Japanese officials, these officials would accuse SCAP of not gaining "the freely expressed will of the Japanese people" as stipulated in the *Potsdam Declaration.* SCAP would typically respond by pointing out that the declaration also called for Japan's "unconditional surrender." Both SCAP officials and Japanese officials interpreted what they wanted to interpret from the *Potsdam Declaration*—a pattern that repeated itself during discussions on constitutional revision.

After the surrender, SCAP immediately stressed the need for constitutional revision to Japanese government officials. Prince Higashikuni Naruhiko, Prime Minister of the "surrender cabinet," met with General MacArthur in September 1945 and was told that the constitution needed to be revised "as a matter of first importance."[5] Prince Konoe Fumimaro, a prime minister before the Pacific war with the Western allies broke out in December 1941 and a state minister in the postwar Higashikuni and Shidehara cabinets, met with MacArthur on October 4, 1945, and told the general that, "the feudalistic forces must be allowed to exist, and progress toward the construction of democracy must be accomplished step by step."[6] MacArthur, however, emphasized that the Meiji Constitution must be revised. A few days later, SCAP political

advisor George Atcheson, who had been present at the earlier Konoe-MacArthur meeting, met with Konoe and other Japanese officials and re-emphasized the importance of revising the constitution. Shidehara Kijuro became prime minister after the fall of the Higashikuni cabinet in early October. In his first meeting with MacArthur on October 11, the SCAP commander advised Shidehara of the importance of revising the constitution.

Soon afterwards, the Shidehara cabinet established the "Constitution Problem Investigation Committee", with Matsumoto Joji, Minister of State and former law professor at Tokyo Imperial University as its chairman. Though Konoe was also a minister of state in the Shidehara cabinet, he was investigating the constitution in his capacity as Special Assistant to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal of the Imperial Household Agency.[7] The confusion of having two agencies investigating constitutional revision ended on November 1, 1945, when SCAP announced that Konoe had not been delegated to work on constitutional reform. Konoe was being criticized from overseas and from within Japan as a possible war criminal because he had been Japan's prime minister in the late 1930s and, therefore, exactly the wrong person to handle the task of reforming Japan's constitutional system. Already under criticism from the allies and the American press for allowing the war-stained Japanese government to continue functioning, American Occupation officials did not want to take on the additional burden of defending a possible war criminal's work on reforming the constitution. Too much of a liability, Konoe was dropped.[8]

During the short time Konoe studied the possibilities for constitutional revision, he "gave no indication that he envisaged anything but the most tokenistic of changes in the Meiji charter."[9] Foreign Minister Yoshida, who later served as prime minister for most of the Occupation, also wanted nothing more than token changes in Japan's constitution. He maintained that democracy "had always formed part of the traditions of our country."[10] Therefore, democratic reforms were unnecessary because Japan had been a democratic country for ages. Citing the "free will" clause of the *Potsdam Declaration* Matsumoto was even more conservative in

his approach to constitutional reform. A few years later, Matsumoto said, "We even thought it might be all right to leave it [the Meiji Constitution] as it was."[11] Shidehara was also extremely reluctant to revise the Meiji Constitution, but he knew that something had to be done to satisfy SCAP.

Japan was a very chaotic country during the early Occupation period. Over two million Japanese had been killed during the war. Fifteen million were homeless. Six million were being repatriated from scattered areas throughout Asia. The country had been devastated from constant bombing, including fire-bombing and two atomic bombings. Japanese government officials had more immediate and pressing problems than revising the constitution.[12] In addition they were just starting to interact with their foreign conquerors. Moreover, it is clear from the beginning of the Occupation that Japanese officials were in no mood for substantial revision of the Meiji Constitution. They were born and raised in the Meiji Era, and had faith in the tradition and image of a wise, benevolent Emperor as sovereign and paternal guardian of his subjects. They clearly recognized the abuses of the military, but felt that these abuses were aberrations that could not be repeated in a Japan that had been torn asunder by war. In addition to having more pressing problems to deal with, Japanese officials felt that any substantial constitutional revision would destroy the traditional social and political order they passionately believed in: the Emperor as a living god; the government controlled by elite bureaucrats; and the Japanese people as subjects, with limited political participation allowed only to males.

On December 8, 1945, Matsumoto presented his "Four Principles of Revision" to the Diet (the Japanese parliament). He demonstrated that continuation of the traditional social and political order was his committee's prime objective:

> 1) No change will be made in the grand principle of the Emperor's right of sovereignty; 2) The Emperor will exercise his right of sovereignty on fewer matters of state, and the Diet will make decisions on a

> greater number of matters; 3) The ministers of state [cabinet ministers] will advise the Emperor on all matters of state and will be responsible to the Diet for their advice; 4) Guarantees of the rights and liberties of the people will be strengthened, and ample redress will be given for all cases of violation.[13]

Three of Matsumoto's principles concern the Emperor, and the relationship between the Emperor, cabinet ministers, and the Diet. Only one principle concerned individual rights. None of Matsumoto's principles contains the fundamental democratic concept of social and political equality. Matsumoto and his committee were transparently trying to maintain the political and social status quo of monarchical government through minor constitutional alterations.

As unimpressed as they were with the Matsumoto Committee, MacArthur and other SCAP officials had not yet directly interfered with the work of these Japanese officials. SCAP policy was to work through the existing Japanese government bureaucracy whenever possible. Not only did SCAP not have enough of its own people to carry out all the reforms and changes it felt were necessary in postwar Japan, SCAP wanted to avoid the appearance of being an alien, colonial overlord. As stated in the official history of SCAP, there was no direct interference at this early stage of the Occupation because too early and "too drastic a change might well carry the stamp of alien rule."[14]

For his part, Matsumoto did not consult with any SCAP officials to ascertain their views on revising Japan's constitution. Although he had assembled some of the most formidable legal minds to serve on his committee, none were experts on American law. The few Japanese experts on American law—such as Takayanagi Kenzo—were not consulted by the Matsumoto Committee.[15] Matsumoto took the "freely expressed will of the Japanese people" clause of the Potsdam Declaration at face value. Being a "supremely confident man," he believed that he and his

committee represented the "freely expressed will of the Japanese people" and so there was no need to consult with SCAP. It is also possible that Matsumoto was unaware that America's allies—particularly the allied representatives on the Far Eastern Commission who had endured years of suffering at the hands of the Japanese military—were pressuring SCAP for drastic constitutional reform.[16] In addition to fundamental differences between Japanese officials and SCAP officials over the principles of democracy, Matsumoto's lack of consultation and lack of information made it virtually inevitable that SCAP would directly interfere in and take control of reforming Japan's constitution. The only question was when.

Both the Japanese government and SCAP were prompted to act on February 1, 1946, when the *Mainichi Shimbun* newspaper published a proposed constitution draft from Matsumoto's Constitution Problem Investigation Committee. Most of this "Matsumoto Draft" had been taken directly from the Meiji Constitution, with the Emperor remaining as the sovereign power and Japan remaining as an imperial monarchy. The chief secretary of the cabinet unconvincingly denied that the draft constitution published in the *Mainichi* was the work of the Matsumoto Committee. The following day, the same newspaper severely criticized the proposed constitutional reforms:

> We believe most people are deeply disappointed at the draft document prepared by the Constitutional Problem Investigation Committee. The draft is too conservative and simply seeks to preserve the status quo. . . . It is devoid of the vision, statesmanship, and idealism needed for a new state structure. . . . [Matsumoto] shows no understanding that Japan is in a revolutionary period.[17]

The *Nippon Times* warned that, "if the Government insists upon the adoption of the Matsumoto draft, public opinion will rise against it."[18] Press condemnation of the Matsumoto Draft's conservative approach to constitutional reform was widespread.

Jolted by the *Mainichi* criticism, the Matsumoto Committee hastily and informally presented two documents to SCAP: "Gist of the Revision of the Constitution" and "General Explanation of the Constitutional Revision."[19] SCAP was unimpressed with the minor modifications that left the fundamental structure of the Japanese political state in place and decided to take direct control of revising Japan's constitution. On February 3, 1946, MacArthur instructed Brigadier General Courtney Whitney, head of SCAP's Government Section, to make a draft constitution for Japan based on three principles: 1) the Emperor would be head of state, but "his duties will be exercised in accordance with the Constitution and responsible to the basic will of the people"; 2) the abolition of war as a sovereign right; and 3 ) the abolition of peerage and nobility, except for the imperial family. Colonel Charles Kades, Lieutenant Colonel Milo Rowell, and Commander Alfred Hussey—all lawyers with Government Section—were put in charge of twenty-one Americans who drafted the new constitution. The drafters relied primarily on three sources for ideas to incorporate into the proposed constitution: "Reform of the Japanese Government System" (SWNCC-228), a secret document written in Washington by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee; MacArthur's "Three Principles"; and the "Draft Outline of the Constitution" written by a private group of liberal Japanese lawyers known as the Constitutional Research Association. SCAP was impressed with this private group's "detailed and extensive recommendations for absolute guarantees" of social, political, and economic rights. On February 10, SCAP completed the draft of the proposed constitution for Japan.[20]

The proposed constitution was based on the democratic rights of the individual and not on the sovereign power of the Emperor. Although the Emperor was described in Article One as "the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people," it was explicitly stated in Article Four that he "shall not have powers related to government." The fundamental equality of all people and all nations were also major democratic themes of the proposed constitution. To Japanese government officials who believed in the

formality of an Emperor-centered state in the hierarchical society of traditional Japan, the political and social liberalism expressed in the democratic constitution written by a group of Americans was a radical departure from the imperial Meiji Constitution.

On February 13, 1946, Foreign Minister Yoshida, State Minister Matsumoto and other Japanese officials were shocked when Whitney, Kades, Hussey, and Rowell presented them with English-language copies of the SCAP-written draft of the new constitution for Japan. Whitney told Japanese officials present that the Matsumoto Committee proposals were "totally unacceptable." He also said that MacArthur was trying to protect the position of Emperor Hirohito from more severe allied proposals, such as demanding the abolition of the imperial system and trying the Emperor as a war criminal in the upcoming Tokyo War Crimes trials (formally known as the International Military Tribunal for the Far East). Whether he meant it as a threat or friendly advice, Whitney warned those at the meeting that if they did not quickly decide to enact the SCAP-written constitution or something similar to it, "General MacArthur would lay the issue before the people himself." As the Japanese press was severely criticizing the conservative approach of the government towards constitutional reform, Japanese officials at the meeting knew that the Japanese people would prefer the SCAP-drafted constitution to any of the conservative proposals they had so far devised.[21]

Japanese cabinet officials were divided between those who insisted upon Matsumoto's conservative proposals and those who wanted some form of democratic, liberal revision along the lines of SCAP's proposed constitution. Yoshida and Matsumoto led the conservative old guard, while Shidehara reluctantly inclined toward the liberals. After Emperor Hirohito advised Shidehara that he "fully supported the most thorough-going revision," the stalemate was broken and Japanese officials prepared a Japanese language translation of the SCAP-drafted constitution.[22] In making this translation, however, Japanese officials tried to retain as much of the traditional political and social order as possible by interpret-

ing Western concepts of liberal democracy within the Meiji constitutional heritage.

## II

At 10:00 AM on March 4, 1946, Matsumoto, Sato Tatsuo of the Cabinet Bureau of Legislation, and three other Japanese officials delivered their government's translated draft of the SCAP-written constitution to GHQ. As this draft was only in Japanese and had not been approved by the cabinet, SCAP ordered that a final version in English and in Japanese be prepared immediately. Kades, other Government Section officials and the Japanese officials worked non-stop in a guarded room until 5:30 PM the following day.

The Americans quickly discovered discrepancies between the original English draft of their proposed constitution and the Japanese version prepared by the Japanese government. There were many arguments over how the Japanese had translated Chapter I on "The Emperor," and Chapter III on the "Rights and Duties of the People." Four hours after the constitution re-writing and translating marathon began, an irritated and tired Matsumoto left, leaving Sato in charge of the Japanese side.[23] Sato valiantly attempted to preserve as much of the traditional political order as possible in making the Japanese translation, but he won few arguments with the Americans who insisted that Japan's new constitution be unequivocally democratic and a rejection of the imperial Meiji Constitution.

By far the most divisive issue between the Americans and the Japanese in making the new constitution was the Emperor. To the Americans—and the allies—Emperor Hirohito was responsible for the reign of destruction caused by the Japanese military in the 1930s and 1940s. Under the Meiji Constitution, the Army and Navy were responsible only to the Emperor, not to the Diet or Cabinet, and everything they did was in the Emperor's name. However, American Occupation officials knew that Emperor Hirohito did not personally approve of the military's destructive actions. After young, right-wing army officers and their reactionary civilian supporters assassinated government leaders in an attempted coup

d'état in the Emperor's name in the "2-26 Incident" (referring to February 26, 1936), Emperor Hirohito punished the military. American officials were also aware that Emperor Hirohito was a very reluctant supporter of the war against the Western allies begun in 1941. After atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, he personally made the decision to surrender despite opposition from half of the cabinet. Nevertheless, the Americans drafting Japan's new constitution were adamant about limiting his powers and explicitly defining his limited role in a new Japanese government so that the Emperor's name could not be used to pursue such destructive policies in the future.

According to the Meiji Constitution, the Emperor is "sacred and inviolable", "combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty."[24] He had great power, but it was symbolic and formal power, not actual power. Japanese officials believed that the Americans did not understand the difference between the Emperor's formal power, which was immense, and his actual power, which was limited. Despite the impressive title of *tenno* (king/crown of heaven), Japanese emperors had not wielded much actual power for many centuries.[25] However, to Japanese steeped in the Meiji tradition, the Emperor was the heart of Japan's *kokutai*, the national polity. They were worried that the American-drafted constitution would overturn the *kokutai*. Overturning the *kokutai* was exactly what the Americans who wrote the proposed constitution intended.

One of the first discrepancies the Americans noticed in the Japanese translation of the SCAP-drafted constitution was how Japanese officials translated the phrase, "advice and consent." The Americans wanted the new constitution to clearly express the concept of the Emperor's non-superiority to the cabinet and Diet, and had written that the Emperor could act only with the "advice and consent" of the cabinet (Articles Three and Seven). Japanese officials translated "advice and consent" as *hohitsu*, a specialized legal term used in the Meiji Constitution meaning, "serving the Emperor by giving him advice in matters pertaining to the affairs of state." To the Americans, the use of *hohitsu* maintained the idea of the Emperor's formal superiority to the cabinet and was

therefore unacceptable. There were many arguments over this translation, during which Matsumoto got so upset he left GHQ and did not return until the following day. Both sides finally agreed to *jogen to shonin*, literally meaning "advice and approval," without the connotation of imperial superiority.[26]

The Americans wanted the sovereign power of Japan to be in the possession of the people and not the Emperor. As previously noted, the Emperor's sovereign power was considered by the Americans to be a major failing of pre-war Japan. In translating "sovereign" the Japanese first tried *hyosho*, meaning "symbolic," and then *shiko*, meaning "supreme." After these were rejected as being too vague, the term was then correctly translated as *shuken*, meaning "sovereignty" or "sovereign power." However, Japanese officials then translated "the people" as *kokumin*, meaning "country's people." In the earlier Matsumoto Draft, the Meiji Era term *shinmin*, meaning "subjects" had been extensively used. *Kokumin* was definitely an improvement over *shinmin*. The Americans did not object to the use of *kokumin* to stand for "the people" even though they were aware that another term, *jinmin* was more egalitarian. In later explanations to the Diet, cabinet spokesmen claimed the Emperor as one of the *kokumin*, thus he held at least some of the nation's sovereign power. Using the "Emperor-as-*kokumin*" interpretation, the cabinet tried to convince itself and members of the Diet that the traditional *kokutai* of Japan was not changed by the new constitution.[27]

While the position of the Emperor was by far the most controversial subject in making the new constitution between SCAP and Japanese government officials, there was surprisingly little debate over what has since become the most controversial part of the 1947 Constitution of Japan: Article Nine, the "Renunciation of War" article. The second of MacArthur's Three Principles was for Japan to abolish war as a sovereign right, "even for its own security."[28] Since the Manchurian Incident of 1931 and until August of 1945, the Japanese military had clearly been on an expansionist, militarist warpath throughout many parts of Asia, especially in China. MacArthur and the allies wanted to produce social and

legal conditions that would make it impossible for the Japanese military to recover in the foreseeable future. Thus, the initial SCAP draft of the new constitution contained the following article patterned after MacArthur's second principle:

> War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. The threat or use of force is forever renounced as a means of settling disputes with any other nation. No army, navy, air force, or any other war potential will ever be authorized and no rights of belligerency will ever be conferred upon the State.[29]

The SCAP-drafted constitution dropped the "even for its own self-defense" clause contained in MacArthur's second principle, but the second paragraph unambiguously meant that Japan could not legally maintain any military forces whatsoever.

During Diet debates on the proposed constitution, Ashida Hitoshi, chairman of the House of Representative's Constitutional Committee (and Prime Minister from March to October 1948), added the phrase, "Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order," before the first sentence and, "In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph," at the start of the second paragraph. The article could now be interpreted to mean that war and the use of military force would be permissible for self-defense of the nation, but not "as a means of settling disputes with any other nation." Although SCAP's early intention had been to disallow any Japanese military forces whatsoever in the constitution, Ashida's addition of clauses to Article Nine and SCAP's non-objection to these clauses opened up a loophole that has allowed the Japanese government to interpret the "renunciation of war" article as permitting the creation of a military organization—the Self-Defense Force—and the use of military force for national self-defense.

At the time, however, these changes attracted little attention among Diet members. Kades knew the "Ashida amendments" would allow for military self-defense, but he did not object.[30] However,

S.H. Tan, the Chinese representative on the Far Eastern Commission, realized what Ashida was doing and objected vehemently. The Chinese had suffered horribly under the boot of the Japanese military and their objection to the clauses added to Article Nine led to the only change in the proposed constitution not initiated by the Japanese or Americans. "The Prime Minister and other Ministers of State must be civilians," was added to the constitution at Tan's insistence.[31]

While the Americans who drafted the proposed constitution were attempting to upend Japan's traditional political structure, they were also trying to upend what they considered to be its backward, feudal social structure as well. They had an especially negative view of the status of women in traditional Japanese society and an article in their proposed constitution exemplified this view:

> The family is the basis of human society and its traditions for good or evil permeate the nation. Marriage shall rest upon the indisputable legal and social equality of both sexes, founded upon mutual consent instead of parental coercion; and maintained through cooperation instead of male domination. Laws contrary to these principles shall be abolished, and replaced by others viewing choice of spouse, property rights, inheritance, choice of domicile, divorce and other matters pertaining to marriage and the family from the standpoint of individual dignity and the essential equality of the sexes.[32]

Beate Sirota, aged 22, wrote this article. Despite her youth, SCAP selected her to work on the proposed constitution because she had grown up in Japan before emigrating to the United States in 1938. Unlike most Americans working for SCAP, she was fluent in the Japanese language. There were three other women who helped draft the proposed constitution, but only Sirota was given the task

of drafting what came to be called the "Equality of the Sexes" article.[33]

Scholars who have researched women's rights in the Occupation era have not yet discovered how the conservative, all-male cabinet reacted to this article. However, as Inoue Kyoko writes, "it must have come as a shock."[34] According to the Meiji Constitution and pre-war legal codes, women did not have the right to vote, married women could not own property separately from their husbands, they were not allowed to inherit family property, and initiating divorce proceedings was almost impossible for Japanese women.[35] The article written by Sirota in SCAP's proposed constitution not only guaranteed equal social and legal rights for both sexes, it specifically blamed males and parents for traditional inequality.

When Matsumoto, Sato, and other Japanese officials arrived at GHQ on March 4, 1946, with their translation of the SCAP-written constitution that had been given to them in February, they had re-written and drastically reduced the above "equality of the sexes" article to the following: "Marriage has to be based only on mutual consent of a man and a woman, and maintained through mutual cooperation of the spouses with the equal rights of husband and wife as a basis."[36] Incorporating all of the specified equal rights into the new constitution could lead to social chaos, Japanese officials believed, and so most were dropped from their version of the constitution. American officials, however, insisted on retaining most of the specified rights in the original article, though Matsumoto and Sato succeeded in removing the "parental coercion" and "male domination" phrases. With a minor change in the one-sentence version written by Japanese officials, the following was added:

> With regard to choice of spouse, property rights, inheritance, choice of domicile, divorce and other matters pertaining to marriage and family, laws have to be enacted from the standpoint of individ-

> ual dignity and the essential equality of the sexes.[37]

Similar in its approach to articles on the Emperor in which certain words and phrases were re-interpreted within the Meiji tradition, the cabinet adopted the view in later explanations before the Diet that despite the legal consequences of the "equality of the sexes" article (Article 24) in the new constitution, there would be no change in traditional gender roles in Japanese society.

The most significant interpretative change that occurred between the SCAP-drafted constitution of February 1946 and the Japanese Constitution promulgated in November 1946 (becoming effective in May 1947) was the use of colloquial Japanese (*kogotai* ) in the Japanese version of the constitution rather than the classical literary style (*bungotai*) of the Meiji Constitution.

After an outline of the proposed constitution was published in the newspapers on March 6, 1946, an organization of writers and scholars, known as the People's National Language Movement, recommended to the Japanese government that the new constitution should be written in colloquial style Japanese. SCAP welcomed the use of colloquial Japanese, but had not initiated its use. Not surprisingly, Matsumoto resisted this idea as too undignified for the nation's most important document. Pressed for time and by other government officials who believed that the colloquial style was more suitable to the new, democratic constitution, Matsumoto relented.

Adopting the colloquial style had two major advantages. First, those with an average education could read it and understand it, unlike the Meiji Constitution which was difficult to read and even more difficult to understand. Second, as SCAP and the Japanese government were presenting the fiction of the proposed constitution as the work of the Japanese government, adopting colloquial language would facilitate the removal of the translation atmosphere in the proposed constitution.[38] Finding and/or creating classical Japanese terms to match the modern, democratic ideals expressed in the original English of the proposed constitution was

an extremely difficult linguistic undertaking that would require the use of awkward terms, raising suspicions that the proposed constitution had been translated into Japanese rather than originally written in Japanese by Japanese officials. The lasting influence of the adoption of colloquial language in the constitution is that all laws since that time have been written in colloquial language and have given a democratic character to postwar Japanese law.

In her linguistic and cultural analysis of *MacArthur's Japanese Constitution,* Inoue Kyoko demonstrates that using colloquial language had an unintended consequence that helped the Japanese government gain the approval of Diet members and the people alike. The original illocutionary force of commanding the government not to abridge the people's democratic rights and of committing the government to work on behalf of the people in the English version underwent a slight, but ultimately important transformation during the change to colloquial Japanese. The illocutionary force of the colloquial Japanese version of the constitution asserts and commits both the government and the people to respect democratic rights. In other words, it is in the language of shared responsibility.[39]

The illocutionary force of command and commitment in the English version of the Constitution of Japan was (and still is) expressed through "shall."[40] For example, the first part of Article 13 commands that, "All of the people shall be respected as individuals." This was translated into colloquial Japanese as, *Subete kokumin wa, kojin toshite soncho sareru.* However, because it uses simple, non-past tense, this sentence is more accurately translated as, "All of the people are/will be respected as individuals."[41] While the general meaning is the same in English and Japanese, the Japanese translation does not convey the same illocutionary force of command that the English version does. Inoue demonstrates that in addition to the use of the simple, non-past tense, the use of *nakereba naranai* for "shall," and the use of *koto ga dekiru* for "may" changed the illocutionary force from command to a commitment of shared responsibility.[42]

The transformation of the illocutionary force when translating the English language, SCAP-drafted constitution into the Japanese language was unintentional and unnoticed by either SCAP officials or by the Japanese officials who made the translation.[43] Instead of the government commanding the people as in the Meiji Constitution, or the people commanding the government as in the American Constitution and to a large extent in the SCAP-drafted constitution, the shared responsibility and commitment expressed in the Japanese translation of the SCAP-drafted constitution was more conducive to the Japanese people's evolving view of the relationship between themselves and their government. This unintentional change in the constitution helped it gain approval in the Diet, as discussed above, and among the people as Japan's most important legal document.

The linguistic problems that occurred between American and Japanese officials in drafting and translating many of the new constitution's specific articles—particularly those on the Emperor and on individual, human rights—were not simply differences over language. Most of these problems occurred because Japanese officials desperately wanted to retain as much of their political and social heritage as possible, whereas the Americans wanted to create a new, democratic order for Japan. Having defeated Japan in war, they believed they had the right to create this new order for Japan in peace.

## III

On August 24, 1946, the Diet's House of Representatives approved the proposed constitution by a 421-8 vote. The House of Peers approved it the following month by a 298-2 vote. The final version of the constitution was then sent back to the House of Representatives and approved by a 342-5 vote. With Emperor Hirohito present, the Imperial Household's Privy Council approved the constitution at a special meeting on October 29, 1946. Subsequently, the Constitution of Japan was promulgated on November 3, and officially came into effect on May 3, 1947.

Despite certain cursory similarities, the postwar Constitution of Japan represents a fundamental—even radical—break with the pre-war Meiji Constitution. However, due to the linguistic and interpretive changes made from the initial SCAP-drafted constitution of February 1946 to the one that was promulgated later that year in November, one Japanese legal scholar writes that the Constitution of Japan was "Japanized."[44] In form, the new constitution was indeed "Japanized." Interpretations of the Emperor as still wielding a degree of sovereign power, and the unintentional change in illocutionary force from command by the people to the government to an assertion of shared responsibility were two of the constitution's major "Japanizing" elements. While there is a higher value placed on form in Japanese society than in most Western societies, the elements of the new constitution that were "Japanized" were in form only. The inherent substance of the document that emerged as the 1947 Constitution of Japan—i.e., the political ideology of democratic liberalism based on individual rights—was not "Japanized" during the drafting, translating, and amending process between SCAP officials, Japanese officials, and members of the Diet.

The vast majority of specific articles in Japan's postwar constitution were fundamentally different in substance from Japan's pre-war Meiji Constitution. Sovereignty was transferred from the sole prerogative of the Emperor to the collective will of the people. Article Four even stipulated that "the Emperor shall not have powers related to government," while Article Forty-One stated, "the Diet shall be the highest organ of state power, and shall be the sole law-making organ of the State." Despite wishful interpretations by Yoshida Shigeru and other conservative officials, the position of the Emperor in Japan's *kokutai* was completely transformed from Ito Hirobumi's Emperor-centered Meiji Constitution.[45]

Almost all of the "Rights and Duties of Subjects" in the Meiji Constitution were qualified by "within the limits of the law," "except in," "unless," and other similar phrases while the "Rights and Duties of the People" in the 1947 Constitution of Japan contains

hardly any qualifying phraseology. Moreover, Article Fourteen in the new constitution guaranteed equality: "All of the people are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic, or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin." The only "equality" guaranteed to the people in the Meiji Constitution is in the duties they must perform for the state. Ironically, the American military officers and civilians working for SCAP who wrote the draft of the new Japanese constitution went over and above the democratic liberalism expressed in the American Constitution, particularly in the area of guaranteed equal rights.

In his memoirs, Yoshida argued that the 1947 Constitution of Japan was a continuation of his country's pre-war, democratic heritage. "[D]emocracy," he wrote, "had always formed part of the traditions of our country, and was not--as some mistakenly imagined--something that was about to be introduced with the revision of the Constitution."[46] As shown earlier, however, Yoshida did not approve of the SCAP-drafted constitution and consistently sided with Matsumoto Joji and other conservatives who fought hard to retain as much of the Meiji political and social heritage as possible.

Why did Yoshida strongly resist SCAP's democratic constitutional revision? Why did he later claim that the new postwar constitution was merely a continuation of democratic ideals already contained in the Meiji Constitution? As did many Japanese government officials of the Occupation era, Yoshida had also served in government in the pre-war era. From 1930 to 1932 he was Japan's ambassador to Italy, and from 1936 to 1939 he served as ambassador to Britain. He was also nearly 70 years old by the time the new constitution was promulgated while he was Prime Minister. With age, length of experience, and high government position being strong indicators of status and wisdom in traditional Japanese society, the elitist and paternalistic Yoshida fervently believed that he knew what was best for Japan and for the Japanese people. In his view, what was best for Japan was Ito

Hirobumi's Meiji Constitution, with a few minor modifications that did not upset the Emperor-centered *kokutai*

Faced with the impossibility of convincing American Occupation officials (or the Japanese public, as evidenced by the hostile press reaction to the conservative "Matsumoto Draft") that only minor modifications to the Meiji Constitution were necessary, he then adopted the wishful interpretation of the new postwar constitution as a continuation of the Meiji Constitution and of a democratic heritage that supposedly "had always formed part of the traditions of our country." He also characterized American Occupation officials as "naively optimistic," with "preconceived plans and ideas," "too idealistic," and they ignored the "feelings, history, and traditions that influenced equally well-intentioned Japanese officials" like himself.[47] Yoshida's characterization of Occupation officials was generally correct; which is precisely why the 1947 Constitution of Japan represented a discontinuity and *not*—as he believed—a continuity with Japan 's pre-war constitutional heritage.

This is not to say that there was no democratic ideology in the Meiji Constitution, or that democratic elements were completely absent in pre-war Japan. The Meiji Constitution of 1889 did allow for the development of political parties, and for a small, but growing segment of the male population to vote for members of the House of Representatives in the Diet. By the 1920s (the so-called "Taisho Democracy" era), these democratic elements were beginning to have a noticeable effect on the Japanese government.[48] Nevertheless, by the mid-1930s these tenuous democratic elements were overwhelmed and crushed by the military and by its reactionary supporters. The imperial Meiji Constitution had done nothing to stop the military or to protect the few elements of democracy that had developed in pre-war Japan. The argument put forth by Kawai Kazuo and others that, "the old constitutional system had been evolving in a pragmatic manner into something with even liberal implications" is yet another wishful interpretation of Japan's pre-war and postwar democratic continuity.[49]

The 1947 Constitution of Japan is permeated by the political ideology of democratic liberalism. The individual rights specified in this constitution are based upon the American Constitution and on the New Deal values of SCAP officials, while the new government structure is based on the British parliamentary system. Legislative supremacy, separation of powers, judicial review, male and female equality, renunciation of war, and the people holding the sovereign power of the state with the previously "sacred and inviolable" Emperor descending to the "symbol" of the state are legal principles incorporated in Japan's postwar constitution that are radically different from the Meiji Constitution.[50]

Conservative, tradition-minded Japanese officials were hoping to hold the line on constitutional reform by dragging their feet, offering a few token changes to the Meiji Constitution, by incorporating traditional, linguistic phraseology in the SCAP-drafted constitution, and finally by interpreting the new constitution as a continuation of Japan's pre-war democratic heritage. They were Meiji Era men who were comfortable with Meiji-era political and social traditions. Despite the horrors of war and massive destruction of the 1930s and 1940s, they felt that these traditions should not be transformed into a new and unknown political and social order. In their negotiations with American Occupation officials and in deliberations before the Diet, Japanese officials were partially successful in interpreting the new constitution within the Meiji political and social order. Nevertheless, in both its fundamental political ideology and in its specifics, the 1947 Constitution of Japan is radically different from the imperial 1889 Meiji Constitution, and represents a break and discontinuity between the legal principles of the Meiji and Postwar eras.

Notes:

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The author wishes to thank Jo Ann Woodsum and Andrew Goble for their comments on an earlier version of this paper. All Japanese names in this paper follow the East Asian custom of placing surnames first.

1. Tanaka Hideo, ed., *The Japanese Legal System* (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1976). This book has copies of both the Meiji Constitution ("Constitution of the Empire of Japan") and the 1947 Constitution of Japan. See also Inoue Kyoko, *MacArthur's Japanese Constitution: A Linguistic and Cultural Study of Its Making* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1991), Appendix One, for both English and Japanese language copies of the 1947 Constitution of Japan.

Most documents referred to in this paper can be found in Supreme Commander for Allied Powers, Government Section, *Political Reorientation of Japan* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, [1949]); and Takayanagi Kenzo, Ohtomo Ichiro, and Tanaka Hideo, eds., *Nihon koku kenpo seitei no katei; The Making of the Constitution of Japan* (Tokyo: Yuhikaku,1972).

2. Article Four of the Meiji Constitution.

3. Continuity and discontinuity are major, dual themes of analysis throughout the study of Japanese history. For an overview of these themes as they relate to the study of the Occupation Era, see the essays in Harry Wray and Hilary Conroy, eds., *Japan Examined: Perspectives On Modern Japanese History* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983), chapter 11, "The Allied Occupation: How Significant Was It."

4. *The Potsdam Declaration*, in *The Japan Yearbook, 1946-1948* (Tokyo: The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, 1948).

5. SCAP, *Political Reorientation of Japan*, p. 91.

6. Junnosuke Masumi, *Postwar Politics in Japan, 1945-1955*, trans. Lonnie E. Carlile (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 46. Higashikuni Naruhiko was Prime Minister from August 17, 1945 to October 9, 1945, when he was succeeded by Shidehara Kijuro. Kijuro served as Prime Minister until May 22, 1946, when Yoshida Shigeru became Prime Minister in the aftermath of Japan's first post-war elections.

7. Ibid., p. 49; and Yoshida Shigeru, *The Yoshida Memoirs*, trans. Yoshida Kenichi (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962), pp. 129-130.

8. On December 6, 1945, SCAP issued an arrest warrant for Konoe. Ten days later, Konoe committed suicide before being taken into custody. Oka Yoshitake, *Konoe Fumimaro: A Political Biography,* trans. Okamoto Shumpei and Patricia Murray (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1983) has a description of former Prime Minister Konoe's work to revise the constitution in the final chapter.

9. John W. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1874-1954* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 318.

10. Yoshida, *The Yoshida Memoirs*, p. 139.

11. Tanaka Hideo, "The Conflict Between Two Legal Traditions in Making the Constitution of Japan," in Robert E. Ward and Sakamoto Yoshikazu, eds., *Democratizing Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), p. 107.

12. Inoue, *MacArthur's Japanese Constitution,* p. 10.

13. Ibid., pp. 10-11. See also Junnosuke, *Postwar Politics in Japan,* p. 52, and Yoshida, *Yoshida Memoirs,* pp. 131-132 for descriptions of "Matsumoto's Four Principles."

14. SCAP, *Political Reorientation of Japan*, p. 90.

15. Tanaka, "The Conflict Between Two Legal Traditions," pp. 116 and 119. Before World War Two, Takayanagi Kenzo spent many years studying and writing on foreign legal systems. He was especially interested in the American judicial system. During the Occupation, he served as one of the defense lawyers at the Tokyo War Crimes trials (formally known as the International Military Tribunal for the Far East). In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Takayanagi headed the Japanese government's Commission on the Constitution.

16. Ibid., pp. 119-120. See also General Courtney Whitney's February 16, 1946 letter to Shirasu Jiro in Takayanagi, Ohtomo, and Tanaka, *Nihon koku kenpo seitei no katei*, p. 346.

17. *Mainichi Shimbun*, February 2, 1946, in Tanaka, "The Conflict Between Two Legal Traditions," p. 120. See also SCAP, *Political Reorientation of Japan,* pp. 611-616 for a copy of the Matsumoto Draft published on February 1, 1946 in the *Mainichi Shimbun.*

18. *Nippon Times,* February 3, 1946, quoted in SCAP, *Political Reorientation of Japan*, p. 100.

19. These documents can be found in ibid., pp. 617-621.

20. Documents cited in this paragraph can be found in Takayanagi, Ohtomo, and Tanaka, *Nihon koku kenpo seitei no katei* and SCAP, *Political Reorientation of Japan,*. Alfred Hussey wrote Section III, "The New Constitution of Japan" in SCAP's *Political Reorientation of Japan*. See also Theodore H. McNelly, "Induced Revolution: The Policy and Process of Constitutional Reform in Occupied Japan," in Robert E. Ward and Sakamoto Yoshikazu, eds., *Democratizing Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), pp. 81; and Tanaka, "The Conflict Between Two Legal Traditions," p. 114 for information cited in this paragraph. Robert E. Ward provides an in-depth analysis of SWNCC-228 on pp. 18-36 of "Presurrender Planning: Treatment of the Emperor and Constitutional Changes," in Ward and Sakamoto, eds., *Democratizing Japan*. Members of the Constitutional Research Association were Takano Iwasaburo, Suzuki Yasuzo, Morito Tatsuo, Murobushi Koshin, Sugimori Kojiro, and Iwabuchi Tatsuo.

21. A fascinating description of this February 13, 1946 meeting is in Takayanagi, Ohtomo, and Tanaka, *Nihon koku kenpo seitei no katei*, pp. 320-336. See also SCAP, *Political Reorientation of Japan*, p. 105, and Yoshida, *Yoshida Memoirs*, pp. 132-133.

22. SCAP, *Political Reorientation of Japan*, p. 106.

23. Inoue, *MacArthur's Japanese Constitution*, pp. 22-23. See also SCAP, *Political Reorientation of Japan*, p. 107, and Yoshida, *Yoshida Memoirs*, pp. 134-135.

24. The Meiji Constitution, Article Three and Article Four.

25. See Ishii Ryosuke, *A History of Political Institutions of Japan* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1980).

26. Inoue, *MacArthur's Japanese Constitution*, pp. 166-173 is the basis for the information cited in this paragraph, except for the definition of *hohitsu* in Masuda Koh, ed., *Kenkyusha's New Japanese-English Dictionary* fourth ed., (Tokyo: Kenkyusha Limited, 1974), p. 471.

27. Inoue, *MacArthur's Japanese Constitution* , pp. 184-194, 204-205; Koseki Shoichi, "Japanizing the Constitution," *Japan Quarterly*, July-September 1988, pp. 238 -239; and McNelly, "Induced Revolution" p. 91. See *Kenkyusha's New Japanese-English Dictionary* or definitions of Japanese terms used in this paragraph.

28. SCAP, *Political Reorientation of Japan*, p. 102; Takayanagi, Ohtomo, and Tanaka, pp. 98-100.

29. Takayanagi, Ohtomo, and Tanaka, *Nihon koku seitei no katei*, p. 272.

30. McNelly, "Induced Revolution," pp. 92-93.

31. Koseki, "Japanizing the Constitution," pp. 237-238. Koseki believes that it was really Kanamori Tokujiro and not Ashida Hitoshi who inserted the "Ashida amendments" into Article Nine. See also Nakasone Yasuhiro, "Toward Comprehensive Security," *Japan Echo* Vol. V, No. 4, 1978, pp. 36-37; and Douglas MacArthur's December 5, 1958 letter to Takayanagi Kenzo, quoted in Takayanagi Kenzo, "Some Reminiscences of Japan's Commission on the Constitution," in Henderson, Dan Fenno, ed., *The Constitution of Japan: Its First Twenty Years, 1947-1967* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1968), p. 88.

32. Quoted from Inoue, *MacArthur's Japanese Constitution*, pp. 235-236. See also Takayanagi, Ohtomo, Tanaka, *Nihon koku kenpo seitei no katei*, p. 222.

33. Susan Pharr, "The Politics of Women's Rights," in Robert E. Ward and Sakamoto Yoshikazu, eds., *Democratizing Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), pp. 229-232. See also Beate Sirota-Gordon's interview in "Reinventing Japan," part 5 of the PBS documentary series, *The Pacific Century* (Pacific Basin Institute, Annenberg/CPB Project, 1992).

34. Inoue, *MacArthur's Japanese Constitution*, p. 236.

35. Kawai Kazuo, *Japan's American Interlude* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1960; Midway Reprint, 1979), p. 243.

36. Inoue, *MacArthur's Japanese Constitution*, p. 236.

37. Ibid., p. 237. The translation of Article Twenty-Four prepared by the Ministry of Justice in 1958 in Appendix One, pages 278-279 of Inoue's book is slightly different.

38. Ibid., p. 30; and McNelly, "Induced Revolution," p. 84.

39. Inoue, *MacArthur's Japanese Constitution*, p. 82. *The Random House Dictionary of the English Language*, Second Edition, Unabridged (New York: Random House, 1987), defines illocutionary "as pertaining to a linguistic act performed by a speaker in producing an utterance, as in suggesting, warning, promising, or requesting."

40. Inoue, *MacArthur's Japanese Constitution*, pp. 76, 82-83.

41. Ibid., pp. 87, 276-277.

42. According to Makino Seiichi and Tsutsui Michio, *A Dictionary of Basic Japanese Grammar* (Tokyo: The Japan Times, Ltd., 1989 ed.),

*nakareba naranai* is more precisely translated as "have to," pp. 274-276, and *koto ga dekiru* means "can" and "be able to," pp. 200-201.

43. Inoue, *MacArthur's Japanese Constitution*, p. 82.

44. Koseki, "Japanizing the Constitution," pp. 234-235.

45. Yoshida, *Yoshida Memoirs*, pp. 145-146. See also Ito Hirobumi, "On the Constitution of 1889" and "Speech on the Restoration and Constitutional Government," in Ryusaku Tsunoda, William Theodore de Bary, and Donald Keene, eds., *Sources of Japanese Tradition* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1958), pp. 668-671, 676-679.

46. Yoshida, *Yoshida Memoirs*, p. 139.

47. Yoshida Shigeru, *Japan's Decisive Century, 1867-1967* (New York, Washington, London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), pp. 58-59.

48. See Ishii, *A History of Political Institutions In Japan*, chapter 5, "Monarchichal Constitutionalism," and Wray and Conroy, eds., *Japan Examined*, chapter 7, "How Democratic Was Taisho Democracy?"

49. Kawai, *Japan's American Interlude*, p. 240.

50. See Yanaga Chitoshi, *Japanese People and Politics* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1956), pp. 125-128, and Robert E. Ward, Conclusion," in Robert E. Ward and Sakamoto Yoshikazu, eds., *Democratizing Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), pp. 429-430.

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# "Dove of the Church": Saint Columba from Seventh- and Sixteenth-Century Perspectives

Mary F. Thurlkill*

> For the whole body of the ship was violently shaken, and heavily struck by great masses of waves, with a mighty storm of winds that pressed on all sides. . . [T]hen the sailors said to him . . . What you are doing now does not very greatly profit us in our danger. You should rather pray for us who are perishing. (Adomnan 351)[1]

In this text, Columba, a sixth-century Irish saint, performed a great miracle. He prayed for the sinking ship, the winds ceased to blow and the waters calmed. Columba controlled nature and had direct access to God. His disciples on the boat, as well as the readers of his *vita* (or life), did not care about the saint's nautical skills or steady hand. Columba had tried to bail the water out of the ship, but his shipmates begged him to pray instead. They wanted a miracle, and a miracle they usually received.

Hagiography is the writing about saints' lives that has a didactic agenda. In the story above, the lesson related the proof of prayer. A saint prayed and God responded in his mercy and grace. However, hagiography usually contains a political lesson as well. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the didactic agenda, both spiritual and political, of two lives (*vitae*) of Saint Columba. In doing so, the paper will recreate the problems and issues important to the Medieval and Early Modern church and ruling structures. It will also examine how hagiographers shaped the lives of saints to didactic ends. The two texts were written by two different authors from two different centuries: Adomnan from the seventh-century and Manus O'Donnell from the sixteenth. Adomnan, abbot at Iona, a

monastery which Columba founded, not only praised his community's founder but also addressed controversial issues confronting the Church in the seventh-century. Manus O'Donnell, author of the sixteenth-century text, was the son of Hugh O'Donnell, Lord of Tirconnell, a northern Irish district. His *betha* (Irish saint's life) proved to be more secular in orientation, addressing Ireland's disunity and English intervention.

Adomnan and O'Donnell chose this Irish saint, complete with the peculiarities of Irish sainthood and Irish Christianity, for didactic purposes unique to their epoches. Hagiography of Irish saints contained more miracles and displays of power than that of any other culture. Irish saints notoriously cursed, healed, blessed, built, and destroyed. Despite the differences in the *vitae* and the authors' dual purposes in creating their respective texts, Columba remained distinctly Irish. Both lives portrayed a powerful abbot, a loving and vengeful saint, a controller of nature, and an intercessor with God. Yet Columba's message and sermons changed from century to century according to the needs of Adomnan and O'Donnell.

This essay analyzes the authors' purposes behind each text and shows how the different miracles and powers attributed to Saint Columba support the social and political realities of the time. I situate each *vita* in terms of the issues surrounding the Church during each time period. Without first understanding the uniqueness of Irish culture, however, it is impossible to understand the *vitae* of Adomnan and O'Donnell; indeed, many of their subject saint's actions appear harsh and brutal. Although both authors largely refashioned Columba to suit their didactic purposes, remnants of sixth-century monasticism, Irish tradition, and biographical fact remain. I first intermingle the two *vitae* to show the consistencies surrounding the character of both Irish Christianity and Saint Columba. Then, I discuss the texts of Adomnan and O'Donnell individually, focusing on differences and purpose.

## Columba's Life

The political and economic climate of sixth-century Ireland, the time Columba lived, appeared quite harsh and disjointed. Over

100 tuatha (clans, or tribes) contended throughout Ireland for supremacy. Surviving sagas from the period related the values of a warrior civilization: strength of warrior heroes and loyalty to regional kings. One extant text, *Tain Bo Cuailnge*, praised the warrior attributes of hero Cuchulainn to the King of Ulster despite his murderous acts. The economy centered on livestock with herding as the predominant activity. Culturally, Ireland inherited a rich Celtic tradition with Mediterranean Christianity superimposed. Roman or Anglo-Saxon influence had not yet strongly effected society.

Columba's parents, Fedilmith and Ethne, lived in this culture and therein raised their son. They were members of the powerful northern Ui-Neill clan with much political influence and strength. Originally named Cremthann, Columba adopted this new Latinized name for monastic purposes. His name in Irish, Colum(m)-cille, translates as "dove of the Church" (or more crudely and less romantically, "Church-pigeon").[2] Around the age of 42, Columba abandoned Ireland in order to serve as a missionary to Britain, Scotland, and Iona where he founded several monasteries. Why Columba left at this time and vowed never to return (even though he did), is difficult to determine. Rumors circulated by the seventh century that Columba considered his departure from Ireland as penance for his participation in the Battle of Cull-drebenem, a heated struggle between the Ui-Neill and southern Irish clans.[3] By the sixteenth century, and possibly earlier, a more mythical explanation of his exile surfaced. Columba apparently copied a Psalter belonging to Bishop Finnen and refused to return the copy to him. Bishop Finnen took the matter before King Diarmaid (king of the tuath), and the King ordered Columba to return the copy:[4]

> (The King decreed): "To every cow her young cow, that is, her calf, and to every book its transcript. And therefore to Finnen belongeth the book thou has written, O Columcille." (O'Donnell 179)[5]

When Columba refused to comply, the King banished him from Ireland.

Adomnan's *vita* included no mention of the Psalter, exile, or self-imposed penance. He simply stated that, "Columba sailed away from Ireland to Britain, wishing to be a pilgrim for Christ."[6] Adomnan chose to portray Columba, and his twelve disciples (a direct *imitatio Christi*), as zealous missionaries spreading Christianity.[7] This apostolic description fit the holy man, who had established monasteries at Derry, Swords, Durow, Kells, and Iona.

The Christian and monastic practices Columba transported to his mission fields emerged from a very different tradition than that of the continent. Missionaries, including the British Patrick, converted the island in the fourth or fifth century. However, Ireland, outside the Roman empire, possessed no pre-existing roman governmental infrastructure. On the continent, the Christian hierarchy developed along the lines of Roman provinces: i. e. most of the dioceses followed the established provincial lines of the Roman empire.[8] With no such divisions to follow, Ireland integrated the Christian hierarchy along the family/clan structure. The abbot assumed responsibilities as head of the monastery, just as the ri' (Irish king) acted as king of the tuath, or tribe. On the continent, bishops held influence over a geographic area whereas the abbot administered control through his monastery. Ireland, unlike the continent, recognized the power of the abbots within the geographical region above bishops, archbishops, and deacons.

Saint Columba, abbot at Io, operated within his monastery as the absolute head. He loved the monks as a father and provided

for their every need. Upon his death, he carefully checked the supply of food:

> the venerable man himself. . .went to bless the nearest barn. After entering it, and blessing it and two heaps of grain that were there in store, the saint spoke thus . . . "I greatly congratulate my family of monks, because in this year also, if I have to depart from you to any place, you will have enough [bread] for the year." (Adomnan 521][9]

With such care provided by the abbot, the bishops and diocesan structure seemed obsolete. Rome failed to significantly influence the structure of the Irish Church until the twelfth-century reform movement.[10]

Irish monasticism deviated from that of the continent in more areas than merely organizational and hierarchical. Holy men, like Columcille, as well as holy women, practiced a more severe asceticism and adherence to strict penitentials. Such severity complemented the barbarian law codes of the Irish tuath: just as crimes against the clan deserved quick and just recompense, transgressors of God's law received their prescribed punishments.[11] If a holy man, such as Columba, failed to administer his own penance, angelic beings provided it for him. After Columba refused to ordain Aidan as King of Erin, the leader chosen by God, an angel appeared to him:

> the angel suddenly stretched out his hand and struck the holy man with a scourge, the livid scar from which remained on his side all the days of his life. (Adomnan 473)[12]

Irish monastics practiced a harsh, dynamic form of Christianity as demonstrated by this passage. The angel delivered quick punishment for Columba's disobedience and sin, reflecting the adherence to rigorous asceticism. Columba then enforced such

standards in his missionary outposts among his monks.

The harsh Irish landscape differed from that of the continent and added to the ascetic prowess of its monks. Rainfall in Ireland numbered more than 200 days a year, and the sun only shone about one hour a day in the winter.[13] Arable land was scarce and periods of hunger and famine were frequent. The genre of miracles and asceticism performed by Irish saints paralleled this environment. The saints controlled nature and the wild elements that threatened everyday subsistence (i. e. rainstorms, famine, wild beasts). Columba, for example, killed threatening animals:

> Then he raised his holy hand, with invocation of the name of God, and praying intently said to the boar: "You will approach no further; in the place to which you have now come, die." (Adomnan 385)[14]

In a similar passage from O'Donnell, Columba raised his hand to a wild hound sent out to kill him by a jealous man. The dog died on the spot and no hound ever lived on the isle again.[15]

Columba also converted naturally dry lands to watery basins by his voice or strike of his rod:

> because water was not to be found anywhere near, the saint turned aside to a rock close by, bowed his knees, and prayed for a little while. And rising after his prayer, he blessed the face of the rock, form which thereupon water flowed in an abundant cascade. (Adomnan 347)[16]

Not only did Columcille imitate Moses from the Old Testament herein, he also promised arable land to his followers. Thus the saint prepared good land for his monks and the community (*populos*) which later grew around the water source.

Through the miraculous intervention and spiritual discernment of the saint, the monks usually built their houses on sacred land. The Irish holy man distinguished the area by altering nature. For

example, Saint Declan, another Irish saint, struck a rock on one location that opened into a continuous stream for his monastery.[17] Holy men, also, located good lands for their monks through visions. Many times, the saints witnessed angels ascending and descending from heaven through a "door." When the saint died, he usually entered into the presence of God through the "door", as did his disciples after him.[18] Hagiographers usually attributed this correlation between saint and monastery to sanctify the establishment, or show its uniqueness from miraculous beginnings.

Irish hagiographers connected saints with the foundation of monasteries for another important reason. The saint validated the transformation of previously pagan sites to Christian use. Monasteries sometimes occupied old pagan grounds marked by sacred wells and groves of oak trees.[19] When confronted with one such vestige of pagan practice, Saint Columba changed the evil "waters" of the well into a sacred spring:

> But he (Columba), first raising his holy hand in invocation of the name of Christ, washed his hands and feet; and after that, with those that accompanied him, drank of the same water, which he had blessed. And from that day, the demons withdrew from that well . . . (Adomnan 351)[20]

Columba integrated these sacred places from pagan and druidic ages into a new tradition. With the assimilation of such diverse belief systems, the saint helped refashion Irish Christianity into something very different from Rome.[21]

The secret practices of the druids shroud the level of exchange between themselves and early Christians in uncertainty. Druids comprised the learned and priestly class of the Celtic British Isles. Their mystical identification with sacred springs, wells and oak groves survived, but little is known of their religion. Brigit, a druid mother goddess, constitutes the best example of Christian assimilation of pagan practices. Brigit guarded a perpetual fire among a sacred grove of oaks. A Christian hagiographer, Cognitius,

recorded the *vita* of Brigit, the Irish abbess of Cell Dara, who protected a fire along with her nuns.[22] The druid religion certainly exemplified a rigorous religion of sacrifice and secrecy among a warlike people.[23] Saints, like Columba, inherited many of these traits. He was both a Christian and a warrior; he both blessed and cursed; he both accepted persecution and sought revenge.

Rather than operating within the realm of Christian *caritas* (charity) and mercy, Saint Columba often unleashed prompt judgment upon his offenders:

> Columcille went to require some relics to put in the shrine. And Tice (the holy man) said he would not give them. . . Anon went Tice to wash his hands in the stream fast by the church, and when he took off his gloves to wash his hands, his thumb fell from his right hand into the glove.[24]

Tice took the thumb to Columcille and apologized for his obstinate behavior. Columcille first accepted the apology and then the thumb as a new relic for his shrine, exemplifying his powers of cursing and judgment.

## Adomnan's Account

Adomnan wrote his account of the sixth-century holy man almost 100 years after Columcille's death, c. A. D. 688-692. Adomnan served as abbot at Iona, the monastery established by Saint Columba. Adomnan had already written one book, *De Locis Sanctis*, concerning sacred places in the Holy Land, and he possessed a previously written *Life of Colum Cille by Cuimine Ailbe*, abbot of Iona from A. D. 657-658.[25] Adomnan recounted many of the holy man's miracles using Biblical *topoi* (recurring themes), but with a specific purpose in mind.

The hagiographer's agenda proved specific in its goal: Adomnan both propagandized and defended the traditions of the Irish Church against the *Romani* (of the Romans) policies of standardization. Rome wanted to insure universal adherence to

Roman Catholicism. The power of Irish abbots had fulfilled the Church need for local patronage and Episcopal structure, but even though they recognized the Pope and Rome, Irish monasteries remained independent from diocesan organization. By the seventh century, when Adomnan wrote about Saint Columba, Rome increasingly pressured Ireland to elevate the status of bishops and conform Irish traditions to Roman decrees.

Calls for reform ranged from the pedantic to the paramount. First, Rome rejected the deviant Johannes tonsure of the Irish monks which differed from the circular tonsure of the continent. Irish monks shaved their heads from ear to ear, reminiscent of the druidic hairstyle.[26] Second, the Irish Church celebrated Easter on a different day than the European Church: Rome recognized the holiday on the first moon after Spring and the Irish three days later. The Roman church regarded disobedience to the Catholic calendar, settled at the Council at Whitby (A. D. 663), as heresy.[27] Third, seventh-century Christianity was still in the process of defining the Sabbath: should it be the Jewish holy day or Sunday, as instituted by the disciples? Ireland, longer than anyone else, distinguished between the "Sabbath" and Sunday, thereby resisting the "Sabbitization" of Sunday. Finally, a number of late seventh- and eighth-century canons from Rome called for more bishop and Episcopal control of the Irish Church.[28]

Even though Adomnan did not address each of these issues individually, his *vita* stressed the importance of following Irish customs. He validated these traditions through the life of Saint Columcille, a man chosen by God with divine discernment and knowledge. Columba's actions, commands and beliefs, albeit in the words of Adomnan, should be considered the will of God and validation of Irish tradition.

To prove Columcille's sanctification (and to manipulate Columcille's life to read as a voice against Romanization), Adomnan utilized several hagiographical tools. He sprinkled his *vita* with many Old and New Testament *topoi*. First, an angel informed Columba's mother about her child:

> Woman, do not grieve, (said the angel) for you will bear to the man to whom you are joined by [the bond] of marriage a son, of such grace that he, as though one of the prophets of God, shall be counted in their number; and he has been predestined by God to be a leader of innumerable souls to the heavenly country.[29]

Just like the Blessed Virgin Mary at the annunciation, Columba's mother knew she carried a divine child. Columba's father, like Joseph, also realized the uniqueness of his "foster-son." One night Fedilmith saw a ball of fire standing around the child's head while sleeping.[30]

In further detailing young Columba's *imitatio Christi*, Adomnan recounted the saint's first miracle as turning water into wine.

> in his youth, when the blessed man was in Ireland, living as a deacon with the holy bishop Findbarr, and the necessary wine for the most holy mysteries was lacking by virtue of prayer he changed pure water into true wine.[31]

Christ had turned water into wine in his first public miracle as told by the Evangelist John. By using these *topoi*, Adomnan not only taught the gospels to his readers but also validated Columba's actions and words as a holy imitation of Christ.

After providing numerous examples of the sanctification of Columba, Adomnan addressed the Roman Sabbath controversy by using the holy man's voice. In one story, Columba clearly distinguished between the "Sabbath" and Sunday (the Lord's Day):

> This day is called in the sacred books "Sabbath," which is interpreted "rest." And truly this day is for me a Sabbath, because it is my last day of this present laborious life. . . at midnight of this

> following venerated Lord's-day, in the language of the Scriptures, I shall go the way of the fathers.[32]

Columba also engaged in various activities on Sunday, including traveling to Troit and aiding wayfarers.[33] Saint Columba even died on a Sunday and fishermen, busy at work, witnessed miracles surrounding his ascension.[34] Adomnan used Columba to protest the Rome-supported "Sabbatization." Irish Christians, until well after Adomnan's time, recognized Saturday as their holy day.

The activities surrounding Columba's death (on Sunday) and the saint's dying plea for peace and concord also addressed the problems with Rome. As he died, Columba said:

> I commend to you, my children, these latest words, that you shall have among yourselves mutual and unfeigned charity, with peace. If you follow this course after the example of the holy father, God, who gives strength to the good, will help you; and I, abiding with him, shall intercede for you.[35]

Adomnan, in the seventh-century, probably considered the Easter controversy one of the most important points of friction in the Church. "Peace" among the brethren meant a reconciliation with the Roman hierarchy who considered the Irish Christians quasi-heretics. In Adomnan's eloquent rendition of Columba's last words, he pleaded for the healing of the rift between Ireland and the continent. He argued that peace and concord among the family of God superseded everything else.

## O'Donnell's Story

During the years between Adomnan (seventh century) and O'Donnell (sixteenth century), the *cultus* (cult or popular following) of Columba remained popular. Ireland, however, underwent many changes. Viking raids began in A. D. 795 with the sacking of Iona and desecration of Saint Columcille's grave. The raids persisted for 200 years, or until the end of the tenth century. By that time, many

Vikings had accepted Irish customs and Christianity. Brian Boru also provided for the ensuing peace; he became high king of Southern Ireland and expanded his power to include the Irish, Vikings, and Danes.[36]

By the twelfth century, sympathies between the Danes in Ireland and the English Danes increased. The English Catholics were especially eager to bring the Irish finally under Roman Catholicism. Thus, England's first formal claim to Ireland occurred when Pope Adrian IV granted lordship of the island to Henry II. By 1250, the Anglo-Normans controlled three-quarters of the country.[37] Racial tensions mounted and segregated the "Pale" region which originally referred to a series of double ditches separating English and Irish landholdings.[38] Eventually the Pale evolved into the bulwark of English control centered on Dublin. Although the English presence waned after the twelfth century, their occupation remained a source of adversity.

Manus O'Donnell wrote his *betha* (Irish *vita*) during the heightened tensions between the Anglo and the Irish in 1532. He was the son of Hugh O'Donnell, Lord of Tirconnell, one of the greatest (and wealthiest) chieftains of Ireland. Manus O'Donnell was especially sensitive to the political activities with England and clan rivalries as is evident throughout his *betha*. In addition, O'Donnell inherited a rich medieval tradition including Arthurian legend, troubadours, chivalry, and folk-tales. These various traditions intermingle with popular accounts of Columba to form O'Donnell's *betha*. One historian wrote that the *betha* was "a collection of legends brought out by Manus O'Donnell . . .a compilation more readable than historical."[39]

O'Donnell borrowed from these chivalric influences when he introduced three women to Columcille after the Saint's vows of celibacy. If Adomnan had introduced these women, Columba might have fled the scene, fearing the temptresses,[40] but O'Donnell's saint questioned the maidens who showered him with kisses:

> [the maidens] said it was their own father that had given them in wedlock to Columcille . . . the

> Lord Jesu Christ, Creator of Heaven and Earth, that was their father. Said Columcille: "Right noble is your father; tell me your names." "Virginity and Wisdom and Prophecy are our name," say they, "and we shall be three wives to cherish thee till thy death and we shall foster and keep love for thee without change for ever."[41]

O'Donnell's account herein contains the *topos* (recurring theme) of chivalric honor and courtesy typical of the high Middle Ages.

Politics and Church issues were equally, if not more effective in shaping O'Donnell's *betha* despite the courtly gestures and noble virtues. An Anglo-Norman population existed in Ireland and direct English Lordships controlled most of the Pale and the urban centers. But as the British Crown had practically withdrawn from Ireland by the fifteenth century because of domestic concerns, wars between the Gaeil (Gaelic Irish) and the Gaill (Anglo-Irish) increased and local Gaelic dynasties consolidated their land holdings. By the 1500's, the Anglo-Irish desperately sought reform and stability from the negligent English government. As a result, the Irish parliament declared Henry VIII head of the Irish Church in 1536[42] and Thomas Cromwell, England's Prime Minister, placed both the secular and ecclesiastical spheres back under British Crown control.[43]

On the eve of this Anglicization of the Irish Church (declared in 1536), O'Donnell set out to write his *betha* (1532). Although he made no direct reference to Henry VIII's imminent reformation, O'Donnell obviously feared the encroachment of Protestantism. In a number of passages, O'Donnell used Columcille to urge the Irish Church to examine itself and to renew its sense of righteousness. For example, O'Donnell related the story of a bishop who accused Columcille of committing a "deadly sin". However, one young monk, Brenainn of Birr, ignored the bishop's banishment of Columba and met the saint as he approached the monastery. Brenainn accused the bishop of bringing a false charge against the saint and the Church of failing in its responsibilities:

> For the power to bind and to loose was not given the Church except she stray not from the very rule that hath been given her. And he declared that they were indeed straying and doing great foolishness, to wit, they were falsely imputing a crime to Columcille that had never done any deadly sin.[44]

Employing Brenainn as his spokesman, O'Donnell warned the Church to please God and not to "stray" from His will. He knew Protestantism spread throughout the continent, with its adherents attacking Catholic corruption and decadence. Whether O'Donnell realized it or not, this new "heresy" would transform Ireland, too, by the late sixteenth century.

O'Donnell clearly understood, however, that Ireland required some type of political transformation in order to save it from foreign domination. To call him a nationalist, using a modern conception of "nation-state," would be premature, but he did use the *betha* to intensify pride in the native Irish Church. Ireland, divided by feuding clans and chieftains, could not as yet form a common resistance. O'Donnell, for many years, tried to consolidate some of the more powerful tribes; his own clan even sought peace with the O'Neills, their longstanding enemies. The plan failed and by 1555 the famous clans resumed their ancient feuds, including the O'Donnells and O'Neills.

Throughout his *betha*, O'Donnell continued his plea for Ireland's release from foreign domination. Again and again Columcille prophesied the Irish "yoke" (i. e. foreign, British presence) and urged faith and prayer to God so that the land might be returned.[45] In one prophetic act, Columcille watched the "symbolic action" of his three pets: a cat, a wren and a fly. The wren turned and ate the fly, and the cat ate the wren. Columcille said:

> the strong of them (men) should eat the weak, that is to say, should take his wealth and his gear from him, and should show him neither right nor justice.

> . . . that while the Gael of Erin were thus, the power of foreigners should be over them, and whenever right and justice were kept by them, they should themselves have power again.[46]

Columcille then turned and spoke to his pets who immediately rose from the dead, just as, in O'Donnell's mind, Ireland would one day be resurrected from English control.

O'Donnell used Columba's exile to incite nationalistic fervor or pride. The exile supposedly resulted after King Diarmaid decided against the saint's argument about a copied Psalter. The saint vowed revenge and waged a small war against the King of Erin. Eventually Columcille, remorseful and convicted by the Holy Spirit, left Ireland because of the catastrophic battle and high death toll. O'Donnell stressed that the departure was a self-inflicted penance; Ireland did not cast out its saint. While away, Columba gazed admiringly on his homeland, longing to return:

> This is why I love Derry/For its level fields, for its brightness/For the hosts of its white angels,/From one end to the other. And he said that not more numerous were the leaves on the trees, or the grass on the meadows, than the angels that hovered over that place.[47]

Hoping to inculcate a sense of pride and nationalism, O'Donnell included many such instances of Columba's homesickness and penitential commentaries. Columba became the patron saint of exiles which inspired love for and awe of Ireland.

O'Donnell's narrative, portraying Columcille as the great exile, neglected one fact: the saint returned to Ireland to attend Church councils, to visit for *aliquot dies* (special days), and to found the monastery of Durrow.[48] O'Donnell confronted this with the grace of a master storyteller:

> he had vowed when he departed therefrom that

> he would not set foot upon the soil of Erin forever, nor look upon her men nor her women, nor taste her food or her drink till Doomsday. But Columcille did observe that fully, for there was a sod of the soil of Alba under his feet the while he was in Erin, and there was cere-cloth over his eyes. . . and he brought with him from Alba sufficient of food and of drink. . . [49]

Herein, Columba never broke his promise and remained Ireland's patron saint of exiles. He could continue to lament his separation from his country which would, as O'Donnell hoped, stir the pride of the Irish.

## Conclusion

Adomnan and O'Donnell present distinct depictions of Columcille. Despite their differences, however, uniquely Irish characteristics appear in both *vitae*. The Church of Ireland diverged from that of the continent because it experienced conversion outside the Roman Empire and drew from a rich barbarian/pagan/druid culture. The Irish Church also had to survive in a sometimes harsh climate and landscape. As the Church differed from that of the *Romani*, so did their saints. Columba cursed and blessed; he accepted persecution and sought revenge.

Adomnan and O'Donnell reconstructed parts of Columcille's *vita* for didactic purposes. Adomnan stressed the independence and validity of the Irish customs against *Romani* pressure to assimilate. He also pleaded for peace within the Church and an end to the trials that threatened the *opus Dei* (work of God). O'Donnell resisted the Protestant Reformation and a rapidly disintegrating Irish political structure due to English domination. He urged the Church to re-examine itself and become just in the sight of God. He strove to unite the Irish clans through an intense pride in order to oust foreign domination.

The political and bureaucratic motivations of the hagiographers do not distract from their message of piety. Columba

imitated Christ in his miracles, teaching the lessons of the gospels; he helped the poor and cared for the sick; he built monasteries to train young monks; and his missionary zeal proved almost unequaled. These *vitae*, as all hagiography, exemplified the dynamic coupling of religious messages with didactic calls for reform, action, and courage.

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Notes:

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1. A. O. and M. O. Anderson, eds., *Adomnan's Life of Columba* (New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Lt., 1961), 351.
2. Ibid., 67.
3. Ibid., 71.
4. Henry Glassie, ed., *Irish Folktales* (New York: Patheon Books, 1985), 61-62.
5. Manus O'Donnell, compiler. *Betha Colaim Chille.* Intro, glossary, notes and indices by A. O'Kelleher and G. Schoepperle. (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1918), 179.
6. Adomnan, 187.
7. Hagiography often employs biblical themes to human actions. In this instance, Columba is attributed twelve followers in imitation of the twelve apostles of Christ.
8. J. A. Watt, *The Church and the Two Nations in Medieval Ireland* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 3.
9. Adomnan, 521. See O'Donnell, 407, for a similar passage. Herein, Columba tells his disciples that he will soon leave them, but that they

should not weep. This is, of course, an *imitatio Christi*, but it also shows the abbot's love for his monks.

10. The twelfth-century reform movement began under Pope Gregory VII (1073-85) and his plan of "Unity and Purity." He pursued a policy of stringent adherence to Roman Catholicism throughout areas of Britain and the continent. He also claimed authority to Ireland because of Gregory I's placement of Saint Augustine as Archbishop of Canterbury in the sixth century. The Archbishop supposedly controlled the whole British Isles.

11. Kathleen Hughes and Ann Hamlin, *Celtic Monasticism: The Modern Traveler to the Early Irish Church* (New York: The Seabury Press, 1981), 5.

12. Adomnan, 473. See O'Donnell, 395, for a similar passage. The hagiographer refers to the severe asceticism practised by Columba, including solitude and scourging himself.

13. Lisa M. Bitel, *Isle of the Saints: Monastic Settlement and Christian Community in Early Ireland* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press: 1990), 19-20.

14. Adomnan, 385.

15. O'Donnell, 105.

16. Adomnan, 347. See also O'Donnell, 77-79, for similar passage. Columba again strikes a rock and water springs forth.

17. Bitel, 17-18.

18. Ibid., 55.

19. Ibid., 45.

20. Adomnan, 351. See O'Donnell, 67, for a similar passage. Columba herein blesses Derry and notices a fire threatening a nearby grove of trees. Columba sings a hymn, *Noli Pater indulgere*, and protects the grove from destruction.

21. O'Donnell, 127, includes one odd story about Columba's encounter with a druid. The druid had received the power to prophecy from God, but Columba told him he was going to die soon. The druid converted, took the sacraments, and went to heaven. God's blessings upon a druid priest proves the assimilation between the two traditions.

22. Gerhard Herm, *The Celts: the People Who Came out of the Darkness* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976), 159. This does not mean, however, that Christianity assumed the worship of a pagan goddess. As Peter Brown suggested, the mentality behind the worship remained very different while the tradition of heaven meeting earth in one sacred spot stayed the same. See Peter Brown's discussion in *The Cult of the Saints: Its Rise and Function in Latin Christianity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).

23. See Herm, chapter 9, discussion of the Druids.
24. O'Donnell, 151. See the similar passage in Adomnan, 369. Columba visited a niggardly man and received no hospitality. The rich man then lost all his riches, became a beggar, and died after being struck with an axe.
25. Michael Richter, *Medieval Ireland: The Enduring Tradition* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), 82.
26. Herm, 267.
27. Ibid., 268.
28. Kathleen Hughes, *The Church in Early Irish Society* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), 126.
29. Adomnan, 467.
30. Ibid., 469. Fire or light is used throughout hagiography to signify the holiness of an individual, imitating the "shekinah" of the Old Testament figures. See, in particular, Exodus 34.34-35.
31. Ibid., 197. See also O'Donnell's account of the same first miracle, 55.
32. Adomnan, 523.
33. Ibid., 293, 271.
34. Ibid., 533-535.
35. Ibid., 527.
36. John O'Beirne Ranelagh, *A Short History of Ireland* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 27-31.
37. Ibid., 33-38.
38. O'Donnell, xxxiv.
39. D'Arcy, 74.
40. Seventh-century Christianity often associated the female with carnality and temptation. Notice, in particular, the theological arguments and epistles to virgins of Ambrose, Jerome, and Tertullian.
41. O'Donnell, 53.
42. Richter, 175.
43. Brendan Bradshaw, *The Irish Constitutional Revolution of the Sixteenth Century* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 118.
44. O'Donnell, 59.
45. See O'Donnell 39 and 125 for two examples.
46. O'Donnell, 111-113.
47. Ibid., 189.
48. See Adomnan, 293 and 409, as examples. These passages are discussed in the introduction, 73. It should be noted here that Bede, in his *Ecclesiastical History*, 223, wrote that Columba founded Durrow before leaving Ireland. A. O. and M. O. Anderson argue that Bede could be

mistaken because of Durrow's claim to be senior and independent of Iona.
49. O'Donnell, 354.

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# *'Living Signs of Themselves':* A Research Note on the Politics and Practice of Exhibiting Native Americans in the United States at the Turn of the Century*

Jo Ann Woodsum**

## Preamble

In their 1992-3 performance piece, Coco Fusco and Guillermo Gomez-Peña impersonated newly discovered aboriginal people being exhibited in a cage. Each dressed in polyglot outfits comprised of stereotypical 'native' clothing including feathered headdress, bone necklaces, and grass skirt. The cage was furnished with modern furniture and electronic equipment including a television and laptop computer. Fusco and Gomez-Peña pretended not to understand any language except their own 'native' language. Attached to the outside of the cage was an excerpt from an encyclopedia describing the aboriginal group to which the caged individuals belonged.

Fusco and Gomez-Peña performed this piece in several locations: Irvine, Madrid, London, Sydney, Washington, D.C., Minneapolis and Chicago. In each locale they were visited by numerous folks, more than half of whom assumed that Fusco and Gomez-Peña were 'authentic' aboriginals:

> A sign tells the crowd that these are members of a 'mythical' people; another sign lists historical incidences of Europeans and white Americans exhibiting indigenous peoples as exotic oddities.
>
> 'You'd think with the technology, the absurdity of the premise, how over the top it all is, that people would realize this is a performance,' Gomez-Peña says. 'But to our surprise, and even a little horror, most people believe we're real human

> specimens from this island. And they don't see anything wrong with our being exhibited that way.'
>
> 'We knew we'd get a strong reaction to the piece', Fusco says. 'But that people would believe it was unanticipated. The point wasn't to fool people or make people believe it was real, but to show the absurdity of it. We meant to parody, to explore notions of the 'other.' That still happens, but what we realized we've also done is tap into a huge colonial wound.
>
> 'People with a heritage of colonialism have fantasies about taming the savage, about controlling somebody else's world. We become the fantasy version of that desire - that's what's scary.'[1]

Of those who did not understand the nature of the performance, most were not concerned that native peoples were being displayed in this manner.[2] In describing this project, Fusco argued that the people who accepted the 'authenticity' of what they were seeing were participating in a cultural tradition dating back to Columbus. In her historiography of the practice of exhibiting indigenous peoples, Fusco pointed out that Columbus returned to Europe with several Arawak Indians to display at the Spanish court.[3]

## Introduction

This research note was inspired by Fusco and Gomez Peña's cage piece and Michel Foucault's *Discipline and Punish* in which Foucault argued that social institutions and their disciplinary functions can best be understood as forming a caracel archipelago.[4] In the caracel archipelago, the prison system was merely the inner most circle of concentric circles of power modeled on the prison system.[5] Foucault argued that all social institutions—hospitals, schools, laboratories—operated on the same principles as that of the prison.

In *Discipline and Punish,* Foucault traced the origins of the prison system to the end of the eighteenth century with particular

emphasis on Jeremy Bentham's panopticon. Bentham, one of the earliest theorists of the prison system, published his work on the Panopticon in 1791. The prison based on the panopticon principle was organized with a central guard tower set in the middle of a circle of prison cells. The goal of the panopticon was to optimize surveillance, the guard could see all, but the prisoner in his cell could not see other prisoners, indeed could not see individual guards merely the tower. In the words of Foucault, each prisoner "is seen, but does not see; he is the object of information, never the subject of communication."[6]

Bentham argued that the panopticon was superior to the older prison system in several respects. First, it required fewer guards due to the centrality of the guard tower. Second, it eliminated the ability of prisoners to communicate with each other which reduced the chance of escape. Most importantly, however, the panopticon was superior to the old prison system in the quality of its discipline. The prisoner was always conscious of being watched and thus of the hierarchy of power which kept him imprisoned. In essence, each prisoner became responsible for his own discipline.

Bentham claimed that panoptic institutions required few of the heavy locks, chains and bars which had been characteristic of the old fortress-like prisons.[7] Foucault explained the psychology of this new system:

> He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes the power relation which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection. By this very fact, the external power may throw off its physical weight; it tends to the non-corporal; and, the more it approaches the limit, the more constant, profound and permanent its effects: it is a perpetual victory that avoids any physical confrontation and which is always decided in advance.[8]

In the panoptic prison, most of the responsibility for security had been transferred from the guards to the prisoner by virtue of constant surveillance.

Foucault pointed out that Bentham believed that his Panopticon had many useful purposes apart from prisons. Michael Ignatieff in *A Just Measure of Pain*, a study of the British penitentiary system, noted that the public played an important role in the panopticon. Members of the public were allowed to visit the central inspection tower in order to make sure the guards were performing their duties properly.[9] Foucault suggested that the public was encouraged to visit prisoners in order "to learn how the benefits of the law are applied to crime—a living lesson in the museum of order."[10] By viewing punishment through the panopticon, citizens could be made aware of the hazards of criminal behavior.

The Panopticon was also an excellent model for any situation in which a small group of people wished to organize the world around them for study:

> It makes it possible to draw up differences: among patients, to observe the symptoms of each individual, without the proximity of beds, the circulation of miasmas, the effects of contagion confusing the clinical tables; among school children, it makes it possible to observe performances (without there being any imitation or copying), to map aptitudes, to assess characters, to draw up rigorous classifications.[11]

Foucault and Ignatieff each pointed out that over time the panoptic model became common place for numerous social institutions during the nineteenth century. So common, in fact, that after the intense debates about the panopticon at the beginning of the nineteenth century, by the 1850s people no longer questioned the validity of this model. Ignatieff concluded that the panopticon as penitentiary "took its place within a structure of other institutions so interrelated in function, so similar in design, discipline, and language of command that together the sheer massiveness of their presence in

the Victorian landscape inhibited further challenge to their logic."[12]

## Exhibiting People

In this research note I explore the common heritage of the politics of the prison system and that of exhibiting indigenous peoples. In particular, several characteristics of the Panopticon can be seen in the display of indigenous peoples. As in the panopticon, the person(s) on display are under constant surveillance and therefore participate in their own discipline before the omnipresent gaze of the colonial eye. In addition, indigenous people were displayed so as to teach the lessons of colonization, i.e. that indigenous peoples lived in a state of savagery which justified European conquest—just as in the panopticon where the prisoner provided the public with a 'living lesson in the museum of order'.

Using Foucault's model of the caracel archipelago, I argue that the display of indigenous peoples which frequently began in the prison system spread in concentric circles from exhibition in jail cells to world's fairs to museums and that all of these modes of display are informed by the panoptic principle as described by Foucault. In her wonderful article entitled "Objects of Ethnography", Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett noted that, "it was not uncommon in the nineteenth century for a living human rarity to be booked into a variety of venues—theaters, exhibition halls, concert rooms, museums and zoos—in the course of several weeks or months as part of a tour."[13] The circulation of indigenous peoples among these various venues—including prisons—had a certain logic for Victorian Euro-Americans which meant that the politics of display were rarely interrogated.

At the same time that the modern prison system was being institutionalized, England and the United States were engaged in imperial conquest. The display of newly colonized subjects was one way in which England and the United States (as well as other imperial nations such as Germany, France and Spain) rationalized and justified their conquest. During the second half of the nineteenth century, anthropology emerged as a discourse justifying and rationalizing colonialism.[14] Anthropologists were also attempting

to professionalize their own discipline. One way in which they demonstrated their role in the social sciences was to participate in the construction of ethnological displays at world's fairs and in museums.

In this research note, I briefly review the lives of two of the most famous Native Americans who were on display in the United States at the turn of the century: Geronimo and Ishi. Geronimo, a Chiracahua Apache, and Ishi, a Yahi, both travelled between actual prison cells where they were on view to the public to other institutional settings for display. Geronimo was displayed at numerous world's fairs while Ishi was displayed for several years at the University Museum in San Francisco.

## Geronimo: America's Fiercest Enemy

After the end of the Civil War, the United States began settlement of the vast territory acquired from Mexico in 1848. In addition to rangelands suitable for ranching, the southwest was full of mineral resources. Mines were established throughout the territory. Settlers and miners ignored the land claims of Apache and other indigenous groups. In order to protect the settlers and miners flooding the region, the U.S. government established military posts throughout the region and began a policy of rounding up indigenous peoples and confining them to reservations.[15]

One of the most popular human exhibits at the turn of the century was Geronimo, a Chiracahua Apache and U.S. prisoner of war. Geronimo was born in 1829 in what is today the southwestern United States.[16] He led a relatively peaceful life until 1858 when his mother, wife and three children were murdered by Mexicans.[17] In 1876, the U.S. government told Geronimo and the Chiracahua Apache to leave their traditional homelands, and move to the San Carlos reservation recently established in southeastern Arizona. Geronimo refused and fled with his people. For the next ten years, Geronimo would fight for the right to remain off the reservation. Finally, in 1886 his band reduced by deprivation and suffering, he surrendered.[18] During these ten years, Geronimo was known as the terror of the Southern Plains. He admitted to having 'made war' on

the United States, but it also appears that he became a scapegoat for all Indian (and many non-Indian) depredations of the day.[19]

The U.S. government informed Geronimo and his band that they had to go to prison for a few years to pay for resisting U.S. colonization. The more than 390 men, women and children of Geronimo's band and related Apache groups were sent by train to an old Spanish fortress in Florida where they were imprisoned.[20] During their stay in Florida, the army guards permitted visitors to view the prisoners. The army officer in charge reported that in 1887, he usually received 20 visitors a day and sometimes as many as 40.[21] The army officers quickly capitalized on the exotic nature of their prisoners and advertised Apache rituals, inviting the public to attend.[22] After Florida, the band was relocated to an old army fort in Alabama and then to Fort Sill, Oklahoma. During this time (ultimately 27 years), the U.S. considered the members of the band to be prisoners of war. The only way to leave the prison was to die or to agree to be exhibited at a World's Fair or Wild West Show.[23]

World's fairs served multiple purposes in turn-of-the-century America.[24] In addition to the explicit goal of educating men and women in the newest developments in commerce and the fine arts, fair organizers stated that they wished to demonstrate the progress of mankind. For example, the organizers of the St. Louis World's Fair in 1904 declared that the Fair was in honor "of the greatest peaceable acquisition of territory the world has known!"[25] Clearly, history was being re-written as the phrase 'peaceable acquisition' ignored the centuries of pitched warfare required to wrest the continent from Native Americans.

One of the primary demonstrations of progress, was the display of colonial subjects. According to Paul Greenhalgh's study of world's fairs:

> Between 1889 & 1914, the exhibitions [world's fairs] became a human showcase, when people from all over the world were brought to sites in order to be seen by others for their gratification and education. The normal method of display was to create a

> backdrop in a more or less authentic tableau-vivant fashion and situate the people in it, going about what was thought to be their daily business. An audience would pay to come and stare. Through this twenty-five year period it would be no exaggeration to say that as items of display, objects were seen to be less interesting than human beings, and through the medium of display, human beings were transformed into objects.[26]

Geronimo was exhibited at several world's fairs. In 1898, he was exhibited along with a few members of his band at the Trans-Mississippi and International Exposition in Omaha.[27] During the Exposition, he made money by selling buttons from his coat (he had brought a large supply) as well as pictures of himself.[28] He next appeared at the Pan-American Exposition in Buffalo in 1901 for which he was paid $45 a month.[29] In 1904 Geronimo agreed to be exhibited at the St. Louis World's Fair. At the Saint Louis Fair, an 'Apache village' had been constructed and Geronimo lived there with other Apaches.[30]

In her biography of Geronimo, Angie Debo notes that several interested entrepreneurs requested permission from the U.S. government to exhibit Geronimo in Wild West Shows and at Madison Garden. But these requests were turned down.[31] Debo points out that the War Department "made a distinction between purely commercial exhibitions and official celebrations."[32] Geronimo's principal attraction to exhibitors and fair-goers was his former status as America's most hated and feared enemy.[33] One contemporary commentator described the Indians (including Geronimo) who were gathered at the 1898 Omaha Exposition:

> All of the tribes that are of any interest from an aboriginal standpoint are represented at the Congress [i.e. Exposition]. Some of them have become civilized, like the Creeks, Choctaws, Cherokees and Seminoles, that their presence would add little interest from an ethnological point

> of view, so the government did not assemble its most civilized proteges at Omaha, *but the tribes it has conquered with the greatest amount of bloodshed are the most important to the congress.*" [emphasis mine][34]

The exhibition of Geronimo and other former enemies of the United States such as Sitting Bull served as a touchstone of American progress.[35] Americans could gaze on their vanquished enemies with a twofold purpose. First, to acknowledge their triumph over a terrible obstacle on the road to progress. Second, as a way of reconciling the bloody nature of that triumph of empire with the foundation of the country as a democratic republic.

**Ishi: The Greatest Anthropological Treasure Ever Captured[36]**

The Yahi Indian who came to be known as Ishi was the last survivor of his tribal group. Through murder, disease, and devastation to food supply, Ishi's people had slowly been killed off until by 1908, he was alone in the world. For the next three years, he survived by avoiding white people until one day in bitter despair spawned by his near starvation and total isolation, he wandered into the town of Oroville, California. Upon being sighted by some townspeople, the sheriff was called and Ishi was taken to the local jail.

While in jail, the townspeople discovered that Ishi spoke a language which no one understood. The sheriff contacted the local expert on California Indians, Alfred Kroeber. The sheriff also contacted the Bureau of Indian Affairs requesting direction on what to do with Ishi. While in jail, Ishi was viewed by hundreds of visitors.

Ishi was later transferred to the custody of Alfred Kroeber and the University Museum in San Francisco where he lived until his death in 1916. During his years at the Museum, Ishi was on view on Sunday afternoons.[37] While on view, Ishi usually "demonstrated stringing a bow, or he made fire with the fire drill, or he turned out a chipped arrowhead. ... The chipping became the favorite demon-

stration because Ishi would afterward graciously present the finished arrowhead while the visitors watched."[38]

Ishi's chief appeal was his scientific designation as the last wild man in America. Theodora Kroeber, Alfred's wife, explained Ishi's value to twentieth century science as follows:

> Ishi was the last California Indian—and so far as we know the last Indian in the United States, perhaps in North America—to have lived his whole life up to his capture without modification of his indigenous Stone Age culture, house, clothing, tools, food; all he did and how he did it, as well as his religion, his code, his social values, his judgments, remained within the ancestral Yahi specialization of the aboriginal pan-Californian life-pattern.[39]

As in the case of Geronimo, numerous entrepreneurs approached Ishi's 'handlers' with offers to exhibit Ishi in various venues.[40] A number of the filmmakers wished to film Ishi and exhibit him in his 'aboriginal state' after the showing of the film.[41]

## Conclusion

In examining the sources for this research note, I detected a shift in the politics of displaying indigenous peoples at the end of the nineteenth century. During most of the nineteenth century, native others were frequently displayed as freaks. Sander Gilman points out that in Western culture those who are different from white, middle class, heterosexual males are considered pathological.[42] Difference was equated with pathology and pathology holds a special fascination in Western culture. Thus, in nineteenth century culture the category of freaks included giants, dwarfs, bearded ladies and indigenous peoples. The exotic was treated like a deformity like being born without arms or legs. In his book *Freak Show*, Richard Bogdan explains the links between pathology or freakishness and the display of indigenous peoples:

> Display of non-Westerners in freak shows was not intended as a cross-cultural experience to provide patrons with real knowledge of the ways of life and thinking of a foreign group of people. Rather, it was a money-making activity that prospered by embellishing exhibits with exaggerated, bogus presentations emphasizing their strange customs and beliefs. Showmen took people who were culturally and ancestrally non-Western and made them freaks by casting them as bizarre and exotic: cannibals, savages, and barbarians.[43]

At the same time, a mood of imperialist nostalgia underlay the politics of display.[44] Imperialist nostalgia, a term coined by anthropologist Renato Rosaldo, describes the longing of the conqueror for the period at the beginning of contact with the native other. The colonizer longs for the time when the colonized had not yet been subjugated. In other words, the colonizer pines for the good old days when the native other was more dramatically native and other. Rosaldo points out that "the peculiarity of their yearning, of course, is that agents of colonialism long for the very forms of life they intentionally altered or destroyed."[45]

## Epilogue

In addition to Gomez-Peña and Fusco's 'Couple in the Cage' described in the preamble to this essay, a number of contemporary native artists problematize the history of displaying indigenous peoples in their art. James Luna, a Luiseño/Digueño Indian, directly addressed the problematic of museums and native display in his "Artifact Piece". In the "Artifact Piece", Luna put himself and some of his personal possessions on display in typical, museum-style glass cases in the Indian section of San Diego's Museum of Man. Signs on the cases indicated various features of the 'artifacts' on display:

> Having been married less than two years, emotional scars from alcoholic family backgrounds

> were cause for showing fears of giving, communicating and mistrust.
>
> Skin callus on ring finger remains, along with assorted painful and happy memories.[46]

Luna's "Artifact Piece" deconstructs the colonial display of Native Americans. Jean Fisher, artist and critic, points out that part of the impact of "Artifact Piece" was the suspense created by the fact that Luna could open his eyes and return the colonial gaze:

> There is a diabolic humor in this parody of the 'Indian' in the realm of the 'undead.' But Luna's work does not look back in any literal sense; it does not simply *reverse* the gaze. (To do so would be to accept the terms of established structures of power, which was a limitation of political activism in art of the 1970s.) If the purpose of the undead Indian of colonialism is to secure the self-identity of the onlooker, the shock of his real presence and the possibility that he may indeed be watching and listening disarms the voyeuristic gaze and denies it its structuring power.[47]

By playing with the historical practice of displaying native peoples, Luna effectively reclaims his subjectivity thereby decoding/subverting/exploding the panopticon.[48]

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*My title is taken from Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett's article "Objects of Ethnography" in which she describes the problematic nature of displaying human beings. "It is one thing, however, when ethnography is inscribed in books or displayed behind glass, at a remove in space, time and language from the site described. It is quite another when people themselves are the medium of ethnographic representation, when they perform themselves, whether at home to tourists or at world's fairs, homeland entertainments, or folklife festivals—when they become *living signs of themselves*." [emphasis mine] Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, "Objects of Ethnography" in *Exhibiting*

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*Cultures: The Poetics and Politics of Museum Display* eds. Ivan Karp & Steven Lavine (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1991): 386-443, pp. 387-88.

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1. Achy Obejas, "Pushing the Borders of Art: Caged Players Reach Across Cultural Chasms" *Chicago Tribune*, January 28, 1993, p. 1 of Tempo section.

2. See, generally, Rick Vanderknyff, "Artists Behind Bars; Exhibit at UCI Puts Caged Aborigines in Their 'Natural Habitat'", *Los Angeles Times*, March 3, 1992, p. F1; Cathy Cutiss, "A Safe Look At Aborigines in Captivity; 2 'Specimens' Are Displayed Behind Bars for Crowd Attending 'Year of White Bear' at UCI" *Los Angeles Times*, March 5, 1992, p. F2 ("They were simply the latest in a long line of curious specimens from outlandish spaces to be displayed for the edification and curiosity of Westerners. A wall chart outlined a number of these public showings, from an Arawak Indian left on display for two years in the Spanish Court in 1493 (he died of 'sadness') to the 13 Ubangis (including 'the nine largest-lipped women in the Congo') proudly presented to the paying public in 1931 by the Ringling Brothers."); Jan Breslauer, "Cultural Politics; Happy Quincentennial, Christopher Columbus!..." *Los Angeles Times*, October 11, 1992, p. C5 ("In Spain, where there is little tradition of such site-specific performance and where the event wasn't pre-announced, as is usually the case with artworks, the majority of visitors 'believed it was an ethnographic display,' Gomez-Peña says. 'Even in Minneapolis, a good 30%-40% believed it. And the really shocking thing is they don't complain."); Pamela Sommers, "The Couple in the Cage", *The Washington Post*, October 20, 1992, p. E3; Achy Obejas, "Live Art Framed by Bars; Cage Comes to Field Museum" *Chicago Tribune*, January 18, 1993, p. 14 ("Although clues abounded to the true nature of the show, most onlookers believed Gomez-Peña and Fusco were really human subjects.")

3. In addition to newspaper accounts, the preceding account is taken from Fusco 1992. Fusco and Gomez-Peña include the cage piece as part of a larger multi-media project for the Quincentenniary she and Gomez-Peña are working on entitled "The Year of the White Bear". Walker Art Center Catalogue, "Guillermo Gomez-Peña and Coco Fusco: The Year of the White

Bear". See also, C. Carr, "Is It Real or Is It? Identity and the Beholder" *LA Weekly*, July 3-July 9, 1992, p. 37.

4. Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, (New York: Vintage Books, ed. 1979).

5. Ibid, p. 298.

6. Ibid, p. 200.

7. Ibid, p. 202.

8. Ibid, pp. 202-203.

9. Michael Ignatieff, *A Just Measure of Pain: The Penitentiary in the Industrial Revolution, 1750-1850*, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), p. 78.

10. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, p. 112.

11. Ibid, p. 203.

12. Ignatieff, *A Just Measure of Pain*, p. 214. At the beginning of the 19th century, Bentham's panopticon was rejected by Parliament as a model for England's prison system. After an initial period of rejection, a number of British prisons were built using a modified version of the panopticon. Ignatieff, *A Just Measure of Pain*, p. 112. However, the panopticon was embraced by the United States at the beginning of the 19th century and prisons continued to be built based on this model until 1929. For additional information on the relationship between the American prison system and the Bentham panopticon, see Norman Johnston, *The Human Cage: A Brief History of Prison Architecture* (New York: Walker and Co., 1973); Blake McKelvey, *American Prisons: A History of Good Intentions* (Montclair, NJ: Patterson Smith, 1977); David J. Rothman, *The Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and Disorder in the New Republic* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., revised ed. 1990), especially Chap. 4: "The Invention of the Penitentiary", pp. 79-108.

13. Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, "Objects of Ethnography", pp. 402-403. One of the most famous of the early cases of indigenous peoples being exhibited is that of the so-called "Hottentot Venus" who was first exhibited in a cage suspended over a stage in London in 1810. Richard Altick, *The Shows of London* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1978), pp. 268-272. Saartjie Baartmen, aka the Hottentot Venus, was a servant of Dutch farmers in South Africa. A relative of Saartjie's employer came up with the idea of displaying her in Europe. His interest in displaying her was due to her pronounced buttocks. This condition, called steatopygia, was not uncommon in Khoi-san people (termed Hottentot by the Europeans). Saartjie was promised half the profits from her exhibition, money which she apparently never received. After a grand tour of England, she was also exhibited in France where she died of small pox in 1815. See Sander Gilman, *Difference and Pathology: Stereotypes of Sexuality, Race and Madness* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), chap. 3. Khoi-san women were also known for a sexual anomaly of their genitalia. Saartjie refused to be exhibited naked and so during her life this aspect of her body was not available to the public or scientific gaze. However, after death the famous French anatomist Cuvier dissected Saartjie and wrote and published a report on the autopsy. After the

dissection, Saartjie's genitalia were placed in a jar and put on display in the Musse de l'Homme in Paris (where they still reside today). Gilman, *Difference and Pathology*, p. 88; Stephen Jay Gould, *The Flamingo's Smile: Reflections in Natural History* (New York: Norton, 1985), pp. 291-305. That which she prided herself on protecting in life, had been literally ripped from her was (and is) available for all to see. After Saartjie's death, other African women were exhibited in Europe under the title "Hottentot Venus". Gilman, *Difference and Pathology*, p. 88.

14. Paul Greenhalgh, *Ephemeral Vistas: The Expositions Universelles, Great Exhibitions and World's Fairs, 1851-1939* (Manchester University Press, 1988), pp. 86-88.

15. Angie Debo, *Geronimo: The Man, His Time, His Place* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976), pp. 59-94.

16. Debo points out that Geronimo said he was born in June 1829, however, other evidence suggests that he may have been born a few years earlier. Debo, *Geronimo*, p. 7.

17. Ibid, p. 35.

18. Ibid, pp. 95-298.

19. Ibid, p. 270.

20. For several months, Geronimo and his fellow [male] warriors were quartered separately from the women and children at Fort Pickens, Florida. Ibid, pp. 320-329.

21. Ibid, p. 326.

22. Ibid, pp. 330-331.

23. The preceding account is taken from Eve Ball, *Indeh: An Apache Odyssey* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, ed. 1988), and Debo, *Geronimo*.

24. For additional information on world's fairs and the exhibition of indigenous peoples, see Burton Benedict, "The Anthropology of World's Fairs" in *The Anthropology of World's Fairs: San Francisco's Panama Pacific International Exposition of 1915* Burton Benedict, ed., (London & Berkeley: The Lowie Museum of Anthropology, 1983), pp. 1-65; John Findling, ed., *Historical Dictionary of World's Fairs and Expositions, 1851-1988* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990); Paul Greenhalgh, *Ephemeral Vistas: The Expositions Universelles, Great Exhibitions and World's Fairs, 1851-1939* (Manchester University Press, 1988); Robert Rydell, *All the World's A Fair: Visions of Empire at American International Expositions, 1876-1916* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984).

25. J.W. Buel, ed., *Louisiana and the Fair: An Exposition of the World, Its Peoples and Their Achievements* (Saint Louis, MO: World's Progress Publishing Co., 1905), 10 vols, vol. 1: p. 7.

26. Greenhalgh, *Ephemeral Vistas*, p. 82.

27. Debo, *Geronimo*, p. 400.

28. Ibid, pp. 404-405.

29. Ibid, p. 407.

30. Ibid, pp. 410-411.
31. Ibid, pp. 407-408.
32. Ibid, p. 408.
33. Jay Mechling's work on authentic Seminole tourist villages demonstrates that one of the primary attractions of the villages was the myth of the Seminole as 'America's last undefeated Indian tribe.' Jay Mechling, "Florida Seminoles and the Marketing of the Last Frontier", unpublished paper presented on November 8, 1992 at the Annual American Studies Meeting in Costa Mesa, California.
34. "The Omaha Exposition and the Indian Congress", *Scientific American*, October 15, 1898, pp. 248-249, p. 248.
35. Richard Slotkin, *Gunfighter Nation: The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth-Century America* (New York: HarperPerennial, 1992), pp. 63-87.
36. This phrase comes from a 1911 newspaper article about Ishi: 'They [the anthropologists] have put Ishi—'the Man'—under the microscope out at the Affiliated Colleges. The professors are gloating, for he opens a new world to them. He is the greatest anthropological treasure they have ever captured." Philip Kinsley, "Untainted Life Revealed by Aborigine" *San Francisco Examiner*, September 6, 1911, p. 101 reprinted in *Ishi the Last Yahi: A Documentary History*. Lest we comfort ourselves with the knowledge that these words express attitudes which are in the distant past, a reviewer of the 1978 made-for-television movie about Ishi described Ishi as "a living casebook of the American past for the anthropologist who befriended him." Tom Shales, "Haunting, Artful 'Ishi': Striking Drama of the Last of the Yahi", *The Washington Post*, December 20, 1978, p. E1.
37. Theodora Kroeber, *Ishi in Two Worlds: A Biography of the Last Wild Indian in North America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), p. 136.
38. Kroeber, *Ishi in Two Worlds*, p. 136.
39. Robert Heizer & Theodora Kroeber, *Ishi the Last Yahi: A Documentary History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), p. 2.
40. Heizer & Kroeber, *Ishi the Last Yahi*, p. 105.
41. Kroeber, *Ishi in Two Worlds*, pp. 131-132.
42. Gilman, *Difference and Pathology*.
43. Robert Bogdan, *Freak Show: Presenting Human Oddities for Amusement and Profit* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 177.
44. Renato Rosaldo, *Culture & Truth: The Remaking of Social Analysis* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989), pp. 68-87. My thinking in this area has been greatly influenced by the writing of bell hooks. In particular, her essay "Revolutionary 'Renegades': Native Americans, African Americans, and Black Indians" in bell hooks, *Black Looks: race and representation* (Boston, Ma: South End Press, 1992), pp. 179-194.
45. Rosaldo, *Culture and Truth*, p. 69.

46. James Luna, "The Artifact Piece", *Fiction International*, 18 (1987): pp. 38-42. Luna also performed this piece at the Studio Museum in Harlem as part of "The Decade Show: Frameworks of Identity in the 1990s" in New York City in 1990. *Art in America*, 79 (January 1991): pp. 56-62.

47. Jean Fisher, "In Search of the 'Inauthentic': Disturbing Signs in Contemporary Native American Art" *Art Journal*, vol. 51 (Fall 1992): 44-50, pp. 48-49.

48. An extended analysis of Luna's 'Artifact Piece' is beyond the scope of this paper, but will be the subject of a future project. However, I would like to make two points: (1) the 'Artifact Piece' does not just comment on historical displays of native peoples—it is also a statement about contemporary displays of native peoples and objects in museums and contemporary native lives on reservations; (2) as with the display of Ishi at the museum and Geronimo at World's Fairs, no one has ever asked indigenous peoples how they feel about being on display. To my knowledge, no one has ever asked James Luna what it felt like to perform the 'Artifact Piece'. He has said that it was physically painful and psychologically demoralizing. James Luna, "James Luna: Greatest Hits, Volume I", Performance for the Biannual Native American Art Studies Association Meeting, November 5, 1993, Santa Fe, New Mexico.

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# BOOK REVIEWS

**James Grant. *Money of the Mind: Borrowing and Lending in America from the Civil War to Michael Milken*. New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1992, 442 pp. + notes.**

A history of debt in the United States could not have come at a more poignant time. Policy-makers, consumers and financial elites are all struggling to free themselves from the excess debt acquisitions of the Reagan-Bush era. *Money of the Mind* attempts to place this crisis in an historical context. The work is limited primarily to a discussion of consumer debt and corporate debt as well as lending by major financial institutions, i.e. banks, savings and loans, and thrifts. Conveniently, national debt is alluded to only in asides—not as an integral part of the argument. Had Grant addressed this issue he would have had a much longer work and would have had to reconsider his anti-state bias.

The author, James Grant, is in a unique position to speculate on the transformation of credit and current problems in the debt markets as the publisher of *Grant's Interest Rate Observer*. This newsletter was launched over five years ago by Grant after he had left *Barron's*. The newsletter's target audience is buyers of debt and financial analysts. It has consistently railed against foolish borrowing, especially loans to the Third World, leveraged buy-outs and junk bonds—in an "irreverent" style. Grant is a fiscal conservative par excellence. Ironically, his principal villain in *Money of the Mind* is one of the primary players in the bond market, where he has made his living, U.S. Government. Despite the fact that the national government has been central to money markets at various times, the state is pointed to as a borrower only in passing. Grant is concerned almost exclusively with the regulatory function of the central state.

Grant maintains that the two primary trends that shaped economy of the 1980s and its crisis were the "democratization of debt" and the "socialization of risk". Democratization of debt is the gradual process by which lending by financial institutions slowly spread to encompass almost all consumers - or at least those who

could obtain a credit card. Grant explains that democratization grew out of the success of turn of the century philanthropic organizations and pawn shops. Moreover, banks became more willing to look to consumers as well as corporations to borrow—to individuals on farms, houses, and small businesses, to corporations on acquisitions, consolidations, and improvement of plant. Socialization of risk is state backing of financial institutions. Thus, deposit insurance and the Federal Reserve are the two most powerful agents of transferring risk from the stockholders, depositors, and corporate managers to the federal government and, ultimately, the taxpayer. If in fact these are the two most important factors in our present credit crisis than borrowing by the national government is secondary. Grant stops short of criticizing Reagan for the logarithmic increase in the national debt and its synergy with other forms of the culture of debt. His own ideological position and conscious effort to avoid treating the national debt points to Grant's possible support of Reaganomics.

According to Grant, the good old days of laissez-faire and good banking judgment were the late nineties and early twentieth century when J. P. Morgan, George Baker, and James Stillman rescued the American economy, i.e. the gold panic of 1895. This noble act "saved" the nation from bankruptcy (p. 75). Of course, the nation really was not in that much trouble because the "hard times of the 1890s . . . yielded [little in the way of] radical politics" (p. 73). Surely, William Jennings Bryan, Tom Watson, Ignatius Donnelly, and Eugene Debs would have disagreed. The populists clearly saw that some inflation would go a long way to relieve the burden of debt and the rigidities in the currency system—they were not advocates for the destruction of capitalism. However, with the gold standard saved and the repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase the United States continue its whiggish march in lockstep with the drummer of the eastern financial community.

For Grant things started to go wrong during the Money Trust Investigation and the subsequent development of the Federal Reserve System. The Federal Reserve gradually wrested control of the American economy from the hands of the New York financial community and placed it in hands of the Federal Government.

Concurrent with this development was the realization by some bankers that consumers were a huge and largely untapped market for lending. Grant states that "World War I marked the great divide in American credit." (p. 145) Things went down hill from this point but fluctuated with the business cycle as psychological pressures drove bull markets and bears ruled triumphantly in depressions and recessions. Important factors did change the course of developments for the worse, especially government intervention: free floating currencies, entering Bretton Woods[1], federally insured bank deposits, leaving Bretton Woods, government funded mortgages, farm subsidies. All these developments led to an ever expanding market for credit that peaked in the 1980s, a period of unprecedented borrowing by corporations and aggressive capitalists, the state and the consumer. The introduction of junk bonds, pyramiding schemes, precarious bank balance sheets, and the disastrous savings and loans debacle were the result.

Grant has an interesting and engaging writing style. Offering a morality play of sorts, he engages the reader by focusing on individuals who represent archetypal figures for the period but with radically different points of view on the practice of lending within a given period. The personalization may be useful but it often obscures the many debates and actions within various periods as well as dilutes the sophistication of Grant's analysis—what were J. P. Morgan and Jacob Schiff's view of credit during the turn of the century as opposed to George Baker? Grant portrays a dichotomy of opinion where a spectrum exists. Moreover, it is not clear why particular figures were chosen to typify a given period.

While *Money of the Mind* is informative and fairly tightly argued, it fails to offer a vision of political economy (a serious defect in a book so concerned with the democratization of debt and the socialization of risk). In part, Grant's libertarian leanings limit his conception of the state to a mere check on the proper functioning of

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1. Bretton Woods was an agreement forged by the major industrialized nations in 1944. The agreement instituted a relatively stable currency exchange system between those participating countries by using the dollar as a base rather than gold. It also established the International Monetary Fund to help nations even out their currency problems.

the market. His conceptual model is consistent with his general conservatism in theory relying in part on the work of Milton Friedman and David Stockman who he thanks in his acknowledgments (as well as others). Grant views regulation as a detriment to the economy despite the incredible abuses of the 1980s. The state is neither captured by powerful interest groups nor a black box that regulates for the good of society, but more a brake on, or a wrench in the works of the economy. This allows Grant to use without qualification the reports of bank examiners (p. 69-70) and to omit important cooperation between government officials and businessmen, i.e. the famous Nelson W. Aldrich-Jekyll Island meeting[2] or Reagan business appointees. His hero is Grover Cleveland, that champion of the gold standard and government by negation (p. 7).

Ironically, Grant does not present any model for the effect of debt on the economy. Generally, he is disdainful of debt but does admit that it was important for growth in certain circumstances. Though he does give a fairly comprehensive description of most forms of institutional debt among the poor and middle income groups, he leaves out a detailed history of the development and spread of credit cards as well as governmental debt.

Despite numerous criticisms, *Money of the Mind* is an important addition to a neglected field of study. Grant brings to bear his years of experience in analyzing credit to a subject crucial to the understanding of the 1980s and 1990s.

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2. Senator Nelson Aldrich of Rhode Island met with bankers from the major New York banks in November of 1910 to formulate plans for a central banking system. They met at Jekyll Island. Their plan would become the Federal Reserve System with important modifications demanded by Senator Carter Glass of Virginia.

**Mark D. Meyerson. *The Muslims of Valencia in the Age of Fernando and Isabel: Between Coexistence and Crusade.* Berkeley, University of California Press: 1991, 372 pp.**

Historians of medieval and early modern Spain, particularly those interested in the crown's treatment of its Muslim and Jewish subjects, will find Mark Meyerson's new book an important, revisionist addition to the historiography. His research is thorough, his arguments are convincing, and many of the theories in this work are quite original. Meyerson focuses on the Mudejars, or Muslims living under Christian rule, of the kingdom of Valencia during the reign of Fernando II (1479-1516). Fernando held the throne of the Realms of Aragon, a conglomeration of states which included Valencia, and which had a long history of expansion and trade in the Mediterranean. His wife Isabel ruled over the Crown of Castile, whose society was geared more strongly toward crusading against the Muslim states of the peninsula. Together the Catholic Monarchs introduced the Inquisition throughout their realms between 1478 and 1483 to prevent *conversos*, or converts from the Jewish faith, from backsliding into Jewish practices; they expelled the Jews, who had been integral to Iberian society and economy since ancient times, from their kingdoms in 1492; they unleashed the fanatic Cardinal Cisneros in the newly-conquered kingdom of Granada in 1499, where he pushed the resident Muslims into revolt and forcibly converted thousands; and in 1502, they faced the remaining Muslims from the kingdoms of Castile and Granada with the choice of conversion or expulsion. Historians have traditionally studied this chain of events and assumed a conscious policy of religious purification on the part of the Monarchs. Meyerson, however, studying the Mudejars who were allowed and even encouraged to remain in the Crown of Aragon until later reigns, offers convincing proof that Fernando and probably even Isabel had no intention of effecting any sort of ethnic cleansing.

Meyerson presents the thesis that the Monarchs' actions with respect to their subject religious minorities were not part of any grand scheme, but were rather always reactions to certain types of events. Many modern historians such as J. N. Hillgarth have concluded that Fernando and Isabel preferred to rule according to the traditions of their predecessors and innovated only when forced to by circumstances. Christian monarchs had traditionally ruled over members of the three religions in Spain for more than seven hundred years. Fifteenth-century circumstances, however, had changed dramatically, beginning with the peninsula-wide pogroms in 1391, during which one third of the Jewish population was forcibly converted to the Christian faith. A new religious group now existed in Spain, the *conversos*, whose very presence destabilized considerably the traditional modus vivendi. The Catholic Monarchs felt themselves responsible for the vulnerable souls of these neo-Christians; the Inquisition, therefore, was instituted by the Monarchs in order to combat the judaizing tendencies of many of these reluctant lambs of God. When Fernando and Isabel came to the conclusion that this institution alone, no matter how ruthless its methods, was not enough to save the *converso* souls, they took the next step of expelling the Jews from their lands so that their readily witnessed, familiar traditions would not tempt the new Christians into sinful ways. The Monarchs' goal for the expulsion, therefore, was not to cleanse the land of Jews, but rather to protect a segment of their Christian population.

As Meyerson shows, a similar situation arose with the Mudejars of Granada and Castile. When Isabel (against Fernando's wishes) sent Cardinal Cisneros to proselytize to the Granadan Muslims, his harsh methods led to rebellions in certain parts of the kingdom. The defeated rebels were faced with the choice of baptism or death. Again, a large body of unenthusiastic New Christians, called Moriscos, was formed. Working from their experiences with the *conversos*, Fernando and Isabel decided that the Moriscos would not learn to be good Christians until they were isolated from their Muslim friends and kinsmen. In 1502, therefore, they rid Castile and Granada of all remaining Mudejars. Once again, their actions were

given impulse not by a policy of the creation of a unified state, but rather by their self-perception as the protectors of Christian souls, a role which they considered more important than that of protectors of their kingdoms' economies.

After laying out his general arguments in the introduction and beginning of the first chapter of his book, Professor Meyerson proceeds to the specific case of the Muslims of Valencia, the study of whom provides the basis for his theories. The first chapter is concerned with Fernando's Mudejar policy as it affected Valencia, where Muslims made up thirty percent of the population. A Morisco problem did not exist in the Crown of Aragon until 1525, when the *Germanias* social uprising resulted in violent, mass conversions. During Fernando's reign, therefore, the situation remained status quo, with the Mudejars living and working beside the kingdom's Christians much as they always had. The Mudejars not only posed no threat to Morisco souls, they were a definite source of wealth for the crown's coffers and a mainstay of the Valencian economy. Meyerson provides plentiful evidence that the king actively competed with the seigneurs of his kingdom for the tenancies of large numbers of Mudejars—while the king was patron of all his Muslim subjects, those who lived on seigneurial lands paid feudal dues and taxes to their lords, which income the king felt he could better employ. The king and his nobles sometimes went to great lengths to lure Mudejars away from each other's territories. Fernando also protected the Mudejars in the royal courts; but since they were tolerated among Christians only for economic reasons, their oppressors were seldom punished beyond a sentence of financial restitution because the Mudejars' financial health was advantageous to the crown. Fernando and his predecessors did not practice 'tolerance' in the modern, post-Enlightenment sense towards his Muslim subjects. Fernando's religious zeal differed from Isabel's in that he preferred less forceful, more persuasive methods be used to convert the infidels. He was also practical enough to realize that the Mudejars were not going to convert voluntarily. He therefore pursued the policy which was most economically beneficial, while disregarding his own aversion to Islam and legislating to isolate wherever possible his

Christian subjects from exposure to the Mudejars' offensive religious practices.

In chapter 2, Meyerson addresses the larger context of the ongoing war between the Spanish powers and various Islamic polities, and its effect on Fernando's Mudejar policy. His basic question is, with Spanish Christians crusading against the infidel in Granada and the Maghrib and against the Ottoman Turks, why did they not turn against the Muslims next door? Also, the Valencian Mudejars had often risen up in the past against their oppressors, particularly in the thirteenth century after the region's conquest by King Jaume I. Why, with the religious confrontation intensifying and their fellow Muslims being expelled from Castile and Granada, did the Mudejars not revolt now? Meyerson answers the latter question by pointing out that, though they did cooperate covertly with the Ottomans, collude occasionally with Muslim raiders, and send money to the sultan of Granada, the Mudejars were practical enough to know that their numbers were nowhere near as overwhelming as they had been two hundred years earlier. They assessed the realities of the situation, the relative powers of the combating forces, and acted accordingly. Also, they were more accepting of their secondary status within Valencian society and more pessimistic about the possibility of the Islamic reconquest of the region. The Christians, on the other hand, had also become accustomed to coexisting beside the Mudejars, were aware of their economic role in the kingdom, and therefore did not become confused between the Muslim abroad and the Muslim at home. Because of the Crown of Aragon's mercantile orientation, the region's inhabitants were accustomed to perceiving war in the Mediterranean as a defense of mercantile interests, and therefore were not as overwhelmed by religious zeal as their Castilian neighbors. Fernando shared this history; his Mudejar policy, therefore, was hardly affected by his international Islamic engagements.

The next three chapters of *The Muslims of Valencia* are much more revealing of the book's origins as a doctoral dissertation. While they are quite polished, the basis for these chapters is the organization and interpretation of archival data relating to Mudejar life in fifteenth-century Valencia. Chapter three, entitled "Mudejar

Officialdom and Economic Life," explains the roles and relative importance of officials and describes the social hierarchy within the aljama, or Mudejar corporate municipal community. It also provides quite a bit of interesting detail relating to the variety and range of Mudejar economic activity: fifteenth-century Mudejars engaged in livestock-raising, manufacturing, commerce, and primarily agriculture. Meyerson's conclusions relating to their land-tenure patterns could prove relevant to many historians interested in agrarian studies. The next chapter, "Taxation of the Mudejars," provides a great deal of information, much of it presented also in clear and helpful charts, on those outlays which so affected the workings and viability of the Mudejar community. Chapter five, "Mudejars and the Administration of Justice," gives the reader fascinating insight into how the Muslims fit into the judicial system. The traditional model for religious minority communities, which had been concretized in Valencia by the privileges granted in the surrender constitutions of the thirteenth century and confirmed by all subsequent Aragonese rulers, included the right to maintenance of a separate, religion-based legal system. Meyerson shows how the Mudejar courts had been largely infiltrated by Christian officials and procedures in the fifteenth century, but argues that the Mudejars had learned how to function in such circumstances and therefore were seldom denied justice.

Each of these three technical chapters is thorough and enlightening, but somewhat limited by the sparsity of analysis of historical processes and the lack of relation of the data to comparable contexts. The final chapter, "Conflict and Solidarity in Mudejar Society," while structured similarly to the previous three, reaches a new height of originality, completion, and relevance. Although the surviving documents of the period are all issued from the point of view of the Christian majority and therefore only give an external glimpse into Mudejar life, the author uses a variety of tools, many anthropological, to delve beyond these restrictive documents and lay out a more intimate view of the workings of the aljama. He considers the challenge posed to the integrity of Mudejar culture by long exposure and accommodation to the dominant culture of the Christians, and

recounts many of the methods by which the Muslims resisted acculturation. Perhaps more interestingly, he describes the Mudejar social structure as it had evolved from their Berber and Arab forbears and how this inheritance resulted in the Mudejar institution of the blood-feud. Such cultural particularities, as much as their religion, differentiated the Mudejars from their Christian neighbors; the dominant society, however, never realized the depth of these cultural differences, and therefore never understood truly why baptism alone did not a Christian make.

These final chapters of the book provide a careful portrait of Mudejar society in Valencia during the reign of Fernando. Robert I. Burns has written a masterful series of books detailing the Valencian Mudejar experience from the time of the region's conquest (1232-1245) until the end of the thirteenth century, through its first formative decades when the impact of Christian rule was most disruptive. John Boswell wrote *The Royal Treasure: Muslim Communities under the Crown of Aragon in the Fourteenth Century* as a dissertation in 1977. In this work, he concentrates on the Mudejars of Valencia during the middle 1300s when the war against Castile was at its destructive height; the portrait he paints of Mudejar life is even more disheartening than that of Meyerson or Burns. Many historians have studied the Moriscos, who replaced the Mudejars after 1525 and were finally expelled from Valencia and the rest of Spain in 1609-1614. Meyerson's work fits into the chronological lacuna of the fifteenth century, which only a few other historians have even touched and none with anywhere near the seriousness and insight of Meyerson. For those interested in Mudejar society and its evolution in the region most densely populated and affected by their presence, this book, along with the others described above, is indispensable. Those whose interests range toward other topics such as peasant life or the Spanish crown's treatment of subject minorities will also find this work quite useful.

The book has a few weaknesses. The various sections sometimes seem disjunctive in tone between one another, a fault which can probably be traced to the book's origins as a dissertation. These variations in emotional approach, commonly from optimism to pes-

simism, can be quite jarring, and could have been avoided with careful editing. Also, the author follows the policy of leaving all the names, primarily Muslim, which he cites as examples in the form in which he found them in the documents. The Christian scribes who recorded the documents transcribed the names with varying degrees of skill as they befell on non-Arabic-speaking ears. Names which seem different in Latin or Romance could actually prove to be variants. Further research by the author to reach educated guesses as to what the Arabic names might actually have been, as Burns does in his works, might yield a wealth of further information about family relations and social structures.

The greatest failing of the book, however, is its tendency to study the situation as a tree alone, without siting it in its forest. Meyerson proves quite convincingly that in many ways fifteenth-century circumstances were quite advantageous to the Mudejars of Valencia, particularly to the agricultural workers. For example, land was available and the conditions of tenure were comparatively favorable, as the crown and the seigneurs were competing for Mudejar tenants. Meyerson relates this situation to a state of under-population and a chronic labor shortage in the kingdom. This problem, however, was traumatically affecting all of Europe, which had been ravaged by plagues and famines during the previous century. Historians of this period have long been attempting to puzzle out the effects of this general depopulation on the social structures of Europe, according to the varying reactions of social groups to the crisis. Meyerson's detailed data, if related to the general situation, would have provided a valuable addition to the historiography of the fall of the feudal order.

The few weaknesses of the book, however, are overwhelmed in number and importance by its many strengths. This work is highly recommended, and should prove very fruitful to any historian.

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**Steven Loza. *Barrio Rhythm: Mexican American Music in Los Angeles*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1993. xvii + 285 pages. Pictures, notes, sources, discography, and index.**

Scholars of immigration and ethnic studies have grappled with controversies surrounding the processes of acculturation and assimilation. These themes are especially pertinent in Chicano cultural history, in part because of issues associated with the proximity of the Mexican border, cyclical patterns of immigration, and the culture of the borderlands. These experiences tend to continually redefine what is "traditional" in both Mexican and Mexican-American cultures. Indeed, in *Barrio Rhythm*, ethnomusicologist Steven Loza posits that one of the challenges in exploring the extent to which the Chicano subculture will assimilate into the dominant society is tempered by the reality that "Mexico is simply too close--geographically, historically, economically, and in the final analysis, culturally." (page 53)

Loza examines the evolution of Mexican-American music as a process of change, maintenance, and adaptation in Los Angeles, one of the major centers of Chicano group life in the United States. He focuses on the post-World War II years, arguing that "the period marks the emergence of the Mexican American, or Chicano, as a dynamic actor on the American state--north and south of the U.S.-Mexican border." (page xviii) This development in the musical life of L.A.'s Chicano communities resulted from the acceptance, viability, and increase of Mexican Americans and other Latinos in the entertainment industry, including the night club circuits, broadcasting, and movies. In addition, focusing on a contemporary period allowed Loza, himself a musician, to play the role of the "native ethnographer," studying and evaluating other Chicano artists and their shared cultural heritage. He notes how at different times and in varying ways, musicians like Lalo Guerrero, Los Lobos, and Teresa Covarrubias countered the hegemony of the dominant culture

by presenting alternative life experiences which are rooted in a Mexican past.

The flourishing of Mexican American music in Los Angeles reflects the extent to which Chicano musicians have, on the one hand, maintained "traditional" Mexican cultural genres while on the other hand, also transforming and adapting them to contemporary styles for a myriad of audiences. This paradox is represented by, for example, the Masked Phantom Band, featuring the Chicano saxophonist Li'l Bobby Rey. In the 1950s, the band mixed the traditional Mexican ballad style of the corrido with the sounds of rock-and-roll in "Corrido Rock," which consisted "of two saxophones playing a norteño-styled riff in harmony, superimposed on a supporting fast rock beat." (page 82) Loza shows how this technique of freely mixing musical styles contributed to a varied assortment of Mexican-American music, as artists incorporated Puerto Rican, Afro-Caribbean, and Latin jazz sounds into their repertoires. Further, this blending of musical genres continues with more recent Chicano groups, including The Alienz, Los Rock Angels, and rappers Kid Frost.

Loza argues that this fluid exchange of cultural artifacts between musicians from a range of ethnic backgrounds and the diversity of Los Angeles itself are major factors in the evolution of the "Eastside sound" beginning in the late 1960s. This emergence coincided with the political activism of the Chicano movement, giving rise to local groups like El Chicano, whose 1971 recording, "'Sabor a mi' became known in some eastside quarters as the 'eastside anthem,' and to this day it is still remembered as one of the most important musical legacies of its period in East Los Angeles." (page 103) Loza posits, however, that among contemporary Chicano musicians from this decade, Los Lobos best depicts the complex cultural processes of maintenance and transformation. The band is well known for its bilingual and rock-and-roll format, receiving a Grammy Award for the best Mexican-American ensemble in 1983 and again in 1989. This critical acclaim came after the band went to Mexico "absorbing ideas, learning music, purchasing instruments, and generally enjoying the journey. They went to learn about their

culture, the source of much of the music that they were re-creating and reinterpreting." (page 237) Thus, the evolution of Chicano popular music in Los Angeles embodies the dynamic processes of borrowing from other genres, preserving selected traditional Mexican styles, and interpreting the diversity of experiences among Chicano people.

Musicians, however, have taken disparate and oftentimes painful journeys in creating this fusion of rhythms and creating identities as Mexican Americans. For example, Loza relates how the difficulties with getting Anglo audiences to accept Guerrero as a mainstream singer compelled him to continue to perform Mexican songs for largely Mexican audiences. Guerrero remembers how in the 1930s, Anglos "couldn't conceive of a Mexican, especially one who looks as Indian as I do, sitting up there and singing Bing Crosby songs." (page 159) But when Guerrero ventured to Mexico, and despite widely-popular Mexican records, Mexicans regarded him as a pocho, a derogatory term for an assimilated Mexican American. Loza delineates how these dilemmas related to forging Mexican American culture and identity continue. These tensions are further complicated by expectations about "traditional" gender roles for women and intergenerational conflicts between Mexican immigrant parents and their children born north of the Rio Grande. For example, Sandra Hahn, a member of Los Illegals, consented to an interview (in October 1984) about her work although her parents did not know that she belonged to a Chicano punk rock band. Hahn told Loza that her parents "wouldn't accept it.... To them, it's just something that you [Chicanas] just don't do." (page 215)

Loza divides his study of Mexican-American music in Los Angeles into three parts: History, Ethnography, and Reflections. The first part examines the complex cultural, political, and socio-economic struggles in the history of the *pueblo*, from its Native American roots, Spanish/Mexican settlement, Anglo conquest and eventual growth as a U.S. metropolis, to the relatively more recent Chicano Movement and Eastside Riots in the post-World War II era. Relying primarily on studies of Los Angeles by Chicano scholars, notably Richard Griswold del Castillo's *The Los Angeles Barrio* (1978)

and Rodolfo Acuña's *A Community Under Seige* (1985), this narrative serves as a succinct background to Loza's forte, the role of Mexican-American music in the lives of Chicanos in and out of the barrio and the fluidity of dialogue across borders. Loza also uses newspaper sections, especially "Mundo Artistico y Social' from *La Opinion*, to trace the growth of, and transformations in, Los Angeles' musical scene. Although a bit thin on analysis, he does provide a good description and chronology of the tremendous expansion of Mexican-American and Latin-based entertainment beginning in the 1950s.

The latter two sections of the book are arguably the most significant, and Loza is clearly in his element talking about music and musical production with fellow musicians. The interviews, conducted in October 1984, contain rich materials not only for examining the development of Chicano music but also for illustrating the diverse experiences, including struggles, failures, and successes, of the fifteen artists who had been instrumental in music originating from Los Angeles since the war years. Their reminisces, oftentimes reflective, convey the humor, determination, and resiliency with which they approach their lives, their legacies, and their music. *Afficionados* will no doubt take notice of Loza's analyses of the musical styles of selected artists ranging from Lalo Guerrero's 1943 *guaracha* "Chucos suaves" to the more contemporary "El Lay (L.A.)" by Los Illegals.

The ethnography section is further divided into two sections, "The War Veterans," which include interviews with Guerrero, Eddie Cano, and Andy Russell; and "Papa's Got a Brand New Bag," which focuses on newer artists like The Brat, Los Illegals, Califas, and Los Lobos. These musicians, however, share some similar problems, for example, marketability in the mainstream recording business remains a tremendous hurdle. For some groups, formal and informal networks in the Chicano community continue to be vital outlets for exposure.

*Barrio Rhythm* makes a significant contribution to Chicano history by showing that continuous, cyclical immigration to and from Mexico influences the cultural developments in Mexico,

Mexican American communities, and the borderlands. Unlike earlier Chicano scholars who had argued that patterns of nineteenth century U.S.-Mexican relations established the boundaries of current and future proceedings, Loza shows that migrations continue to play a crucial role in the creation or rejection of Mexican American identities. This work also makes a contribution to several fields of inquiry, including musicology, urban studies, and the history of Los Angeles.

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